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This thesis examines various issues related to intranational and international trade, 
fiscal decentralization, trade openness, economic diversity, resource curse and 
economic growth – all within a Canada-US sub-national framework.  Chapter 1 
provides the motivation for the study and sets the stage for the various empirical-
based policy trade-offs and insights arrived at in the subsequent chapters.  In chapter 
2, we examine the extent to which trade costs, modeled by distance and contiguity, 
influence the magnitude and direction of both east-west and north-south trade in 
Canada and the US .We provide an alternative framework which pays special 
attention to estimation issues related to unobserved heterogeneity, log-linearization in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity, and logarithmic transformation of zero bilateral 
trade flows.  In all, this thesis provides updated results and garners further evidence in 
support of the home bias argument of McCallum (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000b). Equally, our results uphold the Linder-hypothesis, but refute the Heckscher-
Ohlin factor endowment proposition.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the relative importance of fiscal redistribution and trade 
openness in the economic growth analysis of Canada and the US. Using a dynamic 
panel of Canada-US data, we estimate the importance of redistributive flows based on 
personal income after federal taxes and transfers, and pretax personal income. We 
conclude that there is a clear incidence of “immiserising growth”.  The coefficient of 
the interaction variable gives no evidence of fiscal transfer-induced growth across all 
four major estimators.   Chapter 4 explores the diversity-resource-growth nexus. The 
first major conclusion is that the diversity measures employed are arbitrary because 
both the absolute and relative specialization measures, on which they are based, are 
arbitrary. We find evidence for a positive direct relationship for the diversity-growth 
nexus. Due to statistically insignificant coefficients, the GMM framework does not 
provide us with predictive power to test the resource curse proposition. However, 
through the fixed effects technique, we provide evidence for the role of economic 
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Chapter 1    Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Motivation and Objectives of the Study 
Intranational trade, international trade, fiscal decentralization, income disparity, trade 
openness, resource curse, economic diversity and growth are fundamental issues of 
significant interest among economists, researchers and policy makers across industry, 
government and academia. Many a times, these issues generate a host of all-or-
nothing propositions that involve policy trade-offs on fairness, efficiency, 
macroeconomic stabilization and growth, among others.  Regardless of the differences 
in geography, economics, institutions and political systems, policy makers everywhere 
ponder, identify and use common tools to analyze various policy scenarios in order to 
realize the fundamental objectives of fairness, efficiency, macroeconomic stabilization 
and growth.   
 
Apart from being each other’s largest trading partner and sharing the world's longest 
border, Canada and the US  share a great deal of common cultural, historical and 
institutional framework. This thesis, therefore, provides a veritable opportunity to 
examine these issues empirically. We do so in three substantive chapters; within the 
gravity framework for the first chapter, and the broad framework of the Solow growth 
model, in a dynamic panel data (DPD) environment, for the other two. 
 
The first issue relates to intranational and international trade. Talking about trade, 
global trade flows over the last several decades have grown exponentially due to 
increased globalization and the gradual disappearance of trade “walls” among nations 
of the world. This continues to leave many wondering about when the notion of a 
“borderless” world would be achieved. About 90% of the Canadian population lives 
within 100 miles of the United States (US) border (Wall, 2000). Despite the huge 
trade flows between both countries, provinces trade with themselves far more than 
adjacent US states, a phenomenon often explained by the presence of international 
borders, and termed ‘home bias’. 
 
We apply the gravity model to assess bilateral trade flows between provinces and 
states in Canada and the US, respectively. Specifically, we estimate a gravity model 
focusing on the border effects and subsequent tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Linder 
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hypotheses, while paying particular attention to the estimation issues. We adopt a 
data-driven approach and in the interest of keeping the model and robustness tests as 
simple as possible, we perform the tests for the baseline model first and then compare 
our results with those obtained from other models. We then offer possible 
interpretations of the results in light of the estimation strategies employed 
 
The second issue examined is the relative importance of intergovernmental fiscal 
redistribution and economic openness in the economic growth process of Canada and 
the US – two federations with different divisions of powers between national and sub-
national governments. No doubt, Canada and the US are two affluent countries. 
However, the various provinces and states that make up both countries are 
characterized by huge income gaps, growth differentials and differences in fiscal 
capacities.  This leads to a major motivation to empirically test the redistributive 
consequences of fiscal transfers, even when it is not a policy objective ex-ante, in 
some instances.   
 
Using a dynamic panel of Canada-US data, selected over short-term periods to 
overcome cyclical factors, we estimate the importance of redistributive flows by 
regressions which estimate the relationship between personal income after federal 
taxes and transfers, and pretax personal income. This gives a direct measure of the 
degree to which fiscal transfers reduce inequalities in regional incomes.  Using the 
difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology, we also empirically evaluate the impact 
of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) policy on income convergence in Canada, 
while controlling for fiscal federalism.  
 
In order to increase the reliability of our econometric estimates, we also introduce a 
number of refinements in the estimation methods. In particular, we pay special 
attention to the difference and system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator in a Canada-US sub-national panel data environment. Most of the latest 
literature examining the fiscal decentralization-growth question tends to rely on cross-
country ordinary least square (OLS) empirical methodology; a few others incorporate 




Last but not least, this thesis contributes to the debate on economic diversity, resource 
curse and economic growth across Canadian and US jurisdictions by using the most 
recent techniques of DPD models.  Canadian and US jurisdictions have a variety of 
policies in place to diversify their economies, but the degree to which the “ideal 
diversity” has been achieved varies. While some states and provinces have a 
concentration of goods-producing sectors making up a substantial part of their 
economies, others have economic structures with heavier weights on the services-
producing sectors.  We estimate a conditional growth model in a Canada-US regional 
growth context to (i) investigate the relationship between economic diversification and 
growth (ii) examine real per capita income as a function of natural resources and a set 
of variables drawn from the existing literature and (iii) take a closer look at the 
transmission channel of the resource curse, with diversity as focus. 
1.2 The Importance of Sub-National Focus 
The academic and policy literature increasingly recognizes that globalization and 
advances in technology have made it important that sub-national regions respond 
flexibly to global economic dynamics – in order to create wealth.   For instance, while 
sub-national jurisdictions with good locational access to international markets may 
benefit substantially from national export promotion policies, a high natural resource 
royalty regime may impact resource-rich jurisdictions more disproportionately.  In a 
way, this shows that successful policy coordination across regional levels of 
government depends, to a large extent, on how national governments adopt different 
institutional responses. To the extent that regional economic diversity allows global 
integration and technological progress to shift economic landscapes, national 
economic policies continue to have differential sub-national impacts. 
 
The three central topics analyzed in this thesis are crosscutting issues; successfully 
integrating them into the policy cycle requires interaction between both national and 
sub-national levels of government. This explains how our approach complements a 
better understanding of trade, intergovernmental fiscal relations, economic diversity 
and the resource curse. We attempt to bridge the gap with a sub-national analysis of 
three topical issues that are traditionally addressed with cross-country frameworks. By 
so doing, we indirectly identify and strengthen the determinants of the effectiveness of 
regional economic analysis.  Our approach provides an opportunity to review best 
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practices and successful policies of various regional jurisdictions in Canada and the 
US, with a view to helping to improve performance at the national levels. Using a sub-
national framework creates a robust platform which, among other things, incorporates 
an institutional setting with regional trade and economic development policies, 
administrative systems, and the nuances of intergovernmental relations.  
 
This thesis focuses on the sub-national level because for Canada and the US, many 
important social and economic characteristics at the sub-national level are expected to 
vary sharply from what is observed at the national levels. This becomes even more 
important because a sub-national framework also serves as a laboratory for testing 
direct policy interventions that enable poorer jurisdictions to benefit from national 
economic growth. That is in addition to ensuring that fairness, equity and efficiency 
are balanced, while the issue of spatial disparity is addressed. 
1.3 The Gravity Model of Trade 
1.3.1 Background 
The gravity equation, which relates trade between two jurisdictions positively to both 
of their sizes and negatively to the distance between them, is one of the most popular 
and successful empirical models in international economics. Pioneered by Tinbergen 
(1962), the model has been widely used because it provides a good fit to intranational 
and international trade flows data. Among other things, the gravity model of trade 
explains why international borders constitute an impediment to trade flows. We apply 
the gravity model to assess bilateral trade flows between provinces and states in 
Canada and the US, respectively.   
 
About 90% of the Canadian population lives within 100 miles of the US border (Wall, 
2000). Despite the huge trade flows between both countries, provinces trade with 
themselves far more than adjacent US states, a phenomenon often explained by the 
presence of international borders, and termed ‘home bias’. The choice of this country-
pair provides a robust jurisdictional framework that allows us to seamlessly model 
various policy issues and scenarios related to trade costs, while paying serious 
attention to estimation issues that have qualified an array of studies in this field. Much 
of our analysis on the border effects build upon two seminal papers in the gravity 
literature: Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and McCallum (1995). They both 
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directly and indirectly make a useful suggestion to policy makers and academic 
economists interested in examining the impact of the border on trade flows:  to 
consider a general equilibrium comparative statics exercise of removing the border in 
order to produce unbiased estimates of the border effects. This is especially important 
considering the fact that the past 30 years have seen regionalism re-emerge as a major 
issue in the policy agenda.  
 
We exploit a large annual panel data set spanning three five-year intervals from 1997 
to 2007 and covering all 10 provinces and 50 states. We follow a more standard 
formulation of the gravity model developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), 
albeit we augment it with a contiguity dummy, differences in relative factor 
endowments and per capita income. That way, we estimate a gravity model focusing 
on the border effects and subsequent tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Linder 
hypotheses, while paying particular attention to the estimation issues. We provide an 
alternative framework which pays special attention to unobserved heterogeneity, log-
linearization in the presence of heteroscedasticity, and logarithmic transformation of 
zero bilateral trade flows.   Our methodology recognizes that in the presence of these 
issues, the biases that are present in the various strategies employed to estimate the 
gravity model often produce misleading estimates of bilateral trade flows 
determinants.   
 
1.3.2 Research Hypotheses 
Following the literature framework and theoretical issues, we advance the following 
six hypotheses in order to answer the research questions posed in this chapter:  
H1: There is a positive effect of economic size on bilateral trade flows between 
trading partners.  
H2: There is a negative effect of geographical distance on bilateral trade flows 
between trading partners.  
H3: There is a stronger negative effect of the border on state-province trade, 
compared to interstate and interprovincial trade.  
H4: There is a stronger negative effect of the border on interprovincial trade, 
compared to interstate trade  
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H5: There is a positive relationship between factor endowment differentials 
and bilateral trade flows.  
H6: There is a negative relationship between per capita income differentials 
and bilateral trade flows.  
 
1.3.3 Findings and Contribution 
For the full sample, we find across all specifications that the coefficients of exporter’s 
GDP, importer’s GDP and bilateral distance are economically significant with 
meaningful interpretations. Estimated elasticities of trade to size and distance are close 
to unity. With a statistically and economically contiguity dummy, we also conclude 
that the presence of a border affects the intensities of economic exchange between a 
jurisdiction-pair, after controlling for bilateral distance. The border effect is more 
pronounced under the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) than when OLS 
is used.   
 
For the sub-samples, statistically and economically significant coefficients of 0.299 
(Canada-US) and 0.362 (US-US) uphold the hypothesis that there is a stronger 
negative effect of the border on international trade, compared to within-country trade. 
Notwithstanding a statistically insignificant border effect for the Canada-Canada sub-
sample, we find with the aid of the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) 
method, after controlling for scale and distance, that interprovincial trade is about 17 
times more important than state-province trade. This upholds the hypothesis that there 
is a stronger negative effect of the border on interprovincial trade, compared to 
interstate trade. This finding is consistent with major findings on the border effect; e.g. 
McCallum (1995), Wall (2000) and Anderson van Wincoop (2003).  
 
We also compute how wide the border is, based on both the distance and border 
effects. Our conclusion is that the unrealistically high distance elasticities in our 
regressions do not help the predictive powers of the methods deployed. Results in this 
chapter provide mixed evidence for the Heckscher-Ohlin proposition and the Linder 
hypothesis; the former is refuted, while the latter is supported. We find that a 100% 
increase in per capita income differential will dampen trade by 7.5% and 19.4% for 
the low and high estimates, respectively.  In stark comparison, negative signs on the 
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coefficients of human capital differential and physical capital stock differential refute 
the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis that jurisdictions should trade more, the more 
different their factor endowments. Similar to the Linder scenario, the Heckscher-Ohlin 
coefficients are economically and statistically significant, ranging from a high 
absolute value of 0.305 to a low value of 0.198. 
 
Overall, the findings in this chapter confirm that the Canada-US border remains a 
major factor that influences the patterns of trade flows between both countries. Our 
statistically and economically significant state-province and within-country border 
effects show a decline in the home bias syndrome for Canadian provinces, reflecting, 
in a way, the effects of NAFTA’s full implementation and AIT’s progress. Our results 
reject the notion that trade is driven by differences in relative factor endowments 
between regions. To the extent that gains from specialization arise because of 
differences between regions, the results fail to pick any sharp contrasts in the resource 
endowments of both countries. 
 
This chapter contributes to the debate on whether or not there is a stronger negative 
effect of the border on interprovincial trade, compared to interstate trade, with 
implications for policy. Among other things, we note that any further reductions in 
US-Canada trade barriers will benefit Canada more disproportionately. The attention 
of policy makers is therefore drawn to the need to continue to favour policies focused 
on reducing Canada-US border thickening. In particular, we identify the joint 
declaration issued by the Canadian and US governments in 2011 tagged, “Beyond the 
Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness”. To 
the extent that this policy is geared towards addressing the trade-off involving border 
security and trade relations, the findings in our study will be a useful empirical guide 
for future negotiations. 
1.4 Fiscal Transfers, Trade Openness and Economic Growth 
1.4.1 Background 
The theory of public finance recognizes the importance of fairness and efficiency in 
resource allocation. An important function of fiscal policy in a federal system is the 
capacity to make continuing income transfers from richer to poorer regions; and for a 
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fact, such transfers play different roles. This chapter examines the relative importance 
of intergovernmental fiscal redistribution and economic openness in the income 
growth process of Canada and the US – two federations with different divisions of 
powers between national and sub-national governments.  The decentralization-growth 
question remains open, as most cross-country econometric studies provide weak 
evidence chiefly because results change depending on the countries examined.  
 
Two major pieces of literature are central to the discussion in this chapter. First, 
Bayoumi and Masson (1993) use fiscal transfers at the sub-national level within the 
US and Canada to analyze long-term fiscal flows (the redistributive element) and 
short-term responses to regional business cycles (the stabilization element). While 
long-run flows amount to 22 cents of every dollar spent while the stabilization effect 
is 31 cents in the dollar for the US, Canada produces a larger redistributive effect (39 
cents) and smaller stabilization effect (17 cents). They conclude that federal flows 
depend on the institutional structure of the country concerned, in addition to providing 
evidence that a federal fiscal system tends to support the relative income of poor 
regions and reduce that of rich regions.  
 
Checherita et al. (2009) use a large sample of European regions covering 19 European 
Union (EU) member states for the 1995-2005 period to analyze the aggregate impact 
of taxation and transfers on income and output convergence. They find evidence in 
support of a convergence process across the member states in terms of both per-capita 
output and income. Their results show that output growth rates in less prosperous 
receiving regions decline by less, compared to contributing more prosperous regions, 
in reaction to the fiscal transfers: a condition termed immiserising convergence.   
 
In this chapter, we look at sub-national regions in both countries that share many 
common characteristics typical of a fiscal union, we control for many jurisdiction-
specific features that might obscure the dynamics of the decentralization-growth 
nexus. Using a dynamic panel of Canada-US data, selected over short-term periods to 
overcome short-term cyclical factors, we estimate the importance of redistributive 
flows by regressions which estimate the relationship between personal income after 
federal taxes and transfers and pretax personal income. This gives a direct measure of 
the degree to which fiscal transfers reduce inequalities in regional incomes. As 
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expected, differences in the economic structures and performances among different 
regions are likely to have an impact on the way fiscal redistribution affects income 
convergence.  
 
In the past, many restrictions on interprovincial trade were prevalent in Canada. Over 
the years, specifically starting in 1995, some efforts to ease trade were made – the 
result of which was the AIT negotiated in 1994 and executed in 1995. While this is 
not the first paper to study the implications of Canada-US interregional fiscal transfers 
for income convergence, it definitely is the first to look at this issue from a pre- and 
post-AIT perspective. Even so, we extend the analysis by applying the DiD 
methodology to better capture the effect of the AIT policy. This is a major 
contribution of this chapter.  
 
We also introduce a number of refinements in the estimation methods in order to 
increase the reliability of our econometric estimates. Special attention is paid to the 
difference and system GMM estimators. Most of the latest literature examining the 
fiscal decentralization-income convergence question tends to rely on cross-country 
OLS empirical methodology; a few others incorporate the FEM.  Applying both 
system and difference GMM estimation techniques is a major advance.   
 
1.4.2 Research Hypotheses 
Summarized, the following seven hypotheses are advanced in this chapter: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between net fiscal transfers and GDP per 
capita.  
H2: There is a different impact of fiscal flows on GDP per capita for 
prosperous and poor regions. 
H3: There is a stronger effect of fiscal transfers and lagged income on GDP per 
capita, compared to the lone effect of fiscal transfers 
H4: There is a positive relationship between trade openness and GDP per 
capita 
H5: The combined effect of lagged income and trade openness on GDP per 
capita is much stronger than the individual effect of trade openness on GDP 
per capita.  




H7: The combined effect of lagged income and the AIT policy on GDP per 
capita is much stronger than the individual effect of the policy on GDP per 
capita.  
 
1.4.3 Findings and Contribution 
Our analysis in this chapter finds evidence for the negative effect of fiscal transfers on 
per capita income; no evidence to comment on the degree to which past income 
distribution is linked to economic growth through fiscal transfers in Canada and the 
US. Based on the reported standard errors, the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample 
correction clearly suggests that the system GMM performs much better than the 
difference GMM model.   
 
The DPD-based method produces a coefficient of 0.875 on the relative net fiscal 
transfers variable, while the non-DPD FEM estimator produces coefficients that range 
from -2.272 to -2.381. We conclude that while the FEM results clearly agree with 
Checherita et al. that net fiscal transfers impede output growth, the system GMM 
technique suggests the opposite. The exact opposite is the case when we model 
relative transfers simply as the ratio of disposable income to personal income. We 
draw a fundamental conclusion: the DPD estimators are highly sensitive to the 
particular specification of the model and its instruments. This cautious note guides all 
recommendations in this chapter. 
 
On the policy front, we divide the full sample into below-average, above-average, net 
receiving and net contributing jurisdictions. With estimated coefficient values of -
2.467, -2.051, -1.205 and -2.354 for the fiscal transfers coefficients, we establish a 
two-way negative impact of net fiscal transfers on real GDP per capita. Our 
conclusion is novel: while higher taxes have a negative impact on economic growth in 
the donor jurisdictions, higher net fiscal receipts equally have a negative effect in the 
receiving regions. This is a clear incidence of “immiserising growth”.  The coefficient 
of the interaction variable is further used to test for the impact of past income on 
economic growth and redistribution through fiscal transfers. With statistically 
insignificant results, we conclude that there is no evidence that lagged income 




Furthermore, we find evidence in support of the plethora of studies on the 
inconclusive trade-growth link. As well, the hypothesis that the AIT policy has any 
growth or income distributional impacts on Canadian jurisdictions is refuted. Given 
coefficient values of 0.290 and -0.183 for the interaction between lagged income and 
the AIT under the FEM and the system GMM, respectively, we conclude that there is 
evidence for lagged income impact on economic growth through the AIT policy, 
while the same policy inhibits growth in the latter environment. Before making any 
policy statements, we point out the caveat that the coincidence in the timing of the 
signing of AIT and the execution of NAFTA may obscure key issues. Addressing this 
concern through Mexico-US and Canada-Mexico sub-national export and import data 
is difficult and qualifies the results.  
 
Any intergovernmental transfers, whether or not explicitly designed to help equalize 
the fiscal capacities of sub-national governments, will have redistributional 
implications. This is because one thing is common to all transfer programs: they 
involve a flow of resources from the center to regional governments. Therefore, 
appropriate designs of transfer systems should recognize that transfer programs may 
have conflicting objectives or unintended consequences which may affect their 
potency. 
 
The two major policy contributions of this chapter are: (i) while regional fiscal 
disparity may be bad for growth, policy designs that focus on taxes and transfers may 
even cause more harm than good; policy makers are therefore advised to be cautious 
in drawing specific conclusions on the negative effect of redistributive policies (ii) 
fiscal authorities in the US could consider an Equalization policy that guides and 
determines the appropriate level of fiscal capacity and fiscal need – as an alternative to 
the complex and highly politicized Grants-in-Aid model.  
 
Both recommendations above are in addition to the need for policy makers to first 
unbundle the different components of a redistributive fiscal policy and weigh carefully 
the pros and cons of each specific component, before making a decision on the 




1.5 Economic Diversity, Growth and the Resource Curse 
1.5.1 Background  
The notion of spreading economic activity across a relatively wide range of industry 
sectors as a strategy to address regional income disparities and asymmetric 
macroeconomic shocks continues to gain popularity among practitioners and 
academic researchers. Economic diversification remains a popular topic in policy 
circles; it is popularly believed to be the cure to the “resource curse” challenge. 
Maliza and Ke (1993), for instance, see the wisdom behind economic diversity 
because a variety of economic activities that reflect differences in economic structure 
can help a region handle the disruptive effects of business cycles. While there still is 
no consensus on which diversity measures best capture specialization, capturing the 
dynamics of continually evolving economic structures will go a long way in helping 
policy makers to identify optimal diversification strategies. This chapter makes a 
major contribution in this regard. 
 
Economic diversification remains a recurring theme in public policy debates; it is 
popularly believed to be the cure to the “resource curse” challenge. The economic 
explanation of the curse is that the crowding out effect of a resource boom leads to a 
diminished importance of the manufacturing sector. This is the Dutch disease 
proposition that on average, resource-abundant regions lag behind countries with less 
resources. The benefits of diversification, as well as the importance of key economic, 
demographic, geographic and institutional factors that explain it, remain widely 
acknowledged. However, explaining the specific reasons why diversification helps 
some economies to succeed where others fail remains a mirage. To further complicate 
things, most empirical investigations of the relationship between economic growth 
and diversity provide inconclusive evidence. This chapter provides empirical evidence 
in an attempt to fill this void. 
 
Among other influential contributions, Corden and Neary (1982), Sachs and Warner 
(1995), Auty and Mikesell (1998), Bulte et al. (2005),  Mehlum et al. (2006), 
Robinson et al. (2006) and Torres et al. ( 2013) provide extensive analysis on the 
resource curse and its transmission channel.  Macaspac (2007), Palan (2010), 
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Ahmadov (2012) and Pede (2013) offer robust and contemporary perspectives on the 
economic diversity-growth nexus.  
 
We go a step further by proposing that economic diversity is a possible transmission 
channel of the curse; this is then modeled using five different indices with varying 
characteristics. By looking at the twin issues of diversification and the resource curse, 
our chapter contributes to this debate from a Canada-US regional perspective. This 
becomes even more significant considering our use of the GMM estimator, one of the 
most recent DPD techniques used in empirical regional growth analyses. 
 
1.5.2 Hypotheses  
At a high level, the following hypotheses are presented to test the research questions 
in this chapter: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between economic diversification and 
economic growth 
H2: There is a negative relationship between resource abundance and economic 
growth 
H3: The outcome of the interactions between resource abundance and 
economic diversity is the key determinant of the existence, or otherwise, of the 
resource curse. 
 
1.5.3 Findings and Contribution  
Partly blamed on the notion of equiproportionality of employment share and economic 
activity, we find that the economic diversity measures used are arbitrary because both 
the absolute and relative specialization measures, on which they are based, are also 
arbitrary. Next to that, the Quadratic Ogive Diversity Index supports the growth-
promoting stance of economic diversity. By implication, this supports the hypothesis 
that economic diversity is associated with increased levels of economic growth. The 
use of dynamic panel techniques also helps resolve the uncertainty related to the so 
called diversification effects. We join other empirical researchers who find evidence 
for a positive direct relationship for the diversity-growth nexus (e.g. Hackbart and 




The GMM framework does not provide us with predictive power to test the resource 
curse proposition; same goes for the interactive effect of diversity on resources. On 
the other hand, the FEM with statistically and economically significant coefficients 
capture the partial impact of an increase in natural resources on growth through the 
diversity transmission channel. The required diversity threshold for not having the 
resource curse is given as 0.209.  Above this threshold, the marginal contribution of 
natural resources to economic growth is higher for a relatively more diversified 
regional economy than a less diversified one. The reverse is true when such diversity 
measure based on the Krugman Index is below 0.209.  
 
In all, our results show that the two-step system GMM estimator handles well the 
endogenous regressors by generating internal instruments from their lagged values for 
them. This strategy also augurs well for our static-dynamic and diversity-
diversification debates. A major policy conclusion is noted from the finding in the 
preceding paragraph: jurisdictions with Krugman Index value less than 0.209 are 
bound to suffer from the curse of natural resources, while those above will not.  
 
We conclude that in practical terms, this implies that it is only when regional 
economies are not diversified up to a certain degree that resource abundance is 
harmful to growth.  Unlike its counterparts without natural resources, governments of 
resource-endowed regions may be indirectly faced with incentives to pursue growth-
deterring policies. This is because resource endowments mean citizens expect much 
more from their leaders, and these leaders are in turn under a lot of pressure. They 
may end up pursuing policies that crowd out investment and allocate productive 
resources away from more profitable sectors, with diminishing marginal returns that 
impact inefficiently on the economy.  
1.6 Organization of Chapters 
The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2, we examine the extent to which trade 
costs, modeled by distance and contiguity, influence the magnitude and direction of 
both east-west and north-south trade in Canada and the US .Using a variety of linear 
and non-linear estimation techniques, we provide an alternative framework which 
pays special attention to issues related to unobserved heterogeneity, log-linearization 
in the presence of heteroscedasticity, and logarithmic transformation of zero bilateral 
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trade flows.  We equally examine both the intranational and international home bias 
arguments of McCallum (1995), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) and those after them, in 
addition to the Linder-hypothesis and the Heckscher - Ohlin factor endowment 
proposition.  
 
Chapter 3 builds on the US-Canada sub-national framework, but differs in that it 
focuses on fiscal transfers. In addition to the fixed effects techniques, this chapter 
incorporates dynamic panel methods in examining the relative importance of fiscal 
redistribution and trade openness in the economic growth analysis of Canada and the 
US. We estimate the importance of redistributive flows based on personal income 
after federal taxes and transfers, and pretax personal income using various 
econometric strategies. Important policy lessons are drawn. 
 
In Chapter 4, economic diversity is proposed as the main channel through which the 
effects of natural resources on growth are gauged. This chapter explores the diversity-
resource-growth nexus. Five diversity indices are examined through the OLS, FEM 
and DPD strategies. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with key findings, policy 
implications and limitations. As an extension of the current research, we provide 





Chapter 2   The Gravity Model of Trade: A Canada-
US Sub-National Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b), the border effect on trade flows remains 
one of the “six major puzzles in international macroeconomics”. The gravity equation, 
which relates trade between two jurisdictions positively to both of their sizes and 
negatively to the distance between them, is one of the most popular and successful 
empirical models in international economics. Pioneered by Tinbergen (1962), the 
model has been widely used because it provides a good fit to intranational and 
international trade flows data.  
 
This chapter applies the gravity model of trade to assess bilateral trade flows between 
provinces and states in Canada and the US, respectively. The volume of trade between 
both countries is the largest between any two countries in the world (Government of 
Canada, 2014), and both countries are each other’s biggest trading partners. This 
should not come as a surprise; both economies, by many measures and along many 
dimensions, are highly integrated and share many economic, geographic, historical 
and cultural similarities. Even so, huge differences exist between them. In particular, 
fundamental differences exist in the structure of each country’s population, 
geography, market size, productivity, taxation, prices and social policy. These result in 
different economies, especially in terms of the relative importance of industries 
producing specific goods and services.  
 
We focus on regional Canadian and US jurisdictions because many important social 
and economic characteristics at the sub-national level are expected to vary sharply 
from what is observed at the national levels.  The academic and policy literature 
increasingly recognizes that globalization and advances in technology have made it 
important that sub-national regions respond flexibly to global economic dynamics – in 
order to create wealth.   For instance, while sub-national jurisdictions with good 
locational access to international markets may benefit substantially from national 
export promotion policies, a high natural resource royalty regime may impact 
resource-rich jurisdictions more disproportionately.  In a way, this shows that 
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successful policy coordination across regional levels of government depends, to a 
large extent, on how national governments adopt different institutional responses.  
 
Using a sub-national framework creates a robust platform which, among other things, 
incorporates an institutional setting with regional trade policies and administrative 
systems. This becomes even more important because a sub-national framework also 
serves as a laboratory for testing direct policy interventions that enable poorer 
jurisdictions to benefit from trade-induced national economic growth.  
 
About 90% of the Canadian population lives within 100 miles of the US border (Wall, 
2000). Despite the huge trade flows between both countries, provinces trade with 
themselves far more than adjacent US states, a phenomenon often explained by the 
presence of international borders, and termed ‘home bias’. Closely related to this is 
the presence of within-country border effects; the so-called intranational home bias. 
At the aggregate level, the gravity model is the most common tool used to control for 
the most important determinants of trade between a bilateral pair (e.g., GDP, distance, 
contiguity e.t.c). We exploit a large annual panel data set spanning three five-year 
intervals from 1997 to 2007 and covering all 10 provinces and 50 states.  
 
Frankly speaking, this chapter follows a more standard formulation of the gravity 
model developed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), albeit we augment it with a 
contiguity dummy, differences in relative factor endowments and per capita income. 
Summarized, our goal is to estimate the gravity model focusing on the border effects 
and subsequent tests of the Heckscher–Ohlin and Linder hypotheses, while paying 
particular attention to the estimation issues. We adopt a data-driven approach in the 
analyses that follow. In the interest of keeping the model and robustness tests as 
simple as possible, we perform the tests for the baseline model first and then compare 
our results with those obtained from other models. We then offer possible 
interpretations of the results in light of the estimation strategies employed.  
 
There are three novelties in our approach. First, to our knowledge we are the first to 
use a Canada-US regional panel data framework to jointly test an extended gravity 
model, incorporating factor endowments and per capita income differentials. These 
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additional variables allow us to test the Heckscher–Ohlin proposition-type factor 
endowment differences and Linder hypothesis-style taste differences, respectively.  
 
The second novelty is the attention given, again in a Canada-US panel data 
environment, to the following three econometric problems: unobserved heterogeneity, 
log-linearization of the gravity equation in the presence of heteroscedasticity, and 
logarithmic estimation of zero trade flows. Most previous studies that jointly 
addressed these three issues did so using a cross-country framework. The other few 
that considered them with regional data did so either individually for Canada or the 
US, but not for regions in both countries together. Also, this chapter provides updated 
results and garners further evidence in support of the home bias argument – both 
international and intranational. Our goal is to use the extended model to justify 
examining the above issues jointly. We hope to show that such a model performs well 
empirically, when particular attention is paid to the estimation procedures. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, we review some related literature. 
Section 2.3 discusses a number of theoretical issues related to the gravity model, and 
introduces our data sources and the variables considered as potential determinants of 
bilateral trade. Estimation methods and empirical results are presented in section 2.4, 
while section 2.5 presents conclusions and policy implications.  
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Theoretical Foundations of the Gravity Model 
Proposed by Tinbergen (1962), to explain international bilateral trade, the gravity 
model of trade is inspired by Newton’s law of universal gravitation in physics. 
Newton’s law states that the gravitational force with which two bodies attract each 
other is directly proportional to the product of their masses, and inversely proportional 
to the square of their distance.  The intuition for the gravity model of trade therefore 
comes from here; with economic sizes serving as proxies for masses and distance 
measuring how far apart both jurisdictions are from each other. Tinbergen (1962) and 




In their highly influential work, “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border 
Puzzle”, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) present a theoretical framework for 
understanding the determinants of bilateral trade flows. They manipulate the constant 
elasticity of substitution expenditure system to estimate a theoretical gravity equation 
and calculate the comparative statics of trade frictions. Anderson and van Wincoop 
assume that countries are representative agents that export and import goods, and 
goods are differentiated by place of origin such that each country is specialized in the 
production of only one good.  
 
2.2.2 Border Effects and the Gravity Model 
2.2.2.1 The Border Effects 
Simply put, the border effects exist when after controlling for important factors, there 
is a tendency for the volume of domestic trade to exceed the volume of international 
trade (Evans, 2003). The country-to-country comparison is known as the international 
border effect. However, another version of the border effect also exists: the domestic 
border effect or intranational home bias. This helps explain why, for instance, trade 
within individual provinces (or states) is significantly larger than trade between 
provinces (or states), after controlling for economic size, distance and other important 
determinants of bilateral trade flows.  
 
Understanding the nature of trade barriers is important since they serve as deterrents 
to market integration, with negative welfare consequences. In order to effectively 
measure their economic impacts, it is important to accurately estimate the magnitudes 
of both domestic and international border effects. After controlling for economic size, 
distance and other determinants, Wolf (2000) concludes that trade flows within 
individual US states are much higher than trade between US states. Nitsch (2000) 
carries out a similar exercise for the European Union (EU), with the conclusion that 
within-country trade is roughly ten times larger trade among countries. 
 
In order to solve the border effects puzzle, Anderson and van Wincoop maintain that 
two important criteria must be met. First, that the estimation of the gravity model must 
be based on theory as done by McCallum (1995). Their second argument is that since 
most policy makers and macroeconomic analysts are more interested in examining the 
impact of trade barriers, especially borders, on international trade, it is essential that a 
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general equilibrium comparative statics exercise of removing the US- Canada border 
barrier be carried out in order to determine the effect of the border on trade flows. 
This is especially important considering the fact that the past 30 years have seen 
regionalism re-emerge as a major issue in the policy agenda. For instance, with the 
creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, various 
empirical studies have come up with different estimates of the border effect.  
2.2.2.2 McCallum vs. Anderson and van Wincoop 
McCallum (1995), in his seminal paper, assuming a borderless situation, compares 
trade among Canadian provinces relative to corresponding flows with US states in a 
gravity framework based on aggregate trade volumes. McCallum equation predicts a 
radically different distribution of Canada-US trade, compared to what was 
documented prior to his estimation.  With the aid of an “economic map of North 
America”, he intuitively provides a justification for the predicted north-south flow of 
Canadian trade. McCallum’s conclusion: interprovincial trade is 22 times larger than 
state-province trade.  
 
His point of view is simple: Canadian provinces are small and distant from each other, 
compared to larger, more numerous, and less distant US states. This finding points to 
the relatively skewed spatial distribution of economic activity between both countries.  
Also, a higher population density of 30.71 sq. km in the US, compared to Canada’s 
3.0 sq. km., is highly instructive. Most other studies after McCallum have estimated 
similar border effects for North American and European jurisdictions, albeit with 
much smaller magnitudes. 
 
McCallum concludes that contrary to what some believe, national borders actually 
matter. He draws empirical evidence from how the border continues to influence 
continental trade patterns. One of the major predictions by McCallum was that the 
newly formed NAFTA (in 1992) would cause a radical shift in Canadian trade 
patterns in the future
1
. Considering some of the economic asymmetries between the 
US and Canada, e.g. GDP, population, factor endowments, and technology, the 
relative impact of the agreement on the economy of Canada and the US remains an 
attractive area to gravity researchers.  
                                                          
1
 In all fairness, that is one prediction that has come to pass. 
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Anderson and van Wincoop, in a bid to prove that the border effects were exaggerated 
by McCallum and others after him, concluded that the estimated border effects were 
high due to two reasons. First, the omission of the multilateral resistance term in 
McCallum’s specification could not account for the decomposition of trade resistance 
into bilateral partners’ resistance and the multilateral resistances of each trading 
partner.  Anderson and van Wincoop derive a decomposition of trade resistance into 
three parts: (i) the bilateral trade barrier between region i and region j, (ii) i’s 
resistance to trade with all regions, and (iii) j’s resistance to trade with all regions.   
 
One of the major novelties of Anderson and van Wincoop’s work is the inclusion and 
estimation of a multilateral resistance term in order to conduct comparative statics 
exercises of the effect of trade barriers on trade flows. They estimate a theoretical 
gravity equation and establish that while the effect of national borders among other 
industrialized countries is a reduction of about 30% in trade, Canada-US trade is 
reduced by about 44% due to the border effects. Essentially, their important 
contribution is to highlight that bilateral trade is determined by relative trade costs. 
 
The second reason is that compared to the US, a small trade barrier between Canada (a 
small open economy that trades a lot with the rest of the world, with the US being the 
dominant trade partner) and its other trading partners has a large effect on multilateral 
resistance of the provinces. This, they conclude, explains the increase in province-
state trade by a mere factor of six, compared to McCallum’s 22.   
 
Brown (2003) summarizes the logic behind this as follows: 
 
Canadian regions experience a potentially higher multilateral resistance to trade because there 
are substantial transaction costs associated with trading across the border and because of the 
relative remoteness of Canada’s regions, its spatial structure. Effectively, the Canadian 
economy functions over a thin, dispersed market that stretches east-west along the U.S. border; 
hemmed in by largely uninhabited land to the north and the U.S. border to the south. In 
contrast, the U.S. economy has no comparable economic or geographic limitations. Its market 
is larger, denser and more evenly spread over space. Therefore, because of barriers to trade 
associated with the border and Canada’s spatial structure, Canadian regions encounter a higher 
level of multilateral resistance than their U.S. counter parts. Consequently, any measure of the 




According to Anderson and van Wincoop, McCallum’s conclusion that the removal of 
the US- Canada border will raise province-state trade 22 times is wrong; they find a 
much lower ratio when they estimate McCallum’s model using 1993 data.  Anderson 
and van Wincoop maintain that the regression by McCallum and the subsequent 
literature following him are not adequate to document such huge border effects. In 
their words, “McCallum cautiously did not claim that his estimated factor 22 implied 
that removal of the border would raise Canada-US trade relative to within-Canada 
trade by 2200%”. Anderson and van Wincoop claim their theoretically grounded 
approach does a better job in estimating the border effect. 
 
In comparative terms, the seminal work of McCallum (1995) pioneered the empirical 
debate on border effects. Known as the international border effect, McCallum shows 
that provinces in Canada trade 22 times more with each other than with US states – 
the so-called home bias.  However, it was Anderson and van Wincoop that introduced 
a theoretical foundation robust enough to allow for a consistent and efficient 
estimation of a theoretical gravity model.   
 
2.2.3 The Heckscher–Ohlin Model and the Linder Hypothesis 
The Heckscher–Ohlin theorem states that under a set of assumptions, a country will 
export the good that relatively intensively uses its relatively abundant good, while it 
imports the good that relatively intensively uses its relatively scarce factor. The model 
assumes that factors of production are immobile across countries, while goods are not, 
so trade in goods is enough to lead to factor price equalization. Central to the 
Heckscher–Ohlin model is the equilibrium relations between goods prices, factor 
prices and factor inputs. The model argues that trade occurs due to differences in 
labour, labour skills, physical capital, natural capital, or other factors of production 
across countries.  
 
Of the several implications of the model, the following three are particularly important 
in a Canada-US setting and are worth looking at closely: (i) factor prices equalize 
when endowments are similar between two countries (ii) countries specialize based on 
factor abundance and factor intensity (iii) countries always gain from trade while 
industries and factors may lose. Compared to developing countries, both economies 
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are developed, with a relatively high proportion of their skilled labour force engaged 
in capital intensive goods production; at least compared to most primary production-
based economies in the developing world. A very intuitive way to restate implication 
(i) above is that the ‘death’ of the US-Canada border will ultimately wipe out 
differences in wage or rental rates between both countries. While this may not be the 
exact case, we know it is close to reality when we focus on some specific industry 
sectors.  
 
Leontief (1953) conducts the first major econometric test of the Heckscher–Ohlin 
theorem using 1947 US trade data. With the aid of input-output tables of US exports 
and import substitutes, Leontief concludes that contrary to the predictions of the 
model, the US – which was the most capital-abundant country in the world – actually 
exported labour-intensive commodities and imported capital-intensive commodities. 
This has since been labeled the Leontief Paradox. Over the years, several tests have 
shown that the Leontief Paradox became less pronounced, but has not completely 
disappeared. 
 
Testing and estimating the Heckscher–Ohlin model is a complex and rigorous 
exercise. Krugman et al. (2012) conclude that except for when high-income countries 
trade with low or middle income countries (or when technology differences are 
included), empirical support of the Heckscher–Ohlin model is weak. A review in 2008 
by the World Trade Organization (World Trade Report, 2008) concludes that most 
empirical attempts at testing the model are irrelevant because of the use of 
inappropriate methods. The review states further that when the right estimation 
strategy is adopted, there appears to be robust evidence on the effect of relative factor 
abundance on trade; albeit the trio of an integrated world, same technology, and 
absence of home bias assumptions need to be relaxed.  
 
Again, the above underscores the importance of using a gravity approach in a Canada-
US data environment. The following three reasons explain why. First, the model 
incorporates a distance variable which addresses the relaxation of an integrated world 
assumption. Second, the home bias argument advocated by McCallum, which focuses 
on the effect of formal and informal trade barriers as a result of national borders, is 
revisited. Regarding McCallum’s 22-to-1 factor conclusion, more recent studies (e.g. 
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Helliwell and Schembri, 2005) have shown that this bias is actually less. Apparently, 
the fact that McCallum’s paper is based on a single year data (i.e. 1988) and 30 US 
states presents some challenges. Our work fills this lacuna by using all 50 states, with 
more detailed and current datasets.  
 
The third issue of technological differences above is also important in our analysis 
because Canada has historically had a large gap in the level of technology per capita 
relative to the US. In a way, this partly explains the productivity gap between both 
countries. A study by Sharpe and Andrews (2012) concludes that nominal information 
and communications technology (ICT) investment growth in Canada in 2010 was 3.1 
per cent, while the US had 7.1 per cent. In addition to that, all the three ICT 
investment components experienced slower growth in Canada.  
 
Rao et al. (2008) use 31 industries to estimate Canada-US productivity, capital 
intensity and multifactor productivity gaps. Their results show that the labour 
productivity levels in Canada are much lower in the primary, manufacturing and 
services sectors, albeit Canada does well predominantly in the resource-based and 
transportation equipment industries. They reveal further that wide productivity gap 
exists in the machinery and computer, and electronics and electrical equipment 
industries, to the advantage of the US. Lee and Tang (2000) and Baldwin et al. (2008) 
also estimate and conclude that Canada’s labour productivity level is considerably 
lower than that in the US; they conclude that the gap continues to widen. This result is 
always directly linked to multifactor productivity gap for the most part.   
 
Both countries have remarkable supplies of skilled labour, physical capital stock, and 
natural resources; albeit Canada's natural resources are more abundant when compared 
to the US on a per capita basis. Many of both countries’ important industries are based 
on the exploitation of these resources. With both exporting a significant chunk of their 
GDPs, the US relies on Canada’s natural resources for products like timber and 
minerals, while Canada relies on the US for a variety of manufactured goods.  
 
In a way, Rao et al.’s results above, just like many others in the literature (e.g. 
Leamer, 1995), remind us of the important implications of the Heckscher–Ohlin 
model for a similar country-pair like Canada and the US with notable differences in 
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technology and resource endowments. This further justifies using our current panel 
framework to test the likely outcome of the Heckscher–Ohlin model. Though adequate 
natural resources data for all 50 US states and 10 Canadian provinces are difficult to 
come by for the years considered, nonetheless human and physical capital 
endowments data are incorporated in our study. This provides a more than enough 
robust setting to re-examine the Heckscher–Ohlin model.  
 
Simply stated, the Linder hypothesis predicts that countries of similar income per 
capita would trade more intensely with one another. Unlike many others, the Linder 
hypothesis departs significantly from the neoclassical theories of trade by assuming 
trade is largely determined by supply conditions. This hypothesis emphasizes the 
structure of preferences as what determines bilateral trade flows; in order words, the 
presence of a large domestic market is a key factor in the choice of countries’ export 
of goods (Bohman and Nilsson, 2006).  
 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) push this further by incorporating the importance of 
specialization; according to them, “in the presence of increasing returns to scale, 
specialization is promoted and excess production is exported”. Linder concludes that 
inequality, or the so-called negative correlation between per capita incomes and 
bilateral trade flows is caused by differences in taste; Helpman and Krugman attribute 
this to capital-labour ratio differential. The implication of this is that the higher the 
level of a country on the economic development ladder, the higher is the willingness 
to pay for product differentiation by its high income consumers.  
 
The results in Bergstrand (1990) provide further evidence for the Linder hypothesis 
with the conclusion that the hypothesis holds due to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
supply induced reason, and Linder-type demand reason. We can relate to this in a 
Canada-US context. Per capita income is the most frequent measure of economic 
development across countries. According to the Conference Board of Canada (2014), 
Canada’s income per capita trails that of the US and is about 84 per cent of the US 
level. This gap tripled between 1980 and 2012, to nearly $7,000. This provides 




Based on the analysis so far, it is hard to think of a more important pair of countries 
that are more economically, geographically, politically and culturally linked than 
Canada and the US. Thus, we conduct tests of the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem and 
Linder hypothesis on trade between both countries in order to determine whether their 
trade patterns conform to the predictions of these models, and if not, explain the likely 
reasons behind the divergence.  
This chapter fits into the various discussions so far because it is an extension of the 
various issues bothering on the gravity model in general: the US-Canada border effect, 
the three empirical issues mentioned earlier, and a review of the Heckscher–Ohlin 
theorem and Linder hypothesis. This is interesting because previous studies on these 
issues have been largely done at the cross-country level, especially the Heckscher–
Ohlin theorem and Linder hypothesis tests. This is notably because the necessary data 
and information at the sub-national level are often hard to come by.  
From the foregoing review, it is apparent that our four different panel data sets 
provide a robust framework to examine the identified issues. By looking at 
jurisdictions that share many common characteristics in both countries, we empirically 
model bilateral trade flows making sure to control for many country-specific features 
that might obscure the key role of our key gravity variables. 
2.3 Theoretical Setup, Variables and Data Sources 
2.3.1 Gravity Model of Bilateral Trade 
Newton's law of universal gravitation states that the gravitational attraction between 
two bodies is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them.   
 
Tinbergen (1962) interprets the bodies as exporting and importing countries, while 
their masses represent their economic sizes. In other words, he describes the patterns 
of bilateral trade flows between two countries i and j to be proportional to their gross 
national products and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between 
them. Newton’s law of universal gravitation between two bodies i and j is stated 






2       (2.1) 
where;  
F = attractive force;  
M = mass;  
D = distance;  
G = gravitational constant 
 
Similar to the above, the gravity model of trade in its basic form assumes that only 








  (2.2) 
where, 
𝑋𝑖𝑗= exports from i to j; or total trade (i.e. 𝑋𝑖𝑗  +  𝑋𝑗𝑖)  
Y= economic size (GDP or population) 
T = trade costs (given by distance) 
K = constant of proportionality 
 
2.3.2 Evolution of the Gravity Model 
Theoretical support of the gravity model was limited initially, but since 1979 several 
theoretical developments have sprung up in support of it. After its specification by 
Tinbergen, the first theoretical foundation of the model was provided seventeen years 
later by Anderson (1979). By focusing on the properties of expenditure systems, with 
identical homothetic preferences across regions as a major assumption, Anderson 
provides a micro foundation for the model.  
 
With the advent of the new trade theory a few years later, Armington’s (1969) 
assumption of product differentiation by country of origin was replaced by the 
assumption of product differentiation among producing firms.  In particular, Deardoff 
(1998) concludes that the gravity model can be derived from standard trade theories, 




Over time, there has been a convergence
2
 of opinions in the international trade 
literature that the gravity model can be derived from a host of other trade theories like: 
Ricardian comparative advantage model, Heckscher–Ohlin factor endowment theory, 
and Helpman-Krugman new trade theory, based on the exploitation of scale 
economies in imperfectly competitive markets. Evenett and Keller (2002) argue that 
perfect specialization is a common attribute of these models, and opine that along with 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek factor service trade model, the gravity model is one of the 
most important models of trade flows. The differences in these theories, in a way, 
serve as an added advantage for multiple specifications and availability of varieties in 
empirical results. 
 
2.3.3 The Anderson and van Wincoop Framework 
Based on Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), their gravity equation (i.e. Equation 13 










        (2.3)       
 
subject to Equation 2.4 below (i.e. Equation 12 in their paper): 
 
𝑃𝑗




   (2.4)   
 
where xij represents exports from region i to region j, yi and yj are the GDP in regions 
i and j, y
W
 is world’s GDP, tij represents bilateral trade barriers, Pi and Pj are price 
indexes for regions i and j, θi represents income share and σ is the constant elasticity 
of substitution between all goods. 
 
Anderson and van Wincoop call the price indices multilateral resistance variables, and 
explain that after controlling for size, bilateral trade depends on the trade barrier 
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between i and j, relative to the product of their multilateral resistance indices. They 
also add that the model in (3) suggests that bilateral trade is homogenous of degree 
zero in trade costs, since the equilibrium multilateral resistances 𝑃𝑖 are homogenous of 
degree ½ in trade costs.  
 
The economic implication of this, according to Anderson and van Wincoop, is simple: 
despite higher trade costs, the constant vector of real products must be distributed. 
This delivers one of the most important insights from the theoretical gravity model of 
Anderson and van Wincoop; the proposition that trade between regions is determined 
by relative trade barriers. The next issue to which we turn is the comparative statics of 
this model. 
 
Below is the linear gravity equation estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop: 
 
    ln 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑘 + ln 𝑦𝑖 + ln 𝑦𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎)𝜌 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑗 + (1 − 𝜎) ln 𝑏𝑖𝑗
− (1 − 𝜎) ln 𝑃𝑖 − (1 − 𝜎) ln 𝑃𝑗   (2.5)   
 
Our objective in this chapter is to analyze intranational and international bilateral trade 
flows using the Anderson van Wincoop model as a general framework. At this 
juncture, it is important to point to two caveats regarding both the theoretical model 
derived by Anderson and van Wincoop and the empirical model estimated in (2.5) 
above. First, in estimating a gravity model, it is important to take a closer look at the 
multilateral trade resistance – the barriers to trade that each region faces with all its 
trading partners. 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 are the multilateral trade resistances derived by Anderson 
and van Wincoop and are not observed. Even though they conclude that this method is 
more efficient than others in estimating multilateral resistances, data limitations 
preclude us from fully employing such a structural model.   
 
Also, Anderson and van Wincoop’s assumption of symmetric trade flows in the 
gravity model can potentially bias the estimates since this may not be consistent with 
the data. Even though the Anderson and van Wincoop model cannot be estimated 
fully, we nonetheless use it as a framework as best as we can. We employ an 
estimation strategy that effectively corrects the identified biases under section 2.4. 
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2.3.4 Methodological Issues and the Gravity Model 
2.3.4.1 A Multiplicative Constant Elasticity Model 
As discussed under our introductory remarks, recent empirical literature on the gravity 
model now focuses on the issue of estimation strategies, with emphasis on the 
following three: the existence of heteroscedasticity in trade data, zero trade flows, and 
unobserved heterogeneity. The gravity model is a multiplicative
3
 constant elasticity 
model; thus likening the properties and accuracy of a physical model with an 
economic one creates many estimation problems. One of the important implications of 
Jensen’s inequality, often ignored in many econometric estimations, is that in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, the estimated elasticities of a log-linearized model will 
be biased when the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used. This is because to 
log-linearize a constant elasticity model, some restrictions have to be placed on the 
error term.  The two estimation strategies we adopt to resolve this are the Feasible 
Generalized Least Square (FGLS) and the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
(PPML) estimators.  These are further explained below. 
 
2.3.4.2 Feasible Generalized Least Square 
The FGLS estimator is an alternative technique, applied to the linearized model to 
correct for heteroscedasticity. This estimator is a member of the least squares 
estimators’ family and is an efficient estimator in the presence of heteroscedastic 
errors. It is computed using weighted least squares, whereby the squared OLS 
residuals are computed (z
2
) and regressed on the explanatory variables and a constant. 
An analytical weight, computed as 1/ z
2
, is then used in the second step weighted least 
squares regression. Since it uses the square root of the variance of each observation as 
a weight, even when the weight is biased, the FGLS still results in consistent estimates 
provided the right method is used to retransform the model (Martinez-Zarzoro et al., 
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2007).  Martinez-Zarzoro et al. suggest the FGLS as the solution if we ignore the 
exact form of heteroscedasticity
4
.  
2.3.4.3 Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
As stated under equation 2.3 above, the nonlinear form of the Anderson and Van 
Wincoop gravity model comes with a multiplicative error term. Taking logarithms 
helps achieve linearization of the standard gravity model; however, we face an 
unintended consequence – the error term is in logarithms as well. A situation in which 
errors are heteroskedastic, which is the case in most cases, means we rely on one or 
more of the explanatory variables to determine the expected value of the error term . 
This therefore makes the OLS an inconsistent and biased estimator. 
 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) examine the performance of the PPML and 
conclude that it is a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator, albeit it assigns the same 
weight to all observations. They, however, conclude that in the absence of any further 
information on the pattern of heteroscedasticity, the PPML is the most appropriate 
procedure and would provide consistent estimates provided that the conditional mean 
is correctly specified. 
 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro estimate the Anderson and Van Wincoop model and find 
that there are significant differences between estimates obtained using traditional OLS 
methods and the PPML estimation technique. Santos Silva and Tenreyro suggest that 
the PPML method aids in the estimation of constant-elasticity models in their 
multiplicative forms, and this effectively takes care of the issue of heteroscedasticity, 
in addition to the zero trade flows problem for the dependent variable in trade data. 
The literature generally agrees that the PPML method is capable of resolving both 
issues, albeit some authors qualify such generalization.  
 
For instance, while Martinez-Zarzoro et al. and Martin and Pham (2008) agree that the 
PPML is effective in dealing with heteroscedasticity, they are of the opinion that it 
does a better job when used to resolve zero trade issues in data sets with relatively few 
zero observations. For us, this is good news. With only 51 zero trade flows data in our 
                                                          
4
 The is because the FGLS is robust to any form of heteroscedasticity, in addition to being able to weigh 
the observations in our data sets based on the square root of their variances. 
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13,781 observations, the PPML should provide very robust estimates. Another 
advantage is that many econometric packages have programs designed to implement 
the PPML. 
 
2.3.4.4 The Fixed Effects Model and Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The effects of size and trade costs on trade flows patterns can suffer from 
misinterpretation if the issue of unobserved heterogeneity is not adequately resolved. 
We therefore use the fixed effects model (FEM) to control for heterogeneous trading 
relationships. Using Canada-US trade data, Wall (2000) claims that those trying to 
explain the sources of the border effects using the standard gravity model need to be 
aware of its tendency to provide biased estimates. As an alternative, he uses a 
heterogeneous gravity model in place of the standard gravity model to correct for 
heterogeneity bias. The results show that the home bias is 40 per cent larger, the 
asymmetry of the border is reversed, and all provincial differences are altered 
significantly. The FEM is discussed in detail under section 2.4.1 on model 
specification. 
 
2.3.5 Data and Variables 
Our data are compiled from seven main sources: Statistics Canada (Input-Output 
Division, National Economic Accounts, and Provincial Economic Accounts), Industry 
Canada (Trade Data Online(TDO), US Bureau of Economic Analysis (Regional 
Economic Accounts), US Census Bureau, the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS), Bank 
of Canada (Rates and Statistics – Annual Average Exchange Rates) and the distance 
data website: http://www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/howfar.htm.   
 
We discuss the data sources and construction of our variables below: 
 
2.3.5.1 Bilateral Trade Flows 
Our preferred measure of bilateral trade is the log of bilateral exports or imports in 
current dollars from jurisdiction i to j. We exploit a large annual panel data set 
covering all 10 Canadian provinces and 50 US states for 1997, 2002 and 2007. We do 
not average the trade flows data, but instead use unidirectional bilateral exports or 
imports, leaving five years between our observations to avoid the problem of biased 
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fixed effects estimators: this occurs when dependent and independent variables do not 
fully adjust over a single year for data pooled over consecutive years. 
 
There are at least two ways in which estimated fixed effects are important in this 
chapter. First, we are interested in estimates of the relative magnitude of the fixed 
effects for the jurisdictions; at least to the extent that such cardinal ranking is 
important for the interpretation of the results and resulting policy implications. Also, 
fixed effects are known to soak up a significant portion of the explanatory power of 
explanatory variables that are relatively time-invariant. One consequence of this is that 
even when such variables are economically significant, they may appear to be 
statistically insignificant. The five-year intervals in 1997, 2002 and 2007 help 
overcome these issues. 
 
Since the gravity model is an expenditure equation which explains the value of 
spending by one jurisdiction on the goods produced by another jurisdiction, using 
averages will lead to difficulty in interpreting the coefficients of the regressions 
(Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). In all, data on the 60 jurisdictions are pooled for 1997, 
2002 and 2007. 
 
Our interprovincial trade data are compiled from the matrix of interprovincial trade 
produced by the Input-Output Division of Statistics Canada. These data sets are 
available (in current and producer prices) under CANSIM Tables 386-002 and 386-
003. For our three specific years, estimates of trade flows from each province to the 
other nine provinces are provided. Interprovincial trade flows data are in Canadian 
dollars, and these are converted back to US dollars by adjusting with the average 
annual US-CDN exchange rate for each year. This amounts to nine bilateral trade 
relationships for each province, and when computed for all 10 provinces, this results 
in 90 relationships each year. We then multiply this with three years for a total of 270 
observations on interprovincial trade.  
 
The Commodity Flow Survey (CFS), undertaken through a partnership between the 
US Census Bureau and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics is conducted every 5 
years as part of the Economic Census. The CFS produces data on the movement of 
goods in the US. It provides information on commodities shipped, their value, weight, 
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and mode of transportation, as well as the origin and destination of shipments of 
commodities from manufacturing, mining, wholesale, and selected retail and services 
establishments. Estimates of trade flows in US dollars from each state to the other 49 
states are provided. This amounts to 49 bilateral trade relationships for each state, and 
when computed for all 50 states, this results in 2,450 relationships each year. We then 
multiply 2,450 with the five years for which data are available (1997, 2002 and 2007 
for exports, and 1997 and 2002 for imports) for a total of 12,250 observations on 
interstate trade. 
 
To generate the dependent variable, our interprovincial and interstate trade flows are 
supplemented with a third data source which provides estimates of exports from each 
Canadian province to each US state and imports from a US state to each of the 10 
Canadian provinces. Collected on a province of origin basis, Statistics on Canadian 
domestic exports indicate the province (or territory) in which the goods were grown, 
extracted or manufactured. This may not always coincide with the province where the 
goods were cleared by Customs. According to Trade Data Online (TDO), Canadian 
import statistics are collected by the province of clearance; that is, the province (or 
territory) in which goods were cleared by Customs either for immediate consumption 
in Canada or for entry into a bonded Customs warehouse. This may also not always 
coincide with the province in which they are consumed. These data are sourced from 
Industry Canada: TDO; a database which provides the ability to generate customized 
reports on Canada's trade in goods with over 200 countries.  
 
Only data on trade in goods are available in TDO, data on trade in services are not 
included. For consistency, our interprovincial trade flows comprise of trade in goods 
only, trade in services is excluded. There are 50 bilateral relationships for each 
province-state pair (or state-province), resulting in 500 observations for all 10 
provinces. With both exports and imports data included for the three years considered, 
this amounts to a total of 3,000 observations.  
All bilateral trade relationships therefore result in 15,520 observations, out of which 
there are 1,739 outright incidences of missing data; with the US-US subsample 
accounting for 1,738 and one for the Canada-US subsample. This leaves us with a 
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total number of 13,781 observations, out of which there are 51 zero trade flows
5
. All 
51 zero trade flows are contained in the US- US subsample; none in the US-Canada 
and Canada-Canada subsamples. We do not delete these zeros in order to test the 
robustness of our estimation techniques, which aim at using standard econometric 
techniques to deal with the issue of zero trade flows. 
A variety of reasons can be responsible for missing data. For instance, there are 
proprietary concerns when a single firm dominates a particular industry and this often 
leads to data suppression for confidentiality reasons. Also, since the CFS data are 
derived from a sample survey and may differ from the actual, unknown values for the 
entire population of businesses they represent, data users are often cautioned to take 
into account both the measures of sampling error and the potential effects of non-
sampling error when using the CFS estimates (US Department of Transportation, 
2014). When such errors significantly affect the reliability of the CFS estimates, the 
corresponding data are reported as missing.  
2.3.5.2 Economic Size 
Since larger economies produce more goods and services in order to have more to sell 
in the export market, the size of an economy will be positively related to the volume 
of trade flows. Also, larger economies generate more income from the goods and 
services sold, so people are able to buy more imports. This explains why GDP is an 
important proxy for economic size in the empirical gravity model. GDP in current
6 
(Canadian) dollars data for all 10 Canadian provinces are obtained from Statistics 
Canada (National Economic Accounts – CANSIM Table 384-0002).  
 
Like the interprovincial trade data, we convert back to US dollars by adjusting with 
the average annual US-CDN exchange rate for each year. Bilateral US-Canada real 
exchange rates data come from the Bank of Canada (Rates and Statistics – Annual 
Average Exchange Rates). US data on GDP in current (US) dollars for all 50 states are 
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 Zero trade flows are completely different from missing data. While missing data do not show up at all 
in our datasets, absence of trade between a jurisdiction-pair is reported under our bilateral trade flows 
variable as zeros. 
 
6
 Neither the GDP nor trade data are deflated. The reason for this is simple: the gravity model is an 
expenditure function which merely allocates nominal GDP into nominal imports. As explained by 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), the problem of spurious correlation might occur when the price deflators 




obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (Regional Economic Accounts). 
As done for their Canadian counterparts, we obtain data on population for all 50 states 
from the US Census Bureau and apply these on GDP to get per capita GDP data.  
 
2.3.5.3 Distance 
Based on the gravity model, the bilateral trade between two regions is inversely 
proportional to the geographic distance between them. Despite the large number of 
papers that have controlled for distance while examining the determinants of bilateral 
trade flows, the distance effect is not definitive till date. Following Glick and Rose 
(2002), we model distance as the logarithm of the distance between two cities i and j. 
Data on road distances are measured in kilometers based on the capital city of each 
jurisdiction, and are obtained from the distance data website which uses Google Maps: 
http: www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/howfar.htm. In addition to Google Maps, 
this site incorporates a supplementary list of cities from around the world to find the 




2.3.5.4 Per Capita Income Differential 
In order to explain the trade flow patterns observed between a particular region pairs, 
we include the per capita income for each region. In particular, this variable will 
enable us to re-examine the Linder hypothesis. As discussed in section 2, the Linder 
hypothesis maintains that the structure of preferences is the major determinant of trade 
flows between regions. Therefore, closer levels of per capita income will translate into 
similar preferences; similar but differentiated products, and therefore, more intensive 
trade for regions. Linder therefore suggests that per capita income is a reasonable 
proxy for preferences.  
 
To test this hypothesis, we include the log of the absolute value of the difference in 
per capita incomes between a bilateral trading pair. We obtain data on population for 
all 10 provinces from Statistics Canada (CANSIM Table 051-0001) and then apply 
these to the GDP data discussed above to generate data on per capita GDP. 
 
 
                                                          
7
 The appendix section contains the full list of cities used for the 60 jurisdictions. 
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2.3.5.5 Factor Endowment Differences 
Factor endowments remain an important determinant of the trade patterns of nations. 
The Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade underscores the importance of 
factor endowments in influencing the intensity of trade between any two countries, as 
previously explained. In order to justify the choice of each factor endowment proxy 
included in this chapter, we quickly cite two important papers below.  
 
Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) use differences in per capita land, educational attainment 
and capital-labour ratios as proxies for factor endowments. They find in their 
regressions that these variables are positively related to bilateral trade flows and are 
robust to the inclusion of other variables in their dataset. Likewise, Romalis (2004) 
uses detailed trade data to establish a strong support for two predictions: (i) countries 
capture larger shares of world production and trade of commodities that use their 
abundant factors more intensively (ii) when countries rapidly accumulate a production 
factor, they see their production and export structures systematically shift towards 
industries that intensively use that factor.  
 
To get at the Heckscher–Ohlin theory appropriately, we follow Ghosh and Yamarik 
by measuring the endowments of two factors of production: human capital and 
physical capital. Comparable per capita land data for our 60 jurisdictions are difficult 
to come by, so we leave this component of factor endowment. Measurement details of 
the two factor endowment proxies are summarized below: 
 
2.3.5.6 Human Capital Stock 
Estimates of educational attainment provide a reasonable proxy for the stock of human 
capital and should be useful for a variety of empirical work (Barro and Lee, 2012). 
Blundell et al. (1999) categorize human capital into three main components — early 
ability (whether acquired or innate); qualifications and knowledge acquired through 
formal education; and skills, competencies and expertise acquired through training on 
the job. We use educational attainment as a proxy for human capital. In a broad sense, 
the US Census Bureau defines educational attainment as the highest level of education 
that an individual has completed, and distinguishes this from the level of schooling 
that an individual is attending.  
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In this chapter, educational attainment is defined as the percent of persons 25 years 
and over who have completed at least a Bachelor's degree. The use of the 25+ 
population is plausible since it focuses on adults age 25 years and over, when 
education has been completed for most people. Educational attainment is closely 
related to the skills and competencies of a country's population, and could be seen as a 
proxy of both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the stock of human capital. 
EDUitj, our measure of the difference in the educational attainment between 
jurisdictions i and j at time t, is constructed as follows:  
 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 =
(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠 25 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝐵𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟’𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒)
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 25 +
  (2.6) 
 
Data on educational attainment for all Canadian provinces come from Statistics 
Canada’s Labour Force Survey (LFS), CANSIM Table 282-0004. Corresponding 
educational attainment data for all 50 US states are obtained from the US Census 
Bureau, American Community Survey (ACS). ACS is an ongoing statistical survey 
sent to approximately 250,000 addresses monthly. It provides estimates of educational 
attainment for US states on an annual basis from 2000 onwards; prior to this time, 
only 1990 data are available.  
 
As stated in chapter 1, while our analysis in this chapter is based on 1997, 2002 and 
2007 for all 10 Canadian provinces and 50 US states, chapters 3 and 4 cover the 1987-
2010 period. We therefore deploy a simple and consistent methodology to derive data 
for the missing 1987-1989 and 1991-1999 periods. First we calculate the average 
annual growth rate based on the available 2000-2010 educational attainment data for 
all 60 jurisdictions. This gives us 0.44 percentage points per annum. Generally 
speaking, we expect all 60 jurisdictions to record higher gains in the percent of 
persons 25 years and over who have completed at least a Bachelor's degree in the 
1991 – 1999 period, compared to the 1987-1989 period. The reason is simple: 
universities in most countries have witnessed increased enrolments in the last three 
decades (Conference Board of Canada, 2014; and National Center for Education 




Following this logic, we assume 0.15 and 0.3 percentage points gains in yearly 
educational attainment for the 1987-1989 and 1991-1999 periods, respectively. This 
empirical strategy does not constitute a limitation because, as defined above, the 
“percent of persons 25 years and over who have completed at least a Bachelor's 
degree” is a proportion and does not change significantly – year over year.  
 
2.3.5.7 Physical Capital Stock  
The variable of interest here is 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 , our measure of the capital stock endowments in 
jurisdiction i at time t. 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of capital stock to real GDP
8
. First, we use 
gross private capital as a percentage of GDP for US states and gross business fixed 
capital formation as a percentage of GDP for Canadian provinces. Next, and following 
Yamarik (2011) and Hall and Jones (1999), we construct our capital stock series using 




𝐾𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡−1 − 𝜕𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝐹𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝜕)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝐹𝐾𝑡    (2.7) 
 
where Kt is capital stock level at time t, GFKt is gross fixed capital formation at time t 
and δ is the rate of depreciation (which is assumed constant over time). The PIM 
assumes a geometric declining pattern (Baldwin et al., 2008). In order to implement 
the PIM, the size and time profile of depreciation rates, gross investment time series 
and an initial level of capital stock are required. After creating our capital stock from 
gross fixed capital formation using equation 7, we then construct the initial capital 





   (2.8)   
 
                                                          
8
 The real GDP data used are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). For 1997 forward, BEA reports real GDP by state based on the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS). From 1977 through 1997, BEA reports real GDP by state based on the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). A set of quantity indexes for real GDP by state (1997=100) is 
available for 1977 through 1997. Given the differences in NAICS and SIC, BEA has cautioned against 
appending the two data series in an attempt to construct a single time series. However, this caveat does 
not impact our results since our measure is the ratio of capital stock to real GDP, in addition to the fact 
that the discontinuity in the methodology affects all 60 jurisdictions in our sample. 
 
9
 This method is popular because it provides a seamless means of calculating the stock of fixed assets 
whenever direct information is missing. 
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where K0 is the initial capital stock, GFK0 is the level of gross fixed capital formation 
in the initial period, 𝑔𝐺𝐹𝐾 is the average annual geometric growth rate of GFK, and δ 
is as previously defined. We assume in this study that capital stocks depreciate at a 
constant rate of 6%, in line with Hall and Jones.  
 
Canadian provincial capital stock data are calculated using the PIM discussed above. 
We use GFK data for estimating the initial capital stock. Our 𝑔𝐺𝐹𝐾 value
10
 is taken as 
3.6% – based on the average of Statistics Canada’s old and new capital stock annual 
growth rates.  Equivalent capital stock data for US states are based on Yamarik’s net 
private capital stock data
11
 constructed for the 50 states.  
 
Considering that Yamarik’s data are available only up to 2007, we assume that capital 
stock and GDP grew at the same rate for the 2008 - 2010 period. We therefore use the 
growth rates of real GDP to derive the capital stock figures for 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
Corresponding Canadian provincial capital stock data are calculated using the PIM 
discussed above. In order to generate a series comparable to Yamarik’s net private 
capital stock, at least as much as possible, we use business gross fixed capital 
formation – the private sector portion of total GFK.  
 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, this is 
measured by the total value of a producer’s acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed assets 
during the accounting period plus certain additions to the value of non- produced 
assets (such as subsoil assets or major improvements in the quantity, quality or 
productivity of land) realized by the productive activity of institutional units. To a 
large extent, this captures the private sector share of total capital formation. As a 
check, we compare the capital stock and real GDP series for all 60 jurisdictions and 
find that jurisdictions with the highest real GDPs (e.g. California and Ontario) have 
corresponding highest capital stock values, while those with the lowest GDPs (e.g. 
Prince Edward Island and Vermont) have corresponding lowest capital stock figures.  
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2.3.5.8 Border Effects 
In addition to sharing the world's longest border, Canada and the US have the world's 
longest undefended border – with a length of 8,893 kilometers. While it may not be 
correct to conclude that borders constitute significant barriers to trade that should be 
removed, research shows that the intensities of economic exchange within and across 
borders are remarkably dissimilar for one simple reason: economic linkages are much 
tighter within, than among nation-states. This refers to the home bias argument.  
 
This chapter uses the indicator variable of common borders attributed to Glick and 
Rose (2002), which is unity if a jurisdiction-pair shares a border and zero for lack of 
common border. As discussed in the preceding section, both international and within-
country border effects exist. Therefore, the border effects here refer to both national 
and state/provincial borders. We expect to gain valuable insights on the border effect 
for province-province pairs like Alberta-British Columbia and Quebec-Ontario in 
Canada, state-state pairs like Texas-New Mexico and Oregon-Washington, and 
province-state pairs like Ontario-Michigan and Saskatchewan-North Dakota. 
 
2.3.6 Research Hypotheses 
Following the literature framework and theoretical issues discussed so far, we advance 
the following hypotheses to help address the research questions posed:  
 
Hypothesis 1 
H0: There is no relationship between economic size and bilateral trade flows 
between trading partners.   
H1: There is a positive effect of economic size on bilateral trade flows between 
trading partners.  
 
Intuitively, this hypothesis emphasizes the role of income level as a determinant of 
trade; it asserts that after controlling for other important factors, countries with higher 







H0: There is no relationship between geographical distance and bilateral trade 
flows between trading partners.  
H1: There is a negative effect of geographical distance on bilateral trade flows 
between trading partners.  
 
Indeed, the inverse relationship between distance and trade is one of the most robust 
findings in international economics. Among other things, this helps us understand the 
nature of distance as a trade barrier which not only inhibits trade flows, but also 
creates negative welfare consequences. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
There is a negative effect of the border on bilateral trade flows. We exploit the 
variation across state-state, province-province and state-province trade flows to 
estimate the border effects, while controlling for other factors. To examine this within 
the context of the discussion so far, we advance two lower-level versions for 
Hypothesis 3 below: 
 
Hypothesis 3a 
H0: There is no distinction in the effect of the border on state-province trade, 
compared to interstate and interprovincial trade between trading partners.   
H1: There is a stronger negative effect of the border on state-province trade, 
compared to interstate and interprovincial trade.  
 
International borders represent large barriers to trade. Can we say the same about 
within-country borders?  For instance, it is expected that if the border is truly a 
deterrent to trade, Canadian provinces should trade more with each other than U.S. 




H0: There is no distinction in the effect of the border on interprovincial trade, 
compared to interstate trade   
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H1: There is a stronger negative effect of the border on interprovincial trade, 
compared to interstate trade  
 
Hypothesis 3a implies that the influence of the border on trade is substantially less for 
interstate trade, compared to interprovincial trade. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
H0: There is no relationship between factor endowment differentials and 
bilateral trade flows.  
H1: There is a positive relationship between factor endowment differentials 
and bilateral trade flows.  
 
In other words, jurisdictions should trade more, the more different their factor 
endowments. A positive sign supports the Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment 
proposition, while a negative sign refutes it. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that 
country pairs should trade more, the more different are their factor endowments. 
Again, Canada and the US have similar human and physical capital endowments, so 
we expect a positive sign on the Heckscher-Ohlin variables to support the proposition. 
 
To the extent that differences in per capita income are correlated with differences in 
factor endowments, it is possible for smaller differences to produce lower bilateral 
trade – especially intra-industry trade that depends on existing comparative 
advantages. It is therefore possible to also test the Heckscher-Ohlin proposition 
through the sign on the per capita income differential variable. A positive sign will 
support the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis; a negative sign, as discussed below, would 
support the Linder hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 5 
H0: There is no relationship between per capita income differentials and 
bilateral trade flow.    
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between per capita income differentials 




The Linder hypothesis explains the effects of quality differences on the direction of 
trade flows – a stark contrast to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin proposition. Linder’s 
approach provides an alternative explanation of trade flows, consistent with Leontief's 
findings. Similar levels of per capita income produce similar tastes, which lead to the 
production of similar but differentiated products that result in higher bilateral trade 
flows between jurisdiction-pairs. A negative sign on the Linder coefficient term will 
support the Linder-hypothesis, while a positive sign will refute it. Canada and the US 
have similar economies because they are both developed countries and are each other's 
largest trading partners. This further leads to closer levels of per capita income and 
similar preferences, similar but differentiated products, and therefore more intensive 
trade for regions. We expect a negative sign to support the Linder-hypothesis.  
 
2.3.7 Descriptive Statistics 
As stated under the introductory section, the volume of trade between Canada and the 
US is the largest between any two countries in the world, and both countries are each 
other’s biggest trading partners. Figure 2.1 depicts this succinctly, with other countries 
included for context and better comprehension. Table 2.1 shows total exports and 
imports between each of the four Canadian regions and the US for 1997, 2002 and 
2007. The resulting percentages are interesting. For example, exports from each 
Canadian region to the US (as a percentage of total exports) increased between 1997 
and 2002, generally speaking. Beyond 2002, these percentages trended downward for 
each of the four regions.  
 
It is evident from Table 2.1 below that Canada's manufacturing heartland, Central 
Canada, had the largest export shares for each of 1997, 2002 and 2007. British 
Columbia (B.C.) and the territories had the lowest export shares for the three periods 
considered. This may be partly explained by B.C.’s strategic location as Canada’s 
western continental coastline on the Pacific Ocean, leading to significant trade with 
other Asia Pacific countries. Unlike export shares, Table 2.1 shows fluctuations in 
import shares of the US for each region’s total imports. 
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Table 2.1: Canadian Regional Trade with the US 
 
Panel A: Exports to the US as a Percentage of Total Exports 
 
 
 1997 2002 2007 
Atlantic Canada  73.2% 82.9% 81.0% 
Central Canada  88.1% 90.9% 81.3% 
Prairies  73.3% 82.6% 79.6% 
British Columbia & Territories  55.2% 66.6% 56.5% 
     
Panel B: Imports from the US as a Percentage of Total Exports 
 
 
 1997 2002 2007 
Atlantic Canada  20.5% 22.8% 14.8% 
Central Canada  70.5% 66.0% 55.5% 
Prairies  79.8% 75.6% 75.8% 
British Columbia & Territories  49.9% 37.6% 41.2% 
 Note: Canada comprises of five regions. Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia are collectively referred to as Atlantic    
Canada. Central Canada is made up of Quebec and Ontario. Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta are all together called the Prairies. B.C. (which 
borders the Pacific Ocean) is called the West Coast, while Canada's northern region, called the Territories, comprises of Nunavut, the Yukon and the 
Northwest Territories. For reasons related to data, B.C. is often combined with Nunavut, the Yukon and the Northwest Territories, as one entity.
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Figure 2.1: Global Trade in Merchandise Goods, 2010 ($Billions) 
 
Source: Essentials of International Economics, 3e. Feenstra/Taylor 
 
In general, imports from the US trended downward, with the Prairies recording the 
highest shares, while the Atlantic provinces had the lowest import shares from the US 
The economic structure of the Atlantic provinces – which traditionally rely on the 
resource sector, including fishing, farming, forestry and mining – may be attributed to the 
low import shares.  
 
Summary statistics for the full sample, Canada-US subsample, Canada-Canada subsample 
and US-US subsample are displayed in levels in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below. The data in 
levels show some interesting trends. While the average trade flow in the full sample is 
about $1.8 billion, average trade flow differs significantly across the other subsamples: 
$401 million for Canada-US trade, $1.1 billion for Canada-Canada trade  
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Gravity Variables (Full and International Samples) 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Measure EXPijt ($M) GDPit ($M) GDPjt ($M) DSTij (KM) PCDijt ($) EDUijt (p.p.) CAPijt (p.p.) 
Mean 1,814 197,119 217,767 2,292 6,827 6 26 
Median 419 124,391 137,145 1,922 5,364 5 12 
St. Dev. 3,893 241,531 258,425 1,580 5,868 4 31 
Minimum 0 2,800 2,800 30 0 0 0 
Maximum 64,156 1,870,916 1,870,916 11,727 41,809 26 165 
 
Panel B: Canada-US Sample 
Measure EXPijt ($M) GDPit ($M) GDPjt ($M) DSTij (KM) PCDijt ($) EDUijt (p.p.) CAPijt (p.p.) 
Mean 401 119,791 219,412 2,961 7,972 10 76 
Median 40 36,559 134,053 2,745 6,143 9 70 
St. Dev. 1,847 146,898 267,938 1,618 7,044 5 29 
Minimum 0 2,800 14,556 233 15 0 8 
Maximum 46,411 583,946 1,870,916 11,727 41,809 26 165 
Notes: The full sample and US-US subsample (which both contain 51 zero trade flows) have 13,781 and 10,553 observations, respectively. The Canada-Canada and 
Canada-US subsamples contain 270 and 2,958 observations, respectively. EXPijt, GDPit, GDPjt, DSTij, PCDijt, EDUijt and CAPijt  stand for bilateral trade flows, Gross 
Domestic Product, bilateral distance, per capita income differential, educational attainment differential and capital stock differential. The unit of measurement for 






Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Gravity Variables (Intranational Samples) 
Panel A: Canada-Canada Sample 
Measure EXPijt ($M) GDPit ($M) GDPjt ($M) DSTij (KM) PCDijt ($) EDUijt (p.p.) CAPijt (p.p.) 
Mean 1,140 118,247 118,247 2,888 9,044 4 32 
Median 300 35,451 35,451 2,582 6,583 3 26 
St. Dev. 2,496 146,691 146,691 1,800 8,118 2 24 
Minimum 2 2,800 2,800 326 68 0 0 
Maximum 19,321 583,946 583,946 7,095 39,927 12 93 
 
Panel B: US-US Sample 
Measure EXPijt ($M) GDPit ($M) GDPjt ($M) DSTij (KM) PCDijt ($) EDUijt (p.p.) CAPijt (p.p.) 
Mean 2,228 220,812 219,853 2,090 6,449 5 11 
Median 676 140,378 139,202 1,748 5,137 4 9 
St. Dev. 4,235 259,211 257,465 1,506 5,362 4 9 
Minimum 0 14,556 14,556 30 0 0 0 
Maximum 64,156 1,870,916 1,870,916 9,656 37,355 22 67 
Notes: The full sample and US-US subsample (which both contain 51 zero trade flows) have 13,781 and 10,553 observations, respectively. The  Canada- Canada and 
Canada-US subsamples contain 270 and 2,958 observations, respectively. EXPijt, GDPit, GDPjt, DSTij, PCDijt, EDUijt and CAPijt  stand for bilateral trade flows, Gross 
Domestic Product, bilateral distance, per capita income differential, educational attainment differential and capital stock differential. The unit of measurement for 




and $2.2 billion for US-US trade. This shows that the average bilateral sub-national trade 
for each of Canada and the US is much higher than the average bilateral trade between 
jurisdictions within both countries. 
 
Also, the average bilateral distance between a trading pair in Canada (2,888 km) is higher 
than in the US (2,090 km). This may be partly explained by the higher population density 
in the US (30.71 sq. km), compared to Canada’s 3.0 sq. km. The average bilateral 
distance of 2,961 km for the Canada-US sample also shows that trade between both 
countries involves a larger distance than sub-national trade, on average. 
2.4. Estimation Methods 
2.4.1 Model Specification 







𝜃      (2.9)    
 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is exports and imports from i to j, Y= GDP and D is bilateral distance. The 
basic intuition in the above is that the larger and closer to each other, the more likely it is 
that two jurisdictions are likely to trade. 
 
Log-linearizing and employing our standard notations, we have: 
 




The basic version of the model above takes into account only the standard factors, as 
suggested by the literature. However, we know that there are other factors stimulating or 
hindering bilateral trade flows, beyond economic size and distance. Aside from distance, 
which is often the major proxy for trade costs, other spatial exogenous barriers that drive 
up transport costs are also expected to affect bilateral trade. For instance, sharing a 
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common border and language or even the removal of non-spatial trade barriers – e.g. 
trade liberalization – will significantly affect bilateral trade flows.  
 
As discussed under the variables section, it is also common to include factor endowment 
controls, as the availability of skilled labour or abundant natural resources and capital 
stock can directly and indirectly affect trade relations. The Heckscher–Ohlin model 
explains the reasoning behind this. Equally, the stage of economic development can 
determine the patterns of bilateral trade flows, and this is often proxied by per capita 
income in most tests of the Linder hypothesis. We therefore use the extended version of 
equation 10 above to control for three additional factors including: contiguity, factor 
endowment and per capita income differential.  
 
Our model could be further augmented to incorporate cultural and linguistic proximity, 
institutional quality, and historical links, but considering the many similarities between 
Canada and the US in these areas, we decide to leave these out.  
 
Our extended gravity model is presented below: 
 
ln(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼2 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼3 ln(𝐷𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗) + 𝛼4 ln(𝑃𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
+ 𝛼5 ln(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼6 ln(𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼7𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (2.11)
 
 
In order to effectively deal with the issue of zero trade flows, the PPML method estimates 
bilateral trade flows in three functional forms: 𝑋𝑖𝑗, ln(𝑋𝑖𝑗) and ln(1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗). A detailed 
explanation is provided under the estimation strategy in the next section. 
 
In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, different amounts would be exported by the 
same region to two different regions with the same GDPs and same bilateral distance. 
This may be due to some common factors which affect bilateral trade flows, and are also 
correlated with the two standard gravity variables – i.e. GDP and distance. The intercept 
for each jurisdiction-pair includes the effects of all omitted variables that are specific for 
each year but remains constant over time; such include distance, border effect, culture, 
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and language (Cheng and Wall, 2005). With the omission of individual effects, OLS 
estimates will be biased when individual effects are correlated with the independent 
variables. As an alternative, we use the FEM in our panel data environment to account for 
such heterogeneity bias. With a FEM though, all time-invariant variables drop out as the 
inherent transformation wipes out such variables. We therefore do not include the  𝐷𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗  




With this in mind, our extended FEM is specified below: 
 
ln(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼1 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼2 ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼4 ln(𝑃𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡) +  𝛼5 ln(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡)
+ 𝛼6 ln(𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡) +  𝛼7 JUR 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼8 TIM 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (2.12)
 
 
All variables and notations are defined below: 
i = exporting jurisdiction; j = importing jurisdiction; and t = time period 
𝛼𝑖𝑗 = specific jurisdiction-pair effect between the bilateral trading partners 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = export flows from jurisdiction i to jurisdiction j at time t.  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = gross domestic product of jurisdiction i and in period t 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡   = gross domestic product of jurisdiction j in period t 
𝐷𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗, = distance between the exporting and importing jurisdiction 
𝑃𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡 = per capita income differential between jurisdictions i and j in period t 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = capital stock endowment differential between jurisdictions i and j in period t 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = educational attainment differential between jurisdictions i and j in period t 
𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗 = contiguity dummy; unity if i and j share a land border and zero otherwise 
𝐽𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = specific jurisdiction-pair effect between the bilateral trading partners 
𝑇𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = specific time effect between the bilateral trading partners 
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  = a normally distributed idiosyncratic error term, with mean 0 and variance σε
2
. The 
error term captures all other omitted effects on trade and is assumed to be well-behaved.  
Based on Equation 2.11 and the explanations from section 2.3.5 above, our hypotheses 
are based, a priori, on the signs of the following parameters:  we expect positive signs for 
                                                          
12
 The fixed effects model is discussed in details under estimation strategy below. 
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𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼5, 𝛼6 and 𝛼7, and a negative sign for 𝛼3 and 𝛼4. A negative sign on 𝛼4 will 
support the Linder-hypothesis, while a positive sign will refute it. For 𝛼5 and 𝛼6, a 
positive sign supports the Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment proposition, while a 
negative sign refutes it.  
 
In Tables 2.4 and 2.5 below, we present the summary statistics and correlation matrix for 
all the variables included in the estimated models. A cursory look at the correlation 
matrix shows that multicollinearity is not a problem because all the regressors have 
relatively small correlation coefficients. 
 
2.4.2 Estimation Strategy 
Now that we have agreed on the specification framework to be employed, the next issue 
to which we turn is the performance of the different estimation techniques. This has 
become necessary because recent literature in this field now focuses on all three
13
: 
unobserved heterogeneity, log- linearization in the presence of heteroscedasticity, and the 
problem of estimating the logarithm of zero trade flows. All of these problems are 
prevalent in our case. The first empirical issue is log-linearization in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. Since the gravity model is nothing but a multiplicative model, log-
linearization is a form of transformation that can alter the properties of the error term and 
produce inefficient estimates.  
 
By Jensen’s inequality, a log-linear model cannot be expected to provide unbiased 
estimates of mean effects when the errors are heteroscedastic; this may lead to a huge 
difference between the estimates of the log-linearized model and those of a gravity model 
estimated in levels (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Yet, log-linearization is exactly what the 
Anderson van Wincoop framework proposes. 
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for Key Model Variables 
Measure ln(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) ln(𝐷𝑆𝑇) ln(𝑃𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡) ln(𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡) ln(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
Mean 8.46 11.03 11.11 3.25 3.64 0.12 1.07 
Median 8.63 11.10 11.14 3.28 3.73 0.10 1.09 
St. Dev. 1.11 0.52 0.46 0.33 0.49 0.09 0.62 
Min 2.57 9.45 9.45 1.48 -0.63 0.00 -3.19 
Max 10.81 12.27 12.27 4.07 4.62 0.55 2.22 
       Notes: Based on 13,730 observations; zero trade flows not included 
 
Table 2.5: Correlation Matrix for Key Model Variables 
Variable ln(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) ln(𝐷𝑆𝑇) ln(𝑃𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡) ln(𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡) ln(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
ln(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) 1.00 
      ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡) 0.65 1.00 
     ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡) 0.39 -0.01 1.00 
    ln(𝐷𝑆𝑇) -0.49 -0.14 -0.02 1.00 
   ln(𝑃𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑡) -0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.05 1.00 
  ln(𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡) -0.45 -0.37 0.00 0.16 0.22 1.00 
 ln(𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) -0.44 -0.26 -0.08 0.22 0.08 0.38 1.00 
BDR 0.28 0.04 -0.03 -0.52 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 
     Notes: Based on 13,730 observations; zero trade flows not included 
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A basic assumption with OLS estimation is homoscedasticity, thereby resulting in a 
constant variance and expected value for the error term. If this assumption breaks down, 
which is often the case for trade flows, the expected value of the error term becomes 
statistically dependent on the regressors
14
.  With panel data in our case, it is taken that the 
error term in our specified model is constant across jurisdictions or jurisdiction-pairs
15
. If 
not, we run into this problem. Note that the parameter estimates are still unbiased, hence 
unaffected by heteroscedasticity; but the variance of the estimates are biased and this has 
huge implications on the t-values.  
 
Martinez-Zarzoro et al. suggest the FGLS as the solution if we ignore the exact form of 
heteroscedasticity
16
. The FGLS estimator is computed using weighted least squares, 
whereby the squared OLS residuals are computed (z
2
) and regressed on the explanatory 
variables and a constant. An analytical weight, computed as 1/ z
2
, is then used in the 
second step weighted least squares regression.  
 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro examine the performance of the PPML and conclude that it is 
a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator, albeit it assigns the same weight to all 
observations. They, however, conclude that in the absence of any further information on 
the pattern of heteroscedasticity, the PPML is the most appropriate procedure and would 
provide consistent estimates provided that the conditional mean is correctly specified. We 
use the FGLS for samples with truncated zero flows only, and the PPML for all three 
categories: truncated zero flows, retained zero trade flows and zero trade flows replaced 
with one. The FGLS, if one is happy with ignoring the exact nature of heteroscedasticity, 
is a consistent estimator. The PPML, if one is happy with the lesser accuracy associated 
with this estimator in the presence of zero trade flows, is also robust. We employ both 
estimators and consider the results for the different subsamples. 
                                                          
14
 This is because the logarithm of a random variable has an expected value that depends on the mean and 
higher-order moments of the distribution of the random variable. This violates the condition for the 
consistency of OLS. 
 
15
Silva and Tenreyro suggest that in the presence of heteroscedasticity, nonlinear estimators should be used. 
 
16
 The is because the FGLS is robust to any form of heteroscedasticity, in addition to being able to weigh 
the observations in our data sets based on the square root of their variances. 
 55 
 
The presence of zero trade flows in our data is the second estimation issue we are 
confronted with. While the Newtonian gravitational force between two masses can be 
very small, but never zero, it is the case that bilateral trade flows between many 
jurisdiction-pairs for a particular time period is actually zero. In the presence of such 
zeros, the use of logarithmic transformation for the dependent variable poses a problem 
since the logarithm of zero is undefined.  
 
Most authors recommend truncating the sample by deleting the observations with zero 
trade flows. However, this method is problematic because it leads to loss of information. 
It can also create the problem of sample selection bias, Heckman (1979). In other words, 
dropping zeros from the sample implies that the dependent variable is no longer really 
bilateral trade, but bilateral trade contingent on a trading relationship existing. This can 
bias our OLS estimates, to the extent that the probability of selection is correlated with 
the regressors.  We estimate the model under the zero truncation scenario using both the 
standard OLS and the FGLS methods.  
 
Some other authors estimate in levels so that the estimation can proceed with the zero 
trade values. Again, the PPML estimator recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
solves this problem, especially when the incidences of zero trade values are infrequent. 
We use the PPML, believing this to yield unbiased estimates since both the full sample 
and the US-US subsample only contain 51 zero trade flows apiece. The third strategy for 
the zero trade issue is to simply replace the value of bilateral trade flows by the value of 
trade flows plus one: i.e. instead of using ln(𝑋𝑖𝑗) as the dependent variable, we use 
ln(1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗) instead. We also employ this method and estimate with OLS and PPML, 
albeit we make the model with the truncated trade flows our baseline model in order to 
compare the results with the former.  
 
The last but not least is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. We use a panel data set to 
disentangle the time invariant region-specific effects and to capture the relationships 
between the relevant variables over time. Also, if individual effects are to be included, 
then we must decide whether to treat them as fixed or random effects, and provide a 
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justification for our decision. The issue of using either a FEM or random effects model 
(REM) has received a lot of attention in the literature
17
. Egger (2000) summarizes these 
views and concludes that the FEM is more appropriate than the REM when dealing with 
trade flows between an ex ante predetermined selection of regions. Egger’s reason is 
simple: most of the factors that drive trade flows between regions are not random but 
deterministically associated with certain historical, political, geographical and other 
factors.  
 
In our case, our sample comprises of bilateral trade flows for 60 jurisdictions that share a 
great deal of common cultural, historical and institutional framework. We therefore 
concur with Egger’s point of view on the FEM above.  Any estimation carried out without 
properly accounting for these factors will suffer from heterogeneous bias. We control for 
these factors by allowing each jurisdiction-pair to have its own dummy variable. 
 
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we present a simple summary of the possible 
relationships between bilateral trade flows, GDP and distance using simple scatter plots 
and other descriptive tools. Second, we look more formally at the relationship using 
standard OLS regression methods for panel data. We use the FEM in addition to the 
pooled estimator. Using the Chi square test, the null hypothesis which states that 
unobserved heterogeneity does not exist is either rejected or not. Other hypotheses which 
consider the interaction effect between economic sizes and specific trade costs proxies 
(e.g. distance and contiguity), as well as the individual and combined effect of these 
variables on bilateral trade flows in the selected jurisdictions are considered. The 
robustness of both the baseline specification and the other models is tested for all four 
samples using the traditional OLS estimators and other advanced techniques discussed 
above.  
 
                                                          
17




2.4.3 Gravity Variables: Correlation vs. Causation  
We now take a quick look at the data with respect to discussions so far on the gravity 
model. To achieve this, we plot the log of bilateral trade flows against the log of GDP for 
the exporting jurisdiction, log of GDP for the importing jurisdiction, and the log of 
bilateral distance. Figures 2.2-2.5 below show the results for our four data sets. 
 







Figure 2.3: Canada-US Subsample 
 
 
The plots provide evidence of a positive relationship between bilateral trade flows and 
economic sizes, and a negative one with distance. In addition to that, we see that the 
strength of the relationship between lnEXPijt and lnGDPit differs significantly from that of 
lnEXPijt and lnGDPjt for the different data sets. While the correlation coefficient r 
between lnEXPijt and lnGDPit is 0.647, the relationship between lnEXPijt and lnGDPjt is 
much weaker, with an r value of 0.393. A variety of factors can be adduced for this, but 
we are unable to disentangle them since we are using the full sample. 
 
We observe that while the Canada-US subsample has a stronger relationship for the 
lnEXPijt-lnGDPit nexus, the US.-US. subsample shows the strongest relationship for both 




The relatively higher correlation between lnEXPijt and lnDST for the US subsample may 
be interpreted to mean that when we control for other things, bilateral trade responds 
more to distance among US states, compared to interprovincial trade in Canada and US.-
Canada trade. This seems plausible because of the relative homogeneity across US states, 
compared to Canada. 
 






Figure 2.5: US-US Subsample  
 
 
It is clear in the data, prior to any sophisticated use of controls, that there is some 
preliminary evidence for the economic size and trade cost effects predicted by the gravity 
model. While these correlations are consistent with our priors as well as the literature 
reviewed earlier on the gravity model, one has to be careful interpreting these, especially 
the economic size effect, as causal. It is perfectly plausible that the causation runs in the 
opposite direction:  a higher level of trade flows increases total output. Many authors 




The concerns of reverse causality raised above can be addressed by using instrumental 
variable estimation, conditional on finding appropriate instruments. Another alternative is 
to use a DPD framework where the lags of variables are used as instruments; the 
Arellano-Bond or Blundell-Bond GMM estimators are suitable candidates here. The 
challenge with this method though is that PPML or related methods cannot then be used; 
this is always a trade-off. Unfortunately, a more thorough treatment of reverse causality is 
beyond the scope of the chapter in order to focus on the three estimation issues outlined. 
2.5 Estimation Results 
2.5.1 Full Sample Results 
In this section, two tables are presented to summarize our estimation results. Tables 2.5 
and 2.6 show the estimation results based on the full sample, with the former based on the 
standard gravity model and the latter for the extended model. All the different estimators 
are presented in both cases. Each table shows the results of using both the traditional OLS 
method and other advanced techniques, including a FEM, in order to check the robustness 
of the model. As discussed earlier, we use the FEM in addition to the other estimators 
because the former allows for variation among the observations in the sample data in 
response to jurisdiction-pair fixed effects and, as a result, it takes into account within 
jurisdiction-pair variations.  
 
In order to validate the specification and estimation of a FEM, we carry out a Hausman 
test which basically tests whether the unique errors (𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡) are correlated with the 
regressors or not. We specify the null hypothesis that the preferred model is random 
effects, while the alternative specifies a FEM (Green, 2008). We therefore reject the null 
hypothesis of no fixed effects. Likewise, we carry out the standard F-test for the joint 
significance of jurisdiction-pair dummies and conclude that unobserved heterogeneity is 
present and OLS estimation yields biased and inconsistent estimates. Also, a quick check 
for heteroscedasticity is necessary at this point. Figure 2.6 below shows the relationships 
between the residuals and the fitted values. This graph confirms the presence of 




Figure 2.6: Residuals vs. Fitted Values Plot 
 
 
We estimate different versions of Equations 2.10 and 2.11 using four classes of 
estimators: OLS for models with logged dependent variables, PPML for bilateral trade 
flows in levels, FGLS for purging our dataset of heteroscedasticity from the disturbance 
process, and panel methods for unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
The first column in each of Tables 2.6 and 2.7 below shows the results of the model 
estimated with OLS using the logarithm of bilateral trade flows after truncating 
jurisdiction-pairs with zero trade flows. As explained earlier, the second column reports 
the OLS estimates adding a constant which equals one; the assumption here is that zero 
trade flows take a value of one. This is not a theoretically consistent assumption and may 
lead to OLS estimators with higher standard errors compared to the other estimators 
















Table 2.6: Standard Gravity Model (Full Sample) 
Estimator OLS OLS PPML  PPML PPML  FGLS Panel FE 
Dependent Variable ln(Xij) ln (1 +Xij) Xij > 0 1 + ln(Xij) Xij ln(Xij) ln(Xij) 
Log of exporter's GDP 1.265*** 1.292*** 1.972*** 1.973*** 1.973*** 1.102*** 0.387*** 
 
[0.013] [0.014] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.003] [0.116] 
Log of importer's GDP 0.934*** 0.986*** 1.919*** 1.920*** 1.920*** 0.946*** 0.551*** 
 
[0.011] [0.014] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.002] [0.106] 
Log of bilateral distance -1.356*** -1.473*** -1.821*** -1.821*** -1.821*** -0.966*** 
 
 
[0.018] [0.025] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.006] 
 
Constant -11.457*** -11.969*** -16.885*** -16.896*** 
-
16.896*** -10.970*** -1.926*** 
 
[0.205] [0.227] [0.475] [0.475] [0.475] [0.048] [0.291] 
Observations 13,730 13,781 13,730 13,781 13,781 13,730 13,730 
R - squared 0.737 0.671 0.789 0.790 0.790 0.986 0.179 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Xij in all cases except for Poisson regressions, where 
bilateral trade flows Xij are expressed in levels. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 1%, 








Table 2.7: Extended Gravity Model (Full Sample)  
Estimator OLS OLS PPML  PPML PPML  FGLS Panel FE 
Dependent Variable ln(Xij) ln (1 +Xij) Xij > 0 1 + ln(Xij) Xij ln(Xij) ln(Xij) 
Log of exporter's GDP 1.158*** 1.194*** 1.896*** 1.897*** 1.938*** 1.158*** 0.395*** 
 
[0.012] [0.013] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.000] [0.116] 
Log of importer's GDP 0.921*** 0.976*** 1.846*** 1.846*** 1.908*** 0.921*** 0.545*** 
 
[0.010] [0.014] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.000] [0.106] 
Log of bilateral distance -1.077*** -1.237*** -1.193*** -1.194*** -1.761*** -1.077*** 
 
 
[0.020] [0.031] [0.036] [0.036] [0.039] [0.000] 
 Log of per capita income 
differential -0.075*** -0.099*** -0.176*** -0.176*** -0.194*** -0.075*** 0.002 
 
[0.009] [0.012] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.000] [0.010] 




[0.009] [0.012] [0.020] [0.020] [0.022] [0.000] [0.008] 




[0.008] [0.010] [0.021] [0.021] [0.019] [0.000] [0.007] 
Contiguity dummy 0.319*** 0.256*** 0.748*** 0.747*** n/a 0.319*** 
 
 














[0.193] [0.220] [0.478] [0.478] [0.475] [0.003] [0.301] 
Observations 13,730 13,781 13,730 13,781 13,781 13,730 13,730 
R - squared 0.783 0.701 0.836 0.837 0.81 1.000 0.180 
 Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Xij in all cases except for Poisson regressions, 
where bilateral trade flows Xij are expressed in levels. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 




coefficients in column two are higher than those in column one for both tables. The third, 
fourth and fifth columns present the results of Poisson estimates using truncated, 
replaced, and retained zero flows, respectively. Results based on FGLS estimation 
procedure are presented in column six, while the last column shows the fixed effects 
estimates.  
 
In general terms, the results of the standard gravity model are very similar to those of the 
extended model, with little differences. To keep things simple, I first compare the results 
of the former with the latter, and report any stark contrasts. Thereafter, our full sample 
analysis proceeds with the extended model only, which is our baseline model. First, the 
coefficient estimate of exporter’s GDP in the standard model is higher than that of the 
extended model across all estimation strategies, with the exception of the FGLS and 
FEM. This is even more pronounced in the case of importer’s GDP: the standard model 
has higher estimated coefficients in all cases.  
 
The same trend is observed for bilateral distance: the absolute value of estimated 
coefficient is higher in all cases for the standard model, compared to the baseline model; 
the only exception here being the FGLS estimator. As discussed earlier, the effects trade 
costs on trade flows patterns can suffer from misinterpretation if the issue of unobserved 
heterogeneity is not adequately resolved. The baseline model has a better explanatory 
power than the standard gravity model across all the seven estimators. Obviously, the use 
of more control variables seems to significantly improve the goodness of fit in all cases. 
 
We now analyze the results from the extended model in Table 2.7 based on our full 
sample. In general, differences in estimation techniques seem to affect only the 
magnitudes of the estimated parameters, but not their signs. The only exception though is 
the coefficient of per capita income differential. This comes out with a positive sign when 
estimated with the fixed effects method, compared with the other six cases where the sign 
is negative. All variables are found to be statistically significant at the 1% level, and the 
goodness of fit ranges from 0.701 to 0.837. The estimated coefficients are also significant 
economically, given the right signs and plausible magnitudes that enable us conclude that 
 66 
 
size, distance and other variables indeed determine bilateral trade flows. We notice that 
the within R-squared for the fixed effect estimator is considerably low, but this is normal 
considering that we are using the within estimator here. Also, the FGLS estimator has a 
100% goodness of fit. This looks bizarre at first; but when we consider the fact that the 
FGLS estimator itself is computed using weighted least squares based on an analytical 
weight of 1/ z
2
, this result becomes plausible. 
 
Using datasets with truncated, replaced, and retained zero trade flows, it turns out that 
both the PPML and OLS-estimated coefficients show remarkable similarities, albeit the 
OLS estimates are much smaller than for PPML. Santos Silva and Tenreyro attribute this 
to the fact that residuals for zero trade flows are also very close to zero since the 
estimated value of trade is close to zero. This does not pose much problem in our case 
since there are only 51 zero trade flows in the full sample. Another general observation is 
that the standard errors for OLS and FGLS estimates are much lower than those under 
PPML, an indication of a more accurate estimation with the least square method. For the 
FGLS, the estimated standard errors are extremely small and close to zero in most cases. 
 
Except for the PPML where we introduce bilateral trade flows in levels, the dependent 
variable is the log of exports in all cases. In line with our a priori expectations, the 
coefficients of the standard gravity variables come out with the hypothesized signs and 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The duo of exporter’s GDP and importer’s 
GDP both affect bilateral trade flows positively regardless of the estimation method used, 
while the inverse relationship between trade and bilateral distance is upheld in all cases. 
These coefficients are economically significant. 
 
Also, the results show that the estimated income elasticity of trade is closer to the 
theoretical value of 1 when the model is estimated using the log of bilateral trade flows, 
compared with trade flows in levels. Therefore, it is not surprising that the coefficients of 
exporter’s GDP and importer’s GDP are approximately equal to 1 with OLS and FGLS, 
and about 2 for PPML. The fixed effects results show significantly lower estimates. In all 
cases, the coefficients of exporter’s GDP are much higher than for importer’s GDP; in 
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partial agreement with the OLS results of Santos Silva and Tenreyro, but not their 
PPML’s – where the reverse is the case. Santos Silva and Tenreyro’s observation is 
worthy of note here: the assumption of unit income elasticities in the simple gravity 
framework contradicts the observation of a decreasing trade-to-GDP ratio with increasing 
total GDP. The income elasticities of trade for the PPML estimates show strikingly close 
values for both exporters and importers, but the FEM is an exception. 
 
Our results confirm the role of bilateral distance as a barrier to trade flows between a 
jurisdiction-pair, although the effects are generally comparable among the different 
estimators. For the truncated zeros sample, the estimated effect of distance on trade flows 
is the same for OLS and FGLS at -1.077. This implies that bilateral distance reduces trade 
by 1.1% for every percentage increase in the distance itself. Compared to other 
international studies, e.g. Tinbergen (1962), Frankel (1993), Cheng and Wall (2005), 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) and Herrera (2012), the 
point estimate of the distance variable is somewhat large. One reason for this, according 
to McCallum (1995), maybe because most North American trade goes by air and land, 
compared to most global trade which is transported by water. Also, water transport is 
much cheaper than other modes of transport.  
 
The same value of 1.077 for OLS and FGLS is plausible since bilateral distance is time-
invariant, and FGLS is used to estimate the variance structure of an unknown disturbance 
process. The standard errors show further that the FGLS is consistent and asymptotically 
more efficient than OLS; hence FGLS is a good alternative to OLS in large samples 
(Baltagi 2008; Baum 2006). Across the board, PPML (under retained zero trade flows) 
has the highest effect at -1.761, followed by OLS (under replaced zero trade flows) at -
1.237.  
 
Accurately identifying the magnitudes of coefficients is a necessary step for assessing 
their economic significance.  After the pioneering research of Tinbergen (1962) and 
Poynohen (1963) applied the gravity model to international trade, most gravity 
regressions have typically yielded high R-squared in the 0.65-0.95 range (Sohn, 2005). 
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Our results agree with this; the model fits the data well, explaining over three quarters of 
the variation in bilateral trade flows, in most cases. 
Based on the preceding literature framework and theoretical issues, and following the 
hypotheses advanced in section 2.3.5, a positive effect of economic size, and a negative 
effect of distance are expected on bilateral trade flows, respectively. Across all 
specifications, the three baseline variables (exporter’s GDP, importer’s GDP and bilateral 
distance) are economically significant with meaningful interpretations.  
 
In all cases, the income elasticity of trade is close to the theoretical value of 1, with the 
coefficients of exporter’s GDP much higher than for importer’s GDP. The notable 
exception is the FEM with much lower values and reasons have been adduced. For 
instance, a 1% increase in exporter’s GDP is associated with an increase in bilateral trade 
flows of 0.4%; a 1% increase in importer’s GDP will increase trade by 0.6%.  As well, 
with distance elasticity of trade coefficient values generally stable and hovering around 
unity, results confirm that trade costs increase with distance in a log-linear way. In all, 
elasticities of trade to size and distance close to unity are plausible and economically 
meaningful. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 on the positive effect of economic size on bilateral 
trade, and Hypothesis 2 on the negative effect of distance on bilateral trade, are strongly 
supported. We conclude that the bilateral trade between two regions is proportional to 
their respective sizes, measured by their GDP, and inversely proportional to the 
geographic distance between them. 
 
We also conclude that jurisdictions that share a common border tend to trade more, as the 
contiguity dummy has highly statistically significant coefficients which are positive in all 
cases. The extent to which the presence of a border affects the intensities of economic 
exchange between a jurisdiction-pair, after controlling for bilateral distance, turns out to 
be more pronounced under the PPML than when OLS is used. The border effect is 
calculated here as (e
vi– 1) x 100, where vi is the estimated coefficient from Table 2.7. Our 
results show that the presence of a border between two jurisdictions in the sample 
increases bilateral trade flows by about 38%, 111% and 38% for the OLS, PPML, and 
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FGLS techniques, respectively. Similar to the marginal effect for the distance variable, 
the estimated border effect is exactly the same under OLS and FGLS.  
 
Again, the explanation under the bilateral distance variable will suffice for the contiguity 
dummy here. In the words of Wall (2000), “what is surprising about Canada-US trade is 
not how large it is compared to trade between other international trading partners, but 
how small it is compared with the level of trade within the two countries”. Our results 
uphold the border effect. In terms of economic significance, the values of 38%, 111% and 
38% for the OLS, PPML and FGLS techniques show that borders – international or 
domestic – represent large barriers to trade. In other words, after controlling for distance 
and size, borders inhibit trade flows since they impede the integration of markets, with 
negative welfare consequences. It is therefore important to accurately estimate the 
economic significance of the border effects at the domestic and international levels. We 
discuss the economic significance of both domestic and international border effects under 
section 2.5.2 below. 
 
Table 2.7 provides mixed evidence regarding the Linder hypothesis and Heckscher–Ohlin 
factor endowment proposition. Our research hypothesis expects a negative sign for the 
coefficient of per capita income differential to support the Linder-hypothesis, and this is 
upheld in the empirical results, albeit the effects are stretched over a wide range of 0.075 
and 0.194 for the various estimators. Thus, a 100% increase in per capita income 
differential decreases trade by 7.5% and 19.4% for the low and high estimates, 
respectively. The Linder coefficients are economically and statistically significant with 
sensible interpretations: similar levels of per capita income produce similar tastes, which 
lead to the production of similar but differentiated products, which result in higher 
bilateral trade flows between jurisdiction-pairs.  
 
In stark comparison, however, the coefficients of both human capital differential and 
physical capital stock differential appear with negative signs, refuting the Heckscher–
Ohlin hypothesis: a conjecture that jurisdictions should trade more, the more different 
their factor endowments. As stated under Hypothesis 4, a positive relationship between 
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factor endowment differentials and bilateral trade flows will support the Heckscher–Ohlin 
proposition. In other words, jurisdictions should trade more, the more different their 
factor endowments. Canada and the US have similar human and physical capital 
endowments, so we expected a positive sign on the Heckscher–Ohlin variables to support 
the Heckscher–Ohlin proposition. Similar to the Linder scenario above, the Heckscher–
Ohlin coefficients are economically and statistically significant, ranging from a high 
absolute value of 0.305 to a low value of 0.198.  
 
According to Leamer (1995), commodities exchange among regions amounts to indirect 
factor arbitrage since services of otherwise immobile production factors are transferred 
from regions with surplus to regions with deficit. A fundamental insight from the 
Heckscher–Ohlin model is that traded commodities are nothing more than bundles of 
production factors – land, labour and capital. Large differences in regions’ factor 
endowments generate specialization in production. The empirical result here merits a 
more detailed investigation, but we will not pursue it further. It turns out that the major 
differences among the seven estimators are reflected in the relative magnitudes of 
coefficients.  
 
The FEM finds modest effects on trade from economic sizes and distances, like the other 
estimators. Compared to the baseline estimation technique (i.e. OLS with truncated zero 
data in this case), the economic size effect based on the FEM is much weaker – a 1% 
increase in exporter’s GDP is associated with an increase in bilateral trade flows of 0.4%. 
Likewise, a 1% increase in importer’s GDP will increase trade by 0.6%, compared to 
1.2% for exporter’s GDP and importer’s GDP using the baseline technique. The lower 
estimates of the FEM, compared to other estimators shows a tradeoff: fixed effects 
account for multilateral resistance. 
 
The significantly lower coefficient estimates for the FEM shows that unobserved 
heterogeneity does have a huge impact on the results of gravity model estimates. With 
jurisdiction-pair heterogeneity accounted for, certain deterministic factors (e.g. historical, 
political, and geographical factors) driving trade flows explain why the fixed effects-
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estimated log of exporter’s GDP and log of importer’s GDP for the full sample are 
significantly lower than what we have for other estimators.  The economic size effect here 
implies that there are pair-specific effects that maybe correlated with the trade flows 
between a jurisdiction-pair.  Suffice it to say though that the FEM seems to not fit the 
model well, compared with the other estimators. For instance, while the coefficient 
estimate of the log of per capita income differential turns out to be statistically 
insignificant, that of log of physical capital stock differential is barely significant only at 
the 10% level.  
 
2.5.2 Estimation Results for Subsamples 
In this section, Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 summarize our regression results for the Canada-
US, US-US and Canada-Canada subsamples. Looking at the standard gravity variables, 
the results indicate that the effect of each of exporter’s GDP, importer’s GDP and 
bilateral distance on trade flows varies sharply across the different samples. Based on our 
baseline estimation method, the Canada-US subsample has a more pronounced economic 
size and distance effects, compared with the US-US and Canada-Canada samples. 
Subsamples results are generally comparable with those based on the full sample, in terms 
of statistical and economic significance of coefficients. 
 
The log of exporter’s GDP, log of importer’s GDP and log of bilateral distance each has a 
coefficient estimate of 1.330, 1.067 and -1.657 in the baseline model, compared with 
0.962, 0.938, and -0.875 for US-US trade and 1.010, 0.823 and -1.249 for Canada-Canada 
trade.  Most notably, the point estimate of importer’s GDP for the Canada-Canada sample 
turns out to be negative when estimated with the FEM, though it is not statistically 
significantly different from zero.  
 
It is also not surprising that the distance effect is higher for interprovincial trade than 
interstate trade – our descriptive statistics show that the average bilateral distance 
between a trading pair in Canada (2,888km) is much higher than in the US (2,068 km). 
The higher population density in the US (30.71 sq. km), compared to Canada’s 3.0 sq. km 
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Table 2.8: Extended Gravity Model (Canada – US Sample) 
Estimator OLS PPML FGLS Panel FE 
Dependent Variable ln(Xij) Xij  ln(Xij) ln(Xij) 
Log of exporter's GDP 1.330*** 1.911*** 1.329*** 0.578*** 
 
[0.027] [1.107] [0.001] [0.217] 
Log of importer's GDP 1.067*** 1.948*** 1.068*** 0.467** 
 
[0.029] [0.097] [0.001] [0.227] 
Log of bilateral distance -1.657*** -2.002*** -1.653*** 
 
 
[0.064] [0.164] [0.002] 
 Log of per capita income differential -0.184*** -0.262*** -0.183*** -0.027 
 
[0.026] [0.087] [0.000] [0.027] 
Log of human capital differential -0.117*** -0.628*** -0.118*** -0.060*** 
 
[0.034] [0.096] [0.001] [0.023] 
Log of physical capital differential -0.239*** 0.148 -0.238*** 0.192 
 
[0.090] [0.346] [0.002] [0.165] 
Contiguity dummy 0.299*** 0.732*** 0.290*** 
 
 
[0.076] [0.171] [0.011] 
 Constant -12.790*** -15.342*** -12.801*** -4.233*** 
 
[0.512] [2.761] [0.022] [0.755] 
Observations 2,958 2,958 2,958 2,958 
R - squared 0.730 0.812 1.000 0.124 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Xij in all cases except for Poisson regressions, where 
bilateral trade flows Xij are expressed in levels. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 1%, 







Table 2.9: Extended Gravity Model (US – US Sample) 
Estimator OLS PPML FGLS Panel FE 
Dependent Variable ln(Xij) Xij  ln(Xij) ln(Xij) 
Log of exporter's GDP 0.962*** 1.855* 0.963*** 0.236*** 
 
[0.008] [0.027] [0.001] [0.075] 
Log of importer's GDP 0.938*** 1.863* 0.938*** 0.622*** 
 
[0.008] [0.027] [0.002] [0.075] 
Log of bilateral distance -0.875*** -1.124*** -0.876*** 
 
 
[0.018] [0.037] [0.003] 
 Log of per capita income differential -0.083*** -0.185*** -0.0838** 0.009 
 
[0.008] [0.021] [0.002] [0.008] 
Log of human capital differential -0.067*** -0.164*** -0.067*** -0.011 
 
[0.008] [0.020] [0.000] [0.008] 
Log of physical capital differential -0.087*** -0.065*** -0.087*** 0.016*** 
 
[0.007] [0.022] [0.000] [0.006] 
Contiguity dummy 0.362*** 0.767*** 0.361* 
 
 
[0.015] [0.031] [0.000] 
 Constant -9.169*** -16.325*** -9.170*** -0.803*** 
 
[0.140] [0.447] [0.003] [0.245] 
Observations 10,467 10,467 10,467 10,467 
R - squared 0.805 0.842 1.000 0.233 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Xij in all cases except for Poisson regressions, where 
bilateral trade flows Xij are expressed in levels. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 1%, 







Table 2.10: Extended Gravity Model (Canada – Canada Sample) 
Estimator OLS PPML FGLS Panel FE 
Dependent Variable ln(Xij) Xij  ln(Xij) ln(Xij) 
Log of exporter's GDP 1.010*** 2.023*** 1.010*** 1.815*** 
 
[0.030] [0.079] [0.003] [0.316] 
Log of importer's GDP 0.823*** 1.876*** 0.833*** -0.284 
 
[0.026] [0.075] [0.005] [0.312] 
Log of bilateral distance -1.249*** -1.829*** -1.247*** 
 
 
[0.064] [0.148] [0.007] 
 Log of per capita income differential 0.021 0.014 0.021*** 0.119** 
 
[0.044] [0.100] [0.003] [0.058] 
Log of human capital differential -0.045 0.028 -0.056*** -0.043 
 
[0.029] [0.055] [0.007] [0.029] 
Log of physical capital differential -0.102** 0.481 0.107*** -0.134** 
 
[0.041] [0.100] [0.006] [0.059] 
Contiguity dummy 0.012 0.186** 0.019*** 
 
 
[0.046] [0.092] [0.006] 
 Constant -7.280*** -16.800*** 7.407*** -8.275*** 
 
[0.425] [1.288] [0.072] [1.111] 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
R - squared 0.897 0.936 0.999 0.707 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the logarithm of Xij in all cases except for Poisson regressions, where 
bilateral trade flows Xij are expressed in levels. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 1%, 





may partly explain this. The average bilateral distance of 2,961 km for the Canada-US 
sample also shows that trade between both countries involves a larger distance than 
sub-national trade, on average; so our point estimate for Canada-US trade is consistent 
with the descriptive statistics. 
 
Next, we look at the border effect. Focusing on the parameter of interest – contiguity 
dummy – the estimated coefficients of 0.299 (Canada-US) and 0.362 (US-US) are 
highly significant, statistically and economically. These coefficients are comparable to 
estimates from some of the seminal papers cited under the literature review – e.g. 
McCallum. As stated under Hypothesis 3, there is a negative effect of the border on 
bilateral trade flows, with a stronger negative effect expected on state-province trade, 
compared to interstate and interprovincial trade. In addition, our hypothesis expects a 
stronger negative effect of the border on interprovincial trade, compared to interstate 
trade. This means we expect the influence of the border on trade to be substantially 
less for interstate trade, compared to interprovincial trade. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show 
that the US-US subsample (0.362) has a more pronounced border effect than Canada-
US trade (0.299). This upholds Hypothesis 3a: there is a stronger negative effect of the 
border on state-province trade, compared to interstate trade. The fact that sharing a 
common border has a greater influence on US-US trade than Canada-US trade does 
not come as a surprise. After controlling for distance, we expect Texas and New 
Mexico, for instance, to trade more than Montana and Saskatchewan, on average.  
 
The point estimate for Canada-Canada trade turns out to be statistically insignificant. 
However, the FGLS estimates allow us to compare Canada-Canada border effect with 
the other two samples, since the point estimates of the contiguity dummies are all 
statistically significant under the FGLS scenario. Point estimates of 0.361, 0.290 and 
0.019 for interstate, Canada-US and interprovincial trades, respectively, imply that 
trade between two contiguous jurisdictions is 43.5%, 33.6% and 1.92% higher than 
trade between jurisdictions that do not share a border. These estimates are 
economically significant as well. Comparing only Canada-US and interprovincial 
trades like McCallum, this is a factor of 17-to-1 (i.e. 33.6%-to-1.92%). In other words, 
after controlling for scale and distance, interprovincial trade is about 17 times more 
important than state-province trade. This agrees with Hypothesis 3b on a stronger 
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negative effect of the border on interprovincial trade, compared to interstate trade. 
This finding is consistent with major findings on the border effect; e.g. McCallum 
(1995), Wall (2000) and Anderson van Wincoop (2003). This finding confirms the 
well-known home bias in trade, which Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) refer to as one of 
the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics. Our results uphold the home 
bias argument; thus, we present new estimates for the Canada-US border effect.  
 
Furthermore, using the same McCallum-type gravity equation with the same 1993 
data, Anderson van Wincoop estimate a McCallum-type border effect of 1.6 for 
interstate trade. In our case, we find a border effect of one – with a factor of roughly 
1-to-1 (i.e. 33.6%-to-43.5%). Again, our result is comparable to Anderson van 
Wincoop’s 1.6.  Anderson van Wincoop explain the relatively small interstate border 
effect (and the seemingly large discrepancy between Anderson van Wincoop and 
McCallum’s interprovincial border effect) away by the smallness in size of the 
Canadian economy, compared to the US. As discussed under the review of literature 
in section 2.2.2, Anderson van Wincoop derive a decomposition of trade resistance 
into three parts: (i) the bilateral trade barrier between region i and region j, (ii) i’s 
resistance to trade with all regions, and (iii) j’s resistance to trade with all regions. 
They reason that compared to the US, a small trade barrier between Canada (a small 
open economy that trades a lot with the rest of the world, with the US being the 
dominant trade partner) and its other trading partners has a large effect on multilateral 
resistance of the provinces. They see the inclusion of the multilateral resistance 
variable as a way of modeling the effect of trade barriers on trade flows, while 
controlling for omitted variable bias. 
 
International trade volumes remain small compared to intranational trade. Again, the 
seminal work by McCallum compares trade among the provinces with the states for 
1988 using a gravity framework; McCallum concludes that interprovincial trade is 
about twenty times larger than province-state trade. McCallum says national borders 
matter, since “even the relatively innocuous Canada-US border continues to have a 
decisive effect on continental trade patterns”.  After McCallum, other studies have 
estimated smaller, but comparable border effects (e.g. Helliwell, 1998 and Anderson 
van Wincoop, 2003). The study by Anderson van Wincoop, in particular, estimates a 
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border effect that lies in the 14-16 range. Again, we join the list of researchers in this 
field. 
 
Combined with the distance effect discussed earlier, we take this discussion a step 
further by computing how wide the border is – based on both the distance and border 
effects. In addition to a variety of cultural, historical, linguistic, institutional and 
political obstacles, distance and borders constitute a major impediment to both 
intranational and international trade. Given the rapid rate of globalization and 
disappearance of trade walls, many wonder when the notion of a borderless world will 
become reality. Among other things, the law of one price establishes the lack of 
perfect market integration as the reason why the prices of similar goods will not 
equalize. Friedman (2005) in his popular book, “The World is Flat”, talks about the 
notion of a ‘flat earth’ with perfect market integration. The Commission on Growth 
and Development (2008), for instance, recommends a rapid integration into the global 
economy as a major ingredient needed for economic growth. 
 
Based on the specified gravity equation, the border effect parameter is simply the ratio 
of interprovincial weighted trade to US-Canada weighted trade. Using the McCallum-
type border effect [i.e. parameter exp (e)], we estimate the width of the US-Canada 
border in this thesis. As discussed under sections 2.3.4.3 and 2.3.4.8, distance is 
modeled as the logarithm of the distance between two cities i and j, while border is 
proxied by an indicator variable of common borders with unity if a jurisdiction-pair 
shares a border and zero for lack of common border. Data on road distances are 
measured in kilometers based on the capital city of each jurisdiction. Engel and 
Rogers (1996)
 18
 estimate a distance effect of 75,000 miles (based on their central 
estimate) and 1,780 miles (using the 95% upper confidence estimate for the 




Equation 2.13 below shows the simple framework needed to achieve our objective: 
 
ln(𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln(𝐷𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗) +  𝛼2𝐵𝐷𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (2.13) 
                                                          
18
 Engel and Rogers
18
 (1996) use the covariability of prices between Canadian and US domestic and 
international city pairs. 
 
19
 Parsley and Wei (1999) focus on the US and Japan. 
 78 
 
We follow the Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (1999)
 
 analyses; the 
border effect is stated in terms of an equivalent distance, using our estimated gravity 




).  Again, based on the FGLS estimator the coefficients on the log of distance 
(contiguity dummy) for the interstate, Canada-US and interprovincial samples are -
0.876 (0.361), -1.653 (0.290) and -1.247(0.019), respectively.   
Using the US-Canada sample, we estimate a distance effect of exp (0.290/-1.653) = 
1.19 kilometers.  The PPML and OLS estimates produce distance effects of 1.44 and 
1.20 kilometers, respectively. Obviously this estimate is small, considering that the 
average bilateral distance in our Canada-US sample is 2,961 km. More so, Engel and 
Rogers estimate 75,000 miles and 1,780 miles using two different coefficients above. 
Our candidate explanation for this observation is that the estimated distance 
elasticities in our regressions are unrealistically high. Such high distance coefficients 
apparently affect the ability of the Engel and Rogers equation to deliver reasonable 
estimates of the distance effect. In addition to that, the fact that the distance variable is 
modeled in its logarithmic form may be a contributory factor. 
We next consider an alternative strategy to estimate the distance equivalent of the 
border. Helliwell (2002) suggests that a comparison between the distance and border 
effects should provide an adequate measure of the border effect in terms of an 
equivalent increase in distance, if truly both distance and borders determine the 
strength of economic linkages between two jurisdictions. Following Parsley and Wei 
(1999) and Helliwell
20
 (2002), we determine the increase in distance that is needed to 
exactly offset the border effects, using the average distance between both jurisdictions 
as the baseline. While Helliwell (2002) is based on an equality method, Parsley and 
Wei’s (1999) strategy uses only the estimated intercept, but not the coefficient on the 
border dummy.  
Suppose Y represents the observed average bilateral trade flows between Canadian 
and US jurisdictions, we compute the distance equivalent of the border effect as the 
value of Z that solves Equation 2.14 below (see Parsley and Wei, 1999): 
 
                                                          
20
 Helliwell suggests that the supposed distance effect with and without taking account of the 
intervening border should be estimated. 
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ln(𝑌) =  𝛼 +  𝛽 ln(distance + 𝑍)        2.14 
 
Based on the summary statistics from Table 2.3, the mean bilateral trade volume Y and 
mean distance for the Canada-US sample are $401million and 2,961 km, respectively. 
From the regression results in Table 2.9 and following Equation 2.14 above, α and β 
values for OLS (-12.790 and -1.657), PPML (-15.342 and -2.002) and FGLS (-12.801 
and -1.653) are as provided in the brackets, respectively. The value of Z for each of 
the three models is not significantly different from the average bilateral distance value 
of 2,961 km.  Again, the excessively high distance elasticities in our regressions do 
not help the predictive powers of the Parsley and Wei (1999) and Helliwell (2002) 
methods. 
   
Many of the other regressors, included to test the Linder hypothesis and Heckscher-
Ohlin proposition, are also quite different across the various subsamples – both for the 
baseline model and others, albeit not significantly. The log of per capita income 
differential has a negative coefficient estimate for both Canada-US trade and US-US 
trade, just like the full sample. In a stark comparison, however, this coefficient turns 
out to be positive for all five estimators in our interprovincial sample, albeit it is 
statistically insignificant for our benchmark estimator and PPML. This coefficient is 
insignificant under the FEM for both interstate and Canada-US trade. Focusing on the 
baseline model, again, we conclude that the Linder hypothesis holds for Canada-US 
trade and US-US trade, while the Heckscher-Ohlin proposition is not supported; we 
do not take a position on interprovincial trade because of statistically insignificant 
variables. Interestingly, the parameter estimates on the per capita income differential 
variable are markedly lower for interstate trade, in comparison to the Canada-US 
sample. Rather curiously, coefficient estimates of human capital differential and 
physical capital differential are also relatively lower in the US-US sample, compared 
to the Canada-US sample. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter examines the extent to which trade costs, modeled by distance and 
contiguity, influence intranational and international trade. In an attempt to estimate the 
magnitude and direction of both east-west and north-south trade in Canada and the 
US, we provide an alternative framework which pays special attention to estimation 
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issues related to unobserved heterogeneity, log-linearization in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, and logarithmic transformation of zero bilateral trade flows.   Our 
methodology recognizes that in the presence of these issues, the biases that are present 
in the various strategies employed to estimate the gravity model often produce 
misleading estimates of bilateral trade flows determinants.   
 
Faced with a multiplicative gravity model, log-linearization in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity produces a form of transformation that can alter the properties of 
the error term and produce inefficient estimates, as a result of the huge difference 
between the estimates of the log-linearized model and those of a gravity model 
estimated in levels.  We go with Martinez-Zarzoro et al.’s suggestion on the ability of 
the FGLS method to solve this problem, by ignoring the exact form of 
heteroscedasticity.  The other strategy is the reliance on Santos Silva and Tenreyro’s 
PPML, a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator which assigns the same weight to all 
observations. The use of the PPML estimator comes with a cost – lesser accuracy in 
the presence of zero trade flows.   
 
The presence of zero bilateral trade flows are a common occurrence in international 
trade. Choosing to completely ignore or replace zeros with a small positive number 
creates sample selection bias that renders parameter estimates inefficient for predictive 
purposes, and for trade policy analysis, by extension.  Under a zero truncation 
scenario, we use the FGLS method, while the PPML estimator is the preferred 
alternative when the incidences of zero trade values are infrequent. Our third strategy 
for the zero trade issue is to simply replace the value of bilateral trade flows by the 
value of trade flows plus one: i.e. instead of using ln(Xij) as the dependent variable, 
we use ln(1 + Xij) instead.  The final methodological issue is the problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity. This issue is addressed by using a panel data set which 
incorporates the FEM to disentangle the time invariant region-specific effects and to 
capture the relationships between the relevant variables over time.  
 
To achieve our objectives, a number of hypotheses are advanced. We pay special 
attention to the issue of within-country and international borders, leading to the 
hypothesis that there is a stronger negative effect of the border on state-province trade, 
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compared to interstate and interprovincial trade. This is based on the notion that if the 
border is truly a deterrent to trade, Canadian provinces should trade more with each 
other than U.S. states. The other equally important hypothesis is that there is a 
stronger negative effect of the border on interprovincial trade, compared to interstate 
trade. In other words, we expect the influence of the border on trade to be 
substantially less for interstate trade, compared to interprovincial trade. 
 
For the full sample, we find across all specifications that the coefficients of exporter’s 
GDP, importer’s GDP and bilateral distance are economically significant with 
meaningful interpretations. Estimated elasticities of trade to size and distance close to 
unity. With a statistically and economically contiguity dummy, we also conclude that 
the presence of a border affects the intensities of economic exchange between a 
jurisdiction-pair, after controlling for bilateral distance. The border effect is more 
pronounced under the PPML than when OLS is used.  
 
For the sub-samples, statistically and economically significant coefficients of 0.299 
(Canada-US) and 0.362 (US-US) are comparable to estimates from some of the 
seminal papers cited under the literature review – e.g. McCallum. This upholds the 
hypothesis that there is a stronger negative effect of the border on international trade, 
compared to within-country trade. Notwithstanding a statistically insignificant border 
effect for the Canada-Canada sub-sample, we find with the aid of the FGLS method, 
after controlling for scale and distance, that interprovincial trade is about 17 times 
more important than state-province trade. This upholds the hypothesis that there is a 
stronger negative effect of the border on interprovincial trade, compared to interstate 
trade. This finding is consistent with major findings on the border effect; e.g. 
McCallum (1995), Wall (2000) and Anderson van Wincoop (2003).  
 
We also compute how wide the border is – based on both the distance and border 
effects. Our estimated distance equivalent of the border effect is not significantly 
different from the average bilateral distance value of 2,961 km.  We conclude that the 
unrealistically high distance elasticities in our regressions do not help the predictive 




Results in this chapter provide mixed evidence for the Heckscher-Ohlin proposition 
and the Linder hypothesis; the former is refuted, while the latter is supported. We find 
that a 100% increase in per capita income differential will dampen trade by 7.5% and 
19.4% for the low and high estimates, respectively.  In stark comparison, negative 
signs on the coefficients of both the human capital differential and physical capital 
stock differential refute the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis that jurisdictions should trade 
more, the more different their factor endowments. Similar to the Linder scenario, the 
Heckscher-Ohlin coefficients are economically and statistically significant, ranging 
from a high absolute value of 0.305 to a low value of 0.198. 
 
Overall, the findings in this chapter are reassuring, considering that not only are 
bilateral trade flows from all provinces and states used, the three methodological 
challenges that qualify the results of most gravity studies are equally addressed. There 
are practical implications for the results. Despite the seemingly large similarities in 
geography, culture, institutional framework, climate, history and economy, the Canada 
- US border remains a major factor that influences the patterns of trade flows between 
both countries. An estimated within-country border effect of 43.5% for interstate 
trade, compared to 1.92% for interprovincial trade, shows that the border effect is 
more pronounced in Canada than in the US. Compared to McCallum and Anderson 
and van Wincoop estimates, this also shows a decline, over time, in the home bias 
syndrome for Canadian provinces, reflecting, in a way, the effects of NAFTA’s full 
implementation and AIT’s progress.  
 
Our results reject the notion that trade is driven by differences in relative factor 
endowments between regions.  Historically and relatively speaking, the economies of 
Canada and the US both have labour and capital in abundance. To the extent that gains 
from specialization arise because of differences between regions, the results that we 
see may be due to the lack of sharp contrast in their resource endowments. 
 
That said, more research is needed to explore what impact a reduction in aggregation 
bias may have on estimated parameters. The reasoning behind this is simple: 
disaggregated industry-level trade data will better capture trade costs heterogeneity 
and border effects across sectors. 
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Chapter 3      Fiscal Federalism and Trade Openness:  
A Canada-US Dynamic Panel Specification 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relative importance of intergovernmental fiscal 
redistribution and trade openness as determinants of economic growth in Canada and 
the US – two federations with different divisions of powers between national and sub-
national governments. The central economic argument for most countries organized 
along federalist grounds is that economic integration helps maximize efficiency gains 
from common markets as a result of free trade and factor mobility; at the same time, 
decentralized decision making ensures welfare maximization by ensuring that local 
policies are customized to the needs of often heterogeneous populations with different 
regional tastes (Kessler and Lessmann, 2008).  
  
Fiscal transfers have redistributive consequences, even when it is not a policy 
objective, ex-ante. Canada and the US share many commonalities in their 
intergovernmental fiscal regimes, albeit significant differences abound. For instance, 
both federations have two or more orders of government acting directly, rather than 
through another level of government, on the citizens; and in particular, there is a 
constitutionally defined distribution of expenditure responsibilities and revenue 
sources (Boadway and Watts, 2000). Unlike the US, however, where there is no 
harmonization in the various state and federal taxing programs, Canada’s fiscal regime 
is relatively more integrated.  
 
For instance, the provinces have more flexibility and discretion in the delivery of 
health, education and social services, compared to US states. Also, while Canada’s 
Equalization program is explicitly intended to redistribute resources among provinces, 
this program has no direct counterpart in the US; the US federal government transfers 
resources to the states through the Grants-in-Aid system, a much more complex 
system.  
 
Clearly, the decentralization-growth question remains open, as most cross-country 
econometric studies provide weak evidence chiefly because results change depending 
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on the countries examined. Canada and the US are two of the most sophisticated and 
decentralized fiscal unions in the world. Both federal-provincial and federal-state 
relations provide for sovereign powers in many areas, including taxing power and the 
ability to tap all significant sources of revenue, including natural resources.   
 
By looking at sub-national regions in both countries that share many common 
characteristics typical of a fiscal union, we control for many jurisdiction-specific 
features that might obscure the dynamics of the decentralization-growth nexus.  As 
expected, differences in the economic structures and performances among different 
regions are likely to have an impact on the way fiscal redistribution affects income 
levels. Using a dynamic panel of Canada-US data, we estimate the importance of 
redistributive flows by regressions which estimate the relationship between personal 
income after federal taxes and transfers, and pretax personal income. This gives a 
direct measure of the degree to which fiscal transfers impact inequalities in regional 
incomes. This is the first major objective of this chapter.  
 
In the past, many restrictions on interprovincial trade were prevalent in Canada. Over 
the years, specifically starting in 1995, some efforts to ease trade were made – the 
result of which was the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) negotiated in 1994 and 
executed in 1995. The AIT is a policy initiative focused on negotiations and 
adjustments to further liberalize trade throughout the Canadian economy. 
Surprisingly, no known study has attempted to empirically evaluate the impact of this 
policy on income growth, while controlling for fiscal federalism. While this is not the 
first paper to study the implications of Canada-US interregional fiscal transfers for 
income convergence, it definitely is the first to look at this issue from a pre- and post-
AIT perspective.  Even so, we extend the analysis by applying the difference-in-
differences (DiD) methodology to better capture the effect of the AIT policy. This is 
another major contribution of this thesis. 
 
We also introduce a number of refinements in the estimation methods in order to 
increase the reliability of our econometric estimates. In particular, the attention given 
to the difference and system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator in a 
Canada-US sub-national panel data environment is worth emphasizing. Most of the 
latest literature examining the fiscal decentralization-economic growth question tends 
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to rely on cross-country ordinary least squares (OLS) empirical methodology; a few 
others incorporate the fixed effects model (FEM).  
 
Certainly, net fiscal transfers, trade openness and our other control measures are going 
to be endogenous in the model. Applying both system and difference GMM 
estimation techniques that eliminate biases associated with omitted variables, 
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity (within a regional income convergence 
framework that also examines trade liberalization effect), no doubt, is a major 
advance.  Other by-products of this chapter include: (i) updated results with Canada-
US sub-national data on the fiscal transfers-growth discussion; and (ii) estimates of 
the impacts of trade openness, educational attainment and physical capital stock on 
economic growth. 
Our control measures are among the popular variables identified in the literature as 
potential determinants of economic growth (Mankiw et al, 1992; Sala-i- Martin et al, 
2004). In the interest of keeping the model and robustness tests as simple as possible, 
we perform the tests for the baseline model first and compare our results with those 
obtained from other models. We then offer possible interpretations of the results in 
light of the estimation strategies employed.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 3.2, we review related literature. Section 
3.3 discusses some theoretical issues relating to the growth empirics model, and 
introduces our data sources and variables considered as potential determinants of 
growth under a fiscal decentralization framework. Estimation methods and empirical 









3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Fiscal Transfers and Implications  
The theoretical literature is still unclear about the precise role of fiscal policy in the 
growth process, especially fiscal transfers and taxation (see McCracken, 2006). In 
particular, public finance theorists have long cited the fairness and efficiency concerns 
associated with regional fiscal disparities as something policy makers should worry 
about. The lack of reliable and consistent regional fiscal data further compounds this 
problem. Nonetheless, the importance of fiscal policy in achieving redistribution and 
stabilization for policy makers remains undisputed. Fundamentally, all transfer 
programs involve a flow of resources from central to sub-national governments. 
Whether intended or not, this has redistributive consequences.  
 
Ma (1997), for instance, believes that the need to correct vertical fiscal imbalances, 
horizontal fiscal imbalances and inter-jurisdictional spill-over effects are some of the 
economic rationales for intergovernmental transfers.  Fiscal transfer programs in many 
federal systems try to equalize differences in the tax capacities of regional 
jurisdictions. While equity considerations have a way of making regional 
redistribution appear as a pro-growth policy, economic efficiency arguments clearly 
reject such arguments based on the deadweight loss generated when equilibrium for a 
good or service is not Pareto optimal. Policy makers therefore constantly face the 
dilemma of balancing equity arguments against the distortionary effects of fiscal 
transfers on net payers and net recipients.  
 
Arguments for and against decentralization abound in the literature. Public finance 
theory posits that fiscal decentralization helps to increase the degree of efficiency in 
the allocation of resources: lower levels of governments are closer to the people and 
are believed to have an informational advantage on the needs and preferences of 
residents, compared to central governments (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2009). 
When factor mobility advantages accrue as a result of fiscal decentralization, such 
efficiency gains will generate further benefits through the domino effect. As a pre-
condition for economic convergence, for instance, fiscal transfers to poorer regions 
will be needed to help finance the investment needed to raise the productivity levels of 
residents of these regions in order to allow them compete nationally.   
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In the contrary, some sub-national governments may not have the capacity and 
sophistication required to make optimal decisions on resource allocation, compared to 
the central government (Gill and Rodríguez-Pose, 2004).  Also, fiscal transfers to 
poorer regions may just be enough to supplement the income of regions with low 
productivity due to adverse climatic conditions or other geographic disadvantages.  
 
On Equalization transfers for instance, Canadian territories receive more on per capita 
basis than the provinces due to the harsher climatic conditions and remoteness of the 
territories, which make them sparsely populated and with high costs for public 
services. In this case, we can expect such transfers to create a disincentive for labour 
mobility, and as such, the much expected convergence in productivity may not 
happen; this can be justified based on equity considerations (Boadway and Flatters, 
1982). Likewise, employment Insurance plays a significant role in transferring income 
to regions with high unemployment; rules are designed to make qualification easier in 
high employment regions. 
 
An important function of fiscal policy in a federal system is the capacity to make 
continuing income transfers from richer to poorer regions; we agree though that such 
transfers play different roles. Many countries around the world continually restructure 
the roles of various levels of government. For those organized along federalist 
grounds – e.g. Canada, Australia, Belgium, Germany and the US – pressures continue 
to mount regarding the balance of power between the central and sub-national levels 
of governments (Fraser Institute, 2013).  The US, again, unlike Canada, has no formal 
framework – like Equalization –to transfer resources from prosperous states to less 
prosperous ones. Instead, the federal government uses the Grants-in-Aid, a subsidy-
type program that is accompanied by federal regulations, to extend its power into state 
and local affairs (Fraser Institute, 2013). 
 
While the nature of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth continues to attract considerable attention in the literature, the direction of this 
relationship remains an open question till date. Some empirical tests show a negative 
or no relationship at all [e.g. Davoodi and Zou (1998), Zhang and Zou (1998), Woller 
and Phillips (1998), and Xie et al. (1999)]; others such as Lin and Liu (2000), Akai 
and Sakata (2002) and Stansel (2005) establish a positive association. One important 
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consensus in the literature remains though: the degree of fiscal decentralization is 
important in the growth accounting process of any nation.  
 
Among others, the literature on fiscal federalism suggests three economic rationales 
for fiscal transfers (Ma, 1997).  First, in countries where national governments have 
control over the major tax bases, leaving sub-national governments with insufficient 
fiscal resources to cover their expenditure needs, vertical fiscal imbalances result. 
Fiscal transfer is therefore required to meet the resulting shortfall.  Fiscal transfers 
may also be needed to bridge differences in fiscal capacities as a result of horizontal 
fiscal imbalances.  
 
For instance, while a resource-endowed jurisdiction may have more than enough to 
provide public goods for its residents and care less about fiscal inflows from other 
levels of government, another region with a relatively higher proportion of poor, old 
and young population may be unable to cope without such transfers. In this case, 
Equalization payments will be required to close the gap between the fiscal capacity 
and fiscal need of the jurisdiction in question. In other words, a minimum standard of 
public service is required in all the federating units. In order not to increase the tax 
burden of residents, subsidies will be required from the central government by regions 
without sufficient resources to reach such minimum level.  
 
In Canada, for instance, provinces that are deemed to be eligible for Equalization 
receive monies while those designated as contributors do not receive any payments. 
For the most part, the intensity with which conditional grants are used is more 
pronounced in the US, compared to other federalist developed countries.  
 
Under the assumption of perfect factor mobility, it may not be necessary for 
government to play the role of equalization as the market itself will reallocate 
resources to achieve this end. The reality, however, is that perfect factor mobility is 
unattainable due to information issues, relocation costs and employment constraints, 
among other things.  Last but not least is the need to internalize inter-jurisdictional 
spill-over effects. Due to concerns relating to free-ridership by mobile residents and 
neighbouring jurisdictions, a sub-national government may underinvest in important 
public goods with positive externalities such as education, health and inter-regional 
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highway. In this case, the central government will have to address such sub-optimal 
provision by providing subsidies or other incentives. 
 
Bayoumi and Masson (1993) explain some of the reasons why a federal system may 
tend to support a redistributive fiscal regime. First, they claim that to the extent that 
taxes are higher in regions with high incomes, redistribution will help achieve regional 
after-tax income equalization. The fact that corporate taxes are, to a large extent, 
related to income is their second premise. Political considerations and the fact that 
poor regions are often in more social need (necessitating their residents to receive 
personal transfer payments to help in poverty alleviation) are other grounds cited by 
Bayoumi and Masson.  
 
3.2.2 Fiscal Transfers and Growth Empirics 
One of the main predictions of the neoclassical growth model is that less affluent 
regions will grow faster than more affluent ones, provided  the different regions are at 
different points relative to their steady state growth paths (Solow 1956; Swan 1956). 
This has become known as β-beta convergence; for instance, Barro (1991), Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1992), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) 
provide empirical evidence of income convergence of approximately 2% per annum 
for regions of the US, Japan and Europe.   
 
By the way, Romer (1986), among others, argues through the endogenous growth 
theory that there may be constant or increasing returns to capital – suggesting that the 
notion of convergence in per capita income may not be true. They suggest factoring in 
the positive externalities of a knowledge-based economy in the growth accounting 
process rather than some exogenous technological factors. 
 
In the subsequent paragraphs of this section, we organize the reviewed papers along 
regional and methodological themes. For the former, we look at regional studies, 
while recent panel techniques are examined for the latter. 
 
Bayoumi and Masson (1993) use fiscal transfers at the sub-national level within the 
US and Canada to analyze long-term fiscal flows (the redistributive element) and 
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short-term responses to regional business cycles (the stabilization element). While 
long-run flows amount to 22 cents of every dollar spent while the stabilization effect 
is 31 cents in the dollar for the US, Canada produces a larger redistributive effect (39 
cents) and smaller stabilization effect (17 cents). They conclude that federal flows 
appear to depend on the institutional structure of the country concerned, in addition to 
providing evidence that a federal fiscal system tends to support the relative income of 
poor regions and reduce that of rich regions.  
 
Akai and Sakata (2002) provide evidence that fiscal decentralization contributes to 
economic growth, using carefully selected state-level data drawn from an economic 
survey of the US that leaves out a period of high economic growth. Though consistent 
with theoretical results on the subject matter, their finding contradicts the empirical 
results of many papers before theirs. Akai and Sakata (2002) allude the trajectory of 
their finding to the nature of the data set used in the regression analysis. Among other 
things, this data set is characterized by small differences in history, culture, and the 
stage of economic development. They conclude that such distortion-free data set did 
indeed reveal the true positive effect of fiscal decentralization. Akai and Sakata 
conclude that in measuring the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, 
it is important to get the definition of fiscal decentralization right. 
 
Using a system of simultaneous equations, Checherita et al. (2009) use a large sample 
of European regions covering 19 European Union (EU) member states for the 1995-
2005 period to analyze the aggregate impact of taxation and transfers on income and 
output convergence. They find evidence in support of a convergence process across 
the member states in terms of both per-capita output and income. Their results show 
that, on average, net fiscal transfers impede output growth, and when the sample is 
split further to show the nature and intensity of fiscal transfers, they find varying 
degrees of negative impact of net transfers on growth.  Output growth rates in less 
prosperous receiving regions decline by less, compared to contributing more 
prosperous regions, in reaction to the fiscal transfers: a condition termed immiserising 




Bargain et al. (2013) study the redistributive and stabilizing effects of a fiscal 
equalization scheme in the Euro area. Precisely, they study the economic effects of 
introducing the following two elements of a fiscal union using representative 
household micro data from 11 Eurozone countries: (i) an EU-wide tax and transfer 
system and (ii) an EU-wide system of fiscal equalization. Their study reveals huge 
redistributive consequences – both within and across countries – when one third of the 
national tax and transfer systems are replaced by a European system. While they 
conclude that the EU system will benefit credit constrained countries in particular, 
through improved fiscal stabilization, their study also suggests that a fiscal 
equalization regime based on taxing capacity will lead to income redistribution from 
high to low income countries – with ambiguous stabilization properties. 
 
Using dynamic panel data (DPD) techniques, Potrafke and Reischmann (2014) ask 
whether fiscal policy conducted by sub-national governments in Germany and the US 
is based on fiscal transfers. Employing a Bohn-type (1998) fiscal reaction function, 
and based on the assumption that the debt-to-GDP ratio in the preceding period has a 
positive influence on the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio in the current period, they find 
that sustainable fiscal policy in the US and Germany is only achievable through fiscal 
transfers.  
 
McInnis (1968), the pioneer of studies on regional disparities in Canada, uses per 
capita income levels for the provinces (relative to the Canadian average) in both 
weighted and non-weighted terms to show that the income gap from 1926 to 1962 
stayed the same. On the US side, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) use a neoclassical 
growth framework to establish the presence of  β convergence across the states of the 
US They find a rate of about 2-2.5 per cent per annum between 1940 and 1988 for per 
capita personal income and between 1963 and 1988 for per capita gross state product. 
Six years after, Sala-i-Martin (1996) included Japanese prefectures, regions in 
Western Europe and Canadian provinces; he finds income convergence rates for 
Canada (2.4 per cent from 1961 to 1991), Western Europe (1.5-1.8 per cent from 1950 
to 1990), Japan (1.9 - 3.1 per cent from 1955 to 1990) and the US (1.7-2.2 per cent 




We close this section with a brief discussion on the interrelationships between the 
three key variables discussed so far: income, redistribution and growth. Ostry et al. 
(2014) maintain that the link between all three is a complex one. While they agree that 
theory provides only a partial guide on these issues, they equally caution that care 
should be taken before drawing conclusions from available empirical evidence. Ostry 
et al. use the framework in Figure 3.1 below to drive home their points.  
 
Figure 3.1: Interrelationships between Inequality, Redistribution, 
and Growth 
 




The chart shows the direct effects of redistribution (line D) and net inequality (line E), 
while in each case, the value of the other variable is held constant. Ostry et al. 
calculate the “total effect” of redistribution on growth based on the assumption that 
“redistribution does not affect market inequality, so redistribution affects net 
inequality one-for-one”. They add that the total effect is the sum of the estimated 
direct effect (line D) and the indirect effect, which is a combination of the effect of 
redistribution on net inequality (line C) and the estimated direct effect of net 
inequality on growth (line E). Ostry et al. conclude that many other directions of 
causality abound, in addition to possible channels for the income-inequality-
redistribution nexus.  
 
3.2.3 Trade Openness and Convergence   
The role of international trade in the determination of the long-run pattern of growth 
and welfare has always been under the searchlight of economic research. Major 
studies on the trade-convergence debate (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995; Ben-David, 
1996; Ben-David and Bohara, 1997; Ranjan, 2003; and Sohn and Lee, 2006) conclude 
that trade aids the β-beta convergence process. Among others, these studies cite the 
factor price equalization theorem, factor proportions model and the role of 
international technology transfer in the determination of the long-run pattern of trade, 
growth and welfare (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
 
In support of trade openness as a potent control measure, Gramlich (1987) argues that 
exposure of open economies to international competition leads to disproportionate 
outcomes for the regions involved. He posits that regional stabilization policies can be 
used to address the resulting asymmetric shocks. By allowing for interaction effects 
with lagged per capita income levels, we hope to garner evidence for the impact of 
openness on economic performance. That way, we get insights on how policies 
directed toward more trade openness may help address widening regional income 
gaps. By examining relative jurisdictional trade openness among regions in the US 
and Canada, our thesis makes a novel contribution to the literature. 
 
Thieβen (2003) posits that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between 





 is required to estimate the optimal level of fiscal transfers 
required to maximize economic growth; a positively sloped curve arises when fiscal 
decentralization increases from low levels, while any additional transfers beyond the 
optimum result in a negatively sloped curve. 
 
From an econometric perspective, the use of panel fixed effects in cross-country 
regressions allows for the control of unobserved factors like institutional quality, 
language, geography and other cultural characteristics. However, using Canada-US 
sub-national data provides a more robust platform to look at these issues in detail 
since such individual differences are not expected to be very pronounced in a regional 
data setting. Compared to a cross-country setting, Canadian provinces and US states 
are more homogeneous; we therefore expect to arrive at more precise estimates. 
 
The conundrum on the precise role of fiscal transfers on income growth provides a 
major motivation for this chapter; we will examine the role of federal fiscal flows in 
reducing income differentials under a dynamic panel framework for all 60 
jurisdictions.  This thesis uses the GMM estimation method to separately explain the 
conditionality of income growth on fiscal transfers and economic openness. In so 
doing, we overcome the biases associated with unobserved heterogeneity, omitted 
variables, and endogeneity which often render the results of most cross-sectional OLS 
growth studies in the current literature less potent. 
3.3 Theoretical Setup and Model Specification 
3.3.1 The Mankiw-Romer-Weil Framework  
We base our panel analysis on the empirics of economic growth, which has now 
moved from the "Barro cross-sectional regression" to the static and DPD techniques. 
The Solow growth model presents a theoretical framework for understanding the 
sources of economic growth, and the consequences for long-run growth of changes in 
the economic environment.   
 
A framework available to directly test the Solow growth model is the growth empirics 
method of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) where they argue that the Cobb-Douglas 
                                                          
21
 This is tested empirically under our sensitivity analysis in order to confirm or refute this hypothesis 
for Canada and the US 
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formulation of Solow’s growth model should be extended to include human capital as 
well as physical capital. This would imply an underlying aggregate production 
function of the form:  




1−α−β     (3.1)     
 
Where Y is total income, L is labour supply and A is a technology parameter, with L 
growing at an annual rate n and A growing at rate g.   
 
In line with Solow, Mankiw et al. (2003) rewrite income, physical and human capital 
in (3.1) in terms of quantities per unit of effective labour: 
𝑦𝑡 =  
𝑌𝑡
𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡 










       (3.4) 
 
The changes over time in physical and human capital per unit effective labour are: 
 
𝑘′𝑡 =  𝑠𝑘𝑦𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) 𝑘𝑡   (3.5)  
 
where δ is the proportionate depreciation for both physical and human capital, and 𝑆k 
and 𝑆h are the respective savings rates for physical and human capital which are 
assumed to be constant over time, though not across countries.  
 
Solving for steady-state solutions k* and h*, Mankiw et al. derive an equation for 
steady-state income growth as follows:  
 
lnYt = ln𝐴0 + 𝑔𝑡 − (
(𝛼 + 𝛽)
(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)
) ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝑑) + (
𝛼




(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)
) ln𝑠ℎ           (3.6) 
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The physical capital savings rate, 𝑆k, was approximated by the investment share in 
GDP, while the human capital savings rate 𝑆h was measured by the proportion of the 
working age population at any one time enrolled in secondary school. Mankiw et al. 
conclude that augmenting the Solow model with measures of human capital leads to 
an improvement in its predictive power of explaining cross-country per capita output 
growth and levels. The objective in this chapter is to assess the impact of fiscal 
transfers on economic growth, using the Mankiw et al. model as a general framework.  
 
3.3.2 Research Hypotheses 
The preceding discussion strongly suggests that the dynamics of intergovernmental 
transfers in federalist democracies are complex.  It remains an open question what 
impact fiscal transfers have on GDP per capita. Doing this within a regional income 
framework that also examines trade openness and the AIT policy makes this chapter 
more encompassing.  
 
Following the literature review and theoretical framework presented above, we 




H0: There is no relationship between net fiscal transfers and GDP per capita.     
H1: There is a positive relationship between net fiscal transfers and GDP per 
capita.  
 
Fiscal transfers based on personal income after taxes and transfers, and pretax 
personal income, are a potent fiscal tool used to analyze the effects of redistribution. 
Economic theory provides a partial guide on these issues; we need empirical evidence 
on the precise nature of the tradeoff between redistribution and growth. While 
inequality may provide an incentive to redistribute, we need to establish the 
magnitude and direction of the impact of redistribution on growth. In light of this, the 






H0: There is no distinction in the nature and intensity of fiscal flows impact on 
GDP per capita in prosperous and poor regions.   
H1: There is a different impact of fiscal flows on GDP per capita for 
prosperous and poor regions. 
 
Hypothesis 6b 
H0: There is no distinction in the combined effect of fiscal transfers and lagged 
income on GDP per capita, compared to the lone effect of fiscal transfers. 
H1: There is a stronger effect of fiscal transfers and lagged income on GDP per 
capita, compared to the lone effect of fiscal transfers 
 
Hypothesis 7a 
H0: There is no relationship between trade openness and GDP per capita 




H0: There is no distinction in the combined effect of trade openness and lagged 
income on GDP per capita, compared to the lone effect of trade openness. 
H1: The combined effect of lagged income and trade openness on GDP per 
capita is much stronger than the individual effect of trade openness on GDP 
per capita.  
 
Hypothesis 8a 
H0: There is no relationship between the AIT policy and GDP per capita 




H0: There is no distinction in the combined effect of the AIT policy and lagged 
income on GDP per capita, compared to the lone effect of policy. 
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H1: The combined effect of lagged income and the AIT policy on GDP per 
capita is much stronger than the individual effect of the policy on GDP per 
capita.  
 
3.3.3 Model Specification 
As discussed above, the theoretical underpinnings of a number of work on income 
convergence rely largely on the Solow growth model; for instance, Mankiw et al., 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Coulombe and Lee (1995) and Islam (1995). Even so, 
many other studies relating fiscal transfers specifically to regional income growth are 
also largely based on Solow; as is the case in Coulombe and Lee (1995), Darku (2011) 
and Checherita et al. (2009), among others.  
 
Following section 3.3.1 above, we conclude that: 
 
lnYt = ln𝐴0 + 𝑔𝑡 − (
(𝛼+𝛽)
(1−𝛼−𝛽)







) ln𝑠ℎ        (3.7) 
 
Many studies on conditional convergence (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1990, 1991 
and 1992) pay little or no attention to the initial state of technology, denoted by the 
technology parameter A (0) and the technological growth rate g. Rather than accept 
that A (0) and g differ across regions and therefore correlated with the 𝑆 and (n + g + 
δ ) variables, they are often considered part of the residuals or the constant terms. 
While it may be plausible that g is homogeneous across regions, especially 
considering externalities and spillover effects of technology and innovation, to assume 
that A (0) does not differ across Canadian and US jurisdictions in our own case is 
understating the obvious.  
 
In particular, given these two countries’ vast geographic area, regional resource 
diversities, institutional, climate and technology differences, our strategy in this study 
is to implement a panel data framework that recognizes these differences in the initial 
endowments across jurisdictions. One of our major objectives here is to test the extent 
to which the various policy interventions over the years – e.g. fiscal flows, AIT and 
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trade liberalization – have reduced the huge regional disparities in capabilities. Of 
course, this may not be the case for time-invariant factors like climatic differences.  
 
For instance, while Eaton and Kortum (1999) and Keller (2001) both agree that trade 
liberalization helps international technology diffusion when technical knowledge is a 
component of the goods and services traded, Parente and Prescott (2000) believe in 
the contrary; they argue that income convergence might instead not occur as a result 
of certain constraints on technological adoption.  
 
With differences in jurisdictional initial technological state and with a homogenous 
technological growth rate assumed, our focus shifts to how best to estimate a dynamic 
panel framework. This is important, given our interest in regional convergence among 
regions with transitional growth dynamics towards a steady state income path; Weeks 
and Yao (2003) implement an autoregressive form of the Solow growth model, 
resulting in a DPD model with a distinct time-invariant individual regional effect term 
and a time-specific term. 
 
To assess the impact of fiscal transfers and openness on economic growth, we 
estimate an autoregressive model with structural change in the autoregressive 
coefficient and with jurisdictional fixed effects and year effects.  
 
Following this, Equation 3.7 above is written in a general form as: 
 
Yit = γYit−1 +  ∑βjXitj + 𝜇it +  𝜈it              (3.8)  
 
where γ measures the rate of convergence, νit is the transitory disturbance term with a 
mean of zero which varies across regions and time periods. 
 
One of the objectives of this chapter is to estimate a measure of the impact of the AIT 
policy on economic growth in Canada. We hope to do so by taking advantage of the 
fact that US states were not party to this policy. In fact, the timing of the signing of 
AIT may be correlated with other economically significant developments in Canada – 
for instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Mexican 
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peso crisis of 1995 which put the Canadian dollar under strong downward pressure 
and led to sharply rising interest rates across all maturities.  
 
The DiD approach, by including all 50 US states in the analysis, could help us single 
out the effect of AIT more precisely. The central tenet of the DiD approach is, 
according to Slaughter (2000), in order to study the impact of a treatment, the 
performance of the treatment group is compared, before and after the treatment, 
relative to the performance of some control group pre- and post-treatment. That way, 
the impact of the treatment on the control group reveals what otherwise would have 
happened had the treatment group not been exposed to such treatment. In other words, 
we observe both the US and Canadian samples at two different time periods: pre-AIT 
and post-AIT.  
 
With the Canadian sample exposed to the AIT policy treatment post-1995 but not in 
the pre-1995 period, the US sample therefore qualifies as not having been exposed to 
any treatment pre- or post-1995. Under our panel data framework, this methodology 
delivers an estimate of the required causal effect. However, underlying validity of DiD 
estimates is the fundamental assumption that trends in outcome variables would 
remain the same for treatment and control groups, even when we do not have the 
privilege to observe the counterfactual.  
 
While acknowledging the many interesting advantages of the DiD estimation strategy, 
including being able to help overcome issues relating to endogeneity as a result of 
heterogeneous comparisons, Bertrand et al. (2003) identify major issues with this 
methodology; they also proffer solution to these problems. Essentially, their strategy 
is to “assume away biases in estimating the intervention’s effect and instead focus on 
issues relating to the standard error of the estimate”. 
 
Following Slaughter (2000), we represent the treatment effect to be estimated with the 
below equation: 
yit = α +  βdt + 𝑒it    (3.9)              
 
where yit represents the outcome for agent i at time t,  dt is a dichotomous variable 
with value of one if t = 1 and zero if t = 0. The variance of the error term 𝑒it varies by 
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t.  With the aid of β, we determine the causal effect of the treatment, by considering 
what otherwise would have happened had the treatment group not been exposed to 
such treatment. 
 
Employing our standard notations, we use two basic econometric specifications to 
capture the dependence of real GDP per capita on fiscal transfers, trade openness, AIT 
policy and other control variables.  
 
lnRGDP𝑖𝑡 =
β0 + β1(𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡)  + 𝛽3  (𝑁𝐹𝑇. 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 (EDUit) +
𝛽5 (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡)  + 𝛽6 (AIT)   + JU𝑅𝑖 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝑡 + μit   (3.10)   
 
𝑙𝑛RGDP𝑖𝑡 =
α0 + 𝛼1(𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼2 (𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼3  (𝑂𝑃𝑁. 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼4 (EDUit) +
𝛼5 (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡)  + JU𝑅𝑖 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝑡 + μit   (3.11)                                               
 
All variables and notations are defined below: 
 
RGDPit    Real GDP per capita in levels for jurisdiction i at time t 
RGDPit-1  Lagged real GDP per capita for jurisdiction i at time t 
NFTit        Net fiscal transfers for jurisdiction i at time t 
OPNit       Trade openness measure for jurisdiction i at time t 
EDUit       Human capital stock for jurisdiction i at time t 
CAPit        Physical capital stock for jurisdiction i at time t 
AIT                Agreement on Internal Trade dummy
22
 
JURi             Jurisdiction-specific effects  
TIMt              Year-specific effects 
μit             Random error term for jurisdiction i at time t.  
 
The random error is a normally distributed idiosyncratic error term, with mean 0 and 
variance σε
2
, that captures all other omitted effects on relative real GDP per capita and 
is assumed to be well-behaved.   
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 Basis for period discussed later in this chapter 
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Based on the hypotheses advanced earlier in the chapter, a priori, we expect positive 
signs for β1, β2, β3, β4, β5 and β6 ; and 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3, 𝛼4, 𝛼5 and 𝛼6. A positive sign on the 
coefficient of each variable will support the notion that higher fiscal transfers, higher 
degree of trade openness or existence of the AIT policy – or their interaction term – is 
associated with higher GDP per capita. 
 
3.4 Data, Variables and Econometric Strategy 
3.4.1 Data Sources 
Our data are compiled from the following sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(Regional Economic Accounts), Statistics Canada (Provincial Economic Accounts), 
World Bank (National Accounts Data), OECD (National Accounts Data Files), 
Industry Canada (TDO), Office of Trade and Economic Analysis, US Department of 
Commerce (TradeStats Express) and the Bank of Canada (Rates and Statistics – 
Annual Average Exchange Rates.  
 
We exploit a large annual panel data set spanning eight three-year intervals from 
1987
23
 to 2010 and covering all 10 Canadian provinces and 50 states of the US GDP 
data for the 1981-1997 period for all 60 jurisdictions are based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) system, while 1998-2010 data are based on the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  Ordinarily, we would expect 
some caveat is necessary as a result of appending the two data series to construct a 
single time series.  However, such differences do not have any major impact on our 
analysis since the switch in the NAICS and SIC methodology occurred across all 
jurisdictions at the same point in time. 
We use the following specific three-year averages: 1987 – 1989; 1990 -1992; 1993 – 
1995; 1996 – 1998; 1999-2001; 2002 -2004; 2005-2007 and 2008 - 2010.  This gives 
rise to N = 60; T = 8. In the regression itself, T becomes 7 because we lose one 
complete data set to lagged per capita real GDP calculation. This amounts to 60 
observations for each period, and when multiplied by 7, we have 420 observations. 
 
We use three-year averages in order to abstract from short-term cyclical factors. This 
way, the regression coefficients obtained give a direct measure of the degree to which 
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 Real GDP data for US states are only available from 1987 
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the federal tax system reduces inequalities in incomes (Bayoumi and Mason, 1993). 
Following Loayza (1994) and Islam (1995), the use of three-year averages helps to 
revisit Mankiw et al.’s assumption that the error term is exogenous. Eberhardt and 
Teal (2009) maintain that “the crucial innovation over Mankiw et al. is the 
introduction of country fixed effects (operationalized using the `within-groups' 
transformation), which allow for differential total factor productivity levels across 
countries”.  
 
We therefore go with Islam’s (1995) generally accepted method of short period-
averaged panels, which, again, according to Eberhardt and Teal, has become a 
standard alternative to the single convergence regression framework. More 
importantly, such estimation occurs without the need to qualify our results due to the 
influence of undesirable properties – such as the non-stationarity of the time series. 
Using three-year averages also helps to avoid the problem of biased FEMs: which 
occurs when dependent and independent variables do not fully adjust over a single 
year for data pooled over consecutive years. 
 
Since we are restricted by data availability from all sources for the three issues to be 
examined (i.e. fiscal transfers, trade openness and AIT policy), we focus on two 
different data regimes. The fiscal transfer-AIT-growth component focuses on the 
1987-2010 period, while our analysis on trade openness examines the 1999-2010 
period. We focus on the 1999-2010 period for the latter because while Canadian 
provincial exports and imports data are available from 1990-2013, state-level data for 
the US are only available from 1999 to 2013 for exports. Even so, imports data are 




We discuss data sources and construction of our variables below: 
 
3.4.2.1 Per Capita Real GDP  
Real GDP per capita data are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(Regional Economic Accounts) and Statistics Canada (Provincial Economic 
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Accounts). Canadian data are converted into US dollars using annual Canada-US 
average nominal exchange rates. 
  
3.4.2.2 Relative per Capita Real GDP 
Most government fiscal transfer programs are based on the relative fiscal capacities of 
the participating jurisdictions. In Canada, for instance, the Equalization program is 
executed based on a formula-driven measure of provincial fiscal disparities. Provinces 
with relatively low fiscal capacities receive the most transfers on a per capita basis, 
while provinces with higher fiscal capacities receive less. Not just that, the program is 
set up such that as a province's relative fiscal capacity grows, the new program 
automatically reduces fiscal transfers and vice versa (Department of Finance, Canada).   
 
As previously discussed, the US is one of the few federations in the world without a 
formal system of equalization among its sub-national governments to reduce fiscal 
disparities. Regardless, this country uses its other federal grants programs in such a 
way that the relative fiscal capacities of states are taken into consideration. For 
instance, Medicaid, the largest states’ federal grants program is implemented on the 
basis of the formula based “Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentages” or FMAP 
(Stark, 2010).  
 
The FMAP formula uses relative per capita income as a measure of fiscal capacity. In 
other words, this percentage is calculated by reference to the relative per capita 
income of states – thereby guaranteeing higher FMAP for low-income states and 
lower FMAP for high-income states FMAP (Stark, 2010). Similarly, under the 
Canadian Equalization program, once a province is deemed to have adequate fiscal 
capacity to provide essential public services, it stops being a beneficiary of the 
program.  
 
To effectively control for different fiscal capacities in all 60 jurisdictions, the above 
analysis provides a major motivation for the inclusion of relative per capita GDP. This 
is constructed as the ratio of the per capita GDP of a province (state), relative to the 
Canadian (US) average. As explained above, Canadian real GDP per capita data are 
converted into US dollars using annual Canada-US average nominal exchange rates.  
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3.4.2.3 Net Fiscal Transfers 
One of the major goals of fiscal transfers from central governments is to promote 
equalization of basic public services through narrowing of fiscal disparities across the 
various sub-national regions.  In the fiscal transfers literature, the macroeconomic 
approach to measuring sub-national fiscal capacity is based largely on the notion that 
the level of economic activity within a region ultimately constitutes the measuring rod 
for the ability of sub-national governments to raise revenues (Schroeder and Smoke, 
2003).  
 
Working with county datasets on fiscal transfers from 1993 to 2003, Heng (2008) 
investigates impacts of fiscal disparities and equalization in China. Heng defines fiscal 
ability as the per capita revenue collected by local government plus per capita 
transfers from upper governments, with different definitions in use for net fiscal 
transfers during the 1993-2003 period.  
 
Cottarelli and Guerguil (2014) define net fiscal transfers as the net fiscal flows 
between central and sub-national governments. They explain this term to be the 
difference between gross transfers from the centre to sub-national governments and 
taxes paid by sub-national government residents to the central government. In 
constructing net fiscal transfers, Cottarelli and Guerguil do not include government 
levels below states/provinces. They also do not consider transfers for the purposes of 
offsetting structural vertical imbalances that are the same across regions. Lastly, fiscal 
transfers channeled to help regions during crisis episodes are also excluded in their 
definition. 
 
Bayoumi and Masson (1993), working with sub-national US and Canada data, show 
the importance of fiscal transfers in redistributing income across regions by estimating 
cross-section regressions based on the relationship between personal income before 
and after the influence of federal fiscal flows. Likewise, Checherita et al. (2009) 
investigate the effect of fiscal transfers on economic convergence across 19 European 
regions by measuring fiscal transfers in a similar fashion to Bayoumi and Masson. In 
Checherita et al.’s words, “we construct the variable net transfers as the ratio between 
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household disposable income and primary income, thus capturing the aggregate 
impact of taxation and other distributional policy measures” (p.7) 
By the way, personal income is defined as the sum of all incomes received by 
residents, including returns for labour and investments, and transfers from the 
government and other sectors (including old age security payments and employment 
insurance). And of course, personal disposable income is what is left from personal 
income after deducting direct taxes and other mandatory insurance premiums to 
government.  
The Bureau of Economic Analysis defines personal income as the income received by 
residents from participation in production, from government and business transfer 
payments, and from government interest. Statistics Canada uses a slightly different 
definition (which though conveys the same meaning); personal income is defined as 
the sum of all incomes received by residents, including returns for labour and 
investments, and transfers from the government and other sectors (including old age 
security payments and employment insurance). In essence, personal income
24
 includes 
both earnings and transfers such as wages and salaries, supplementary labour income, 
dividends, interest and miscellaneous investment income and all transfer payments. 
 
Following Bayoumi and Masson (1993), Obstfeld and Peri (1998) and Checherita et 
al. (2009), our net fiscal transfers variable is constructed as net transfers (i.e. the 
difference between personal income and disposable income) as a percentage of 
personal income.  This is captured below:  
 
NFT𝑖𝑡 = (
RPI 𝑖𝑡   − RPDI 𝑖𝑡
RPI 𝑖𝑡
)                         3.12 
 
Here, RPI 𝑖𝑡 is real personal income per capita and RPDI 𝑖𝑡 is real personal disposable 
income per capita. NFT𝑖𝑡 therefore represents the percentage of income that constitutes 
the transfers. This ratio reflects the distributional outcomes of net taxes and transfers 
paid and received by households in a region, respectively (Obstfeld and Peri, 1998). 
The difference between the two gives a fair approximation of the income 
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 Personal income does not include capital gains from the sale of assets; the taxes paid for such capital 




redistribution regime in a federal system. Real personal income and real personal 
disposable income data for Canada are converted into US dollars using annual 
Canada-US average nominal exchange rates.  
 
3.4.2.4 Relative Net Fiscal Transfers 
As part of our robustness checks, we also use relative fiscal transfers as an alternative 
measure of fiscal transfers. In this case, both RPI 𝑖𝑡 and RPDI 𝑖𝑡 are constructed as the 
ratio between each province (state), relative to the Canadian (US) average – as 
discussed above. Canadian data are converted into US dollars using annual Canada-
US average nominal exchange rates.  
 
3.4.2.5 Personal Current Transfer Receipts 
As part of our robustness checks, we also use personal current transfer receipts as an 
alternative fiscal transfers measure. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis defines this 
variable as the benefits received by persons for which no current services are 
performed. In other words, payments by governments and businesses to individuals 
and nonprofit institutions serving individuals. Data are converted into US dollars 
using annual Canada-US average nominal exchange rates.  
 
3.4.2.6 Human Capital Stock 
Apart from fiscal transfers, governments deploy other policy tools, from time to time, 
to encourage regional income convergence. Typical tools include human capital 
investment, physical capital investment, social programs and others. Human capital 
stock is one of the two control variables employed in the model. Blundell et al. (1999) 
categorize human capital into three main components — early ability (whether 
acquired or innate); qualifications and knowledge acquired through formal education; 
and skills, competencies and expertise acquired through training on the job. We use 
educational attainment as a proxy for human capital; educational attainment is defined 
as the percent of persons 25 years and over who have completed at least a Bachelor's 






3.4.2.7 Physical Capital Stock  
Physical capital stock is our proxy for investment in infrastructure. The variable of 
interest here is 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 , our measure of the capital stock endowments in jurisdiction i at 
time t. This variable has been discussed extensively under data and variables in 
section 2.3.4. 
 
3.4.2.8 Trade Openness 
Sachs and Warner (1995), Ranjan (2003) and Sohn and Lee (2006), among others, 
show that international trade has an important role in regional and national income 
convergence. Most cross-country analyses measure trade openness as the sum of 
exports and imports divided by GDP. To test the impact of trade openness on the 
reduction of income disparities, we follow suit, except that our measure is narrowed 
down to the ratio of exports to GDP as discussed under data constraints above.  
 
Merchandise exports are used; our focus is on international and not interprovincial or 
interstate trade – i.e. the trade flows between a Canadian province – or a US state – 
and the rest of the world. The US is Canada’s largest trade partner; we therefore 
expect north-south trade to have a significant influence on the degree of jurisdictional 
economic openness. Trade data for all provinces are compiled from Industry Canada 
(TDO), while corresponding data for US states are sourced from the Office of Trade 
and Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce (TradeStats Express). 
 
3.4.2.9 AIT Policy 
We are interested in looking at the possible impact of the AIT policy on regional 
economic growth. The AIT came into force on July 1, 1995 for all Canadian 
provinces; it was aimed at reducing trade costs by eliminating barriers to trade, 
investment and mobility within Canada. Considering that US states were not party to 
the AIT, we use the DiD approach to single out the effect of the AIT.  
 
3.4.3 Econometric Strategy 
Now that we have agreed on the specification framework to be employed, the next 
issue to which we turn is the performance of the different estimation techniques. This 
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has become necessary because our estimation work is based on this. The theoretical 
framework presented in the previous section offers interesting insights that require 
empirical testing. One of the major objectives of this research is to examine the extent 
to which fiscal redistributive systems reduce inequalities in regional incomes. To 
eliminate the influence of business cycle (Islam, 1995) on our results, and more 
importantly, to facilitate comparison of our results with other studies on regional 
income redistribution, we calibrate our variables relative to the national average.  
 
From the analysis so far, it is hard to think of a more important federation-pair with 
regions that are similar in many respects, yet distinct in other areas. Thus, we conduct 
tests of the fiscal transfer-growth nexus in Canada and the US in order to determine 
the impacts of governmental transfers. This chapter fits into the various discussions so 
far because it is an extension of the various issues related to fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth: income disparities, fiscal federalism, and estimation techniques. 
This is interesting because previous studies on these issues have been largely done at 
the cross-country level with OLS and other static linear panel techniques, notably 
because the necessary data and information at the sub-national level are often hard to 
come by.  
 
Given the inclusion of the lagged value of relative real GDP per capita in our growth 
empirics framework, traditional panel data estimators such as fixed and random 
effects will not be consistent in the present context. In other words, the FEM is 
inconsistent because it often eliminates the error term by a de-meaning transformation 
that induces a negative correlation between the transformed error and the lagged 
dependent variables of order 1\T , which in short panels remains substantial 
(Cavalcanti et. al, 2012). We also can no longer impose the restriction that there is no 
correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables required for random 
effects consistency. Any traces of heteroscedasticity or serial correlation in the errors 
will render the estimators inconsistent. 
 
The Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM 
estimators are general estimators designed for situations with “small T, large N” 
panels, with independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated 
with past and possibly current realizations of the error; with fixed effects; and with 
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heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals.  According to Bond (2002), 
a generally acceptable consistent estimator will lie between the OLS and “within-
group” estimates, and the GMM provides a convenient framework for obtaining it. In 
the words of Roodman (2009), the Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond estimator 
augments Arellano–Bond by assuming that first differences of instrument variables 
are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This provides flexibility in introducing more 
instruments, leading to improved efficiency. This is the way Roodman explicitly puts 
it, “It builds a system of two equations—the original equation and the transformed 
one—and is known as system GMM”. 
 
Large finite sample biases occur when instrumental variables are weak; this leads to 
poorly behaved first-differenced GMM estimators because “under these conditions, 
lagged levels of the variables are only weak instruments for subsequent first-
differences” (Bond et al. 2000). The system estimator, on the other hand, leverages 
initial conditions assumptions to obtain moment conditions that provide useful 
information for persistent series, leading to efficient coefficient estimates. Roodman 
posits that using too many instruments can lead to biased results in GMM estimation; 
using the xtabond2 command in a panel data environment helps in implementing 
these.  In order to correct for the biases created by lagged endogenous variables and 





A number of specifications are used to test our three central and lower level 
hypotheses, using the Solow Growth model as the benchmark. Among other things, 
we compare our results with those of pioneers [e.g. Bayoumi and Masson (1993) and 
Coulombe and Lee, 1995] and subsequent researchers (e.g. Checherita et al. 2009 and 
others) in this area.  By looking at jurisdictions that share many common 
characteristics, we empirically model various scenarios – including recent trade policy 
issues from the Canadian Internal Trade Secretariat – while making sure to leverage 
the GMM methodology to control for endogeneity and many country-specific features 
that might obscure the key role of our key variables.  In all specifications, we apply 
both least squares and panel estimation techniques, in addition to difference GMM 
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 This will be discussed in details. 
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and system GMM estimators. Different scenarios on instruments exogeneity and 
functional forms are modeled separately as part of our robustness checks. 
 
To summarize and conclude our thoughts in this section, we employ and compare four 
econometric methods for estimating the specified models using two separate datasets 
with a variety of known characteristics. While the OLS strategy is expected to 
generate upward-biased estimates, due to its inability to incorporate the panel structure 
of our datasets, the FEM does handle the panel framework well – albeit it produces 
downward-biased estimates because it is unable to handle the dynamic component, 
which involves the lagged dependent variable and regression residuals. The difference 
GMM methodology seamlessly captures the lagged endogenous variable as an 
explanatory variable by first-differentiating the regression each period in order to 
eliminate individual specific effects. The system GMM on the other hand incorporates 
both lagged levels and lagged differences. This estimator is obtained at a cost 
involving a set of additional restrictions on the initial conditions of the process 
generating y (Baum, 2013).   
3.5 Descriptive and Exploratory Analysis 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
No doubt, Canada and the US are two affluent countries. However, the various 
provinces and states that make up both countries are characterized by huge income 
gaps, growth differentials and differences in fiscal capacities. We provide descriptive 
analysis below on the three central issues in this chapter: income distribution, 
intergovernmental transfers and trade openness.  
3.5.1.1 Income Distribution  
Figures 3.2 puts into context the respective locations of all 60 Canadian and US 
jurisdictions, while Figure 3.3 shows the income distribution in both countries, 
including their neighbour to the south, Mexico, for better comprehension.  
 
The relatively affluent nature of the US and Canada (compared to Mexico) is 
amplified by Figure 3.3’s varying colour shades – almost entirely red and orange for 
Mexico; different shades of green for Canada and the US. Table 3.1 corroborates the 
income distribution pattern displayed in Figure 3.3. As depicted, all US and Canadian 
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jurisdictions have real GDP per capita greater than $25,000
26
. At $68,847 and $ 
66,080, Alaska and Alberta in the US and Canada, respectively, come first on our per 
capital income scale (Table 3.1 Panel A).   
 
Figure 3.2: Map of Canada and the US  
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 Based on methodology and year used by chart provider; figures in Table 3.1 may not necessarily 
match those in Figure 3.3. In addition, our data are averaged over the 2007-2010 period, while chart 





Figure 3.3: Income Distribution in Canada, US and Mexico (2008) 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, US Census and Reddit.com 
 
Prince Edward Island and Mississippi rank as the poorest jurisdictions in their 
respective countries, with $31,277 and $31,744 in average incomes over the 2007-
2010 period. We see from Table 3.1 that the richest and poorest US states are richer 
than their Canadian counterparts. The table reveals further that over the 2008-2010 
period, the regional income gaps between the richest and poorest jurisdictions in the 
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US and Canada are $37,103 and $34,803, respectively. This has huge policy 
implications. We expatiate below. 
 
As discussed earlier, fiscal decentralization is at the heart of the discussion on whether 
poor regions eventually catch-up with affluent ones and how long this might take. The 
observed distribution in average income above can be attributed, at least partly, to 
fiscal federalism. As explained in the preceding section, sub-national governments in 
fiscal unions receive significant transfers from the central government, in different 
forms, to assist them in the provision of essential programs and services. The 
Canadian Constitution specifically makes provision for Equalization to ensure the 
regions have the fiscal capacity to provide reasonably comparable levels of public 
service at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. The US does not have such a 
system; its closest intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanism is the Grants-in-Aid 
system which the US federal government uses to extend aid to the states and local 
governments to finance certain areas of domestic public spending.  To continue to 
qualify for federal funds for projects, recipients have to abide by certain rules from the 
federal government.  The Grants-in-Aid system has grown steadily for more than a 




Stark (2009) suggests the adoption of a Canada-type Equalization as a strategy to 
address the huge fiscal disparities among the states of the US. In addition, fiscal 
decentralization means resource-endowed jurisdictions have sole access to natural 
resource revenues; these greatly enhance their fiscal capacities. This is the case of 
resource-endowed jurisdictions like Alaska, Alberta, Wyoming, Saskatchewan, 
Newfoundland and North Dakota, all with above average incomes (Table 3.1).
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 Appendix 3.7 depicts the exponential growth in federal aid to the states, increasing from four in 1905 




Table 3.1: Per Capita Income Levels for US and Canadian Jurisdictions (2008-2010) 
 
Panel A: Top Five Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction Per Capita Income ($) Jurisdiction Per Capita Income ($) 
Alaska 68,847 Alberta 66,080 
Wyoming 67,929 Newfoundland 50,438 
Connecticut 64,997 Saskatchewan 48,789 
Delaware 62,587 Ontario 42,348 
Massachusetts 59,756 British Columbia 41,846 
Panel B: Bottom Five Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction Per Capita Income ($) Jurisdiction Per Capita Income ($) 
Mississippi 31,744 Prince Edward Island 31,277 
West Virginia 34,496 Nova Scotia 34,787 
Idaho 35,567 New Brunswick 34,903 
Arkansas 35,612 Quebec 37,126 
South Carolina 35,880 Manitoba 39,689 
Notes: Figures in Panel A are in descending order; figures in Panel B are in ascending order. Data are averaged over the 2007-2010 period.  Per capita 
income is based on real GDP as explained under the data section. 
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Natural resources continue to play an increasingly important role in these countries’ 
overall economic picture.  Bernard (2012) observes this and concludes that the large 
differences in revenues obtained by the resource-endowed jurisdictions, coupled with the 
instability of resource prices, have been and remain at the origin of the greatest 
difficulties encountered in the implementation of the Canadian Equalization program. We 
will explore the natural resource-economic growth link further in chapter 4. 
 
3.5.1.2 Intergovernmental Transfers and Fiscal Capacities 
As discussed in section 3.4.2, net fiscal transfers (NFT) and relative net fiscal transfers 
(RNFT) are both expressed in terms of net transfers as a percentage of primary income. 
Table 3.2 below, sorted on the basis of both NFT and RNFT, shows that the US state of 
Connecticut (with -14.2% NFT and -4.5% RNFT) and the Canadian province of Alberta 
(-17.3% NFT and -5.7% RNFT) emerge as the highest contributors (Panel B). Negative 
transfers from these jurisdictions imply that they are net contributors to the fiscal 
redistributive regimes in their respective countries.  
 
Tennessee (-6.9% NFT and 3.7% RNFT) and Newfoundland (-2.4% NFT and 11.3% 
RNFT) both settle for the top net fiscal recipient positions in their respective countries 
(Panel A). The picture that emerges in Table 3.2 does not come as a surprise, especially 
when reconciled with our earlier discussion on sub-national income distribution in Table 
3.1. The league of poor and rich jurisdictions each features the states/provinces that we 
see in Panel A and Panel B, respectively
28
. Another interesting observation from Table 
3.2 is the fact that Newfoundland received more than Tennessee, both in absolute and 
relative terms. The converse is true for Alberta and Connecticut: the former contributed 
more than the latter both in absolute and relative terms. Again, such Gumbel-type 
distribution, with extreme values in both directions, underscores the relative pointedness 
of the intergovernmental fiscal policy in Canada, compared to the US. To fully 
understand the importance of constructing our regional fiscal transfers measures relative 
to their respective national averages, we take a closer look at Table 3.2.
                                                          
28
 With mixed evidence for Newfoundland and Tennessee; this is due largely to the dynamics of the 
resource economy for the former and by the relatively arbitrary nature of federal spending in the US for the 
latter.   
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Table 3.2: Net Fiscal Transfers for US and Canadian Jurisdictions (2008-2010) 
Panel A: Top Five Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction NFT (%)             RNFT (%)      Jurisdiction                    NFT (%)  RNFT (%) 
Tennessee -6.9                         3.7 
          Newfoundland                       -2.4 11.3 
South Dakota -7.0                         3.6 
Prince Edward Island           -2.5 11.2 
Mississippi -7.4                         3.1 
 New Brunswick                  - 4.6 8.8 
New Mexico -8.1                         2.4 
 Nova Scotia                          -7.4 5.6 
Texas -8.2                        2.2 
   Manitoba                             -10.5 2.1 
 
Panel B: Bottom Five Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction NFT (%)             RNFT (%) Jurisdiction                  NFT (%) RNFT (%) 
Connecticut -14.2                         -4.5 
          Alberta                              -17.3 -5.7 
New York -13.9                         -4.1 
           Ontario                             -12.9 -0.7 
Massachusetts -12.7                         -2.8 
           British Columbia             -11.1 1.4 
New Jersey -11.9                         -1.9 
            Quebec                            -11.0 1.5 
Maryland -11.7                         -1.6 
Saskatchewan               -10.5 2.1 
 
Notes: Figures in Panel A are in descending order; figures in Panel B are in ascending order. Data are averaged over the 2007-2010 period. NFT stands 
for net fiscal transfers; RNFT for relative net fiscal transfers. 
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While we see negative NFT values for all top five jurisdictions in both countries, their 
corresponding RNFT values remain positive. Not just that, three out of the bottom five 
Canadian provinces come out with positive relative transfers, while the net transfers to all 
bottom five US states, both in absolute and relative percentages, are negative
29
.  These 
findings are consistent with previous research as discussed under the review of literature.  
 
In particular, we garner support for two of the basic tenets of this chapter: (i) relative net 
fiscal transfers as an alternative measure of fiscal transfers and (ii) the relative importance 
of fiscal capacity in both countries’ intergovernmental fiscal policy. The results in (i) 
above have serious econometric implications; this will be looked at more formally under 
sensitivity analysis under the estimation section. We provide further insights on (ii) 
below. 
 
As reiterated, the US is about the only federation in the developed world without a formal 
federal Equalization policy in place to address regional fiscal disparities. Stark (2009) 
says it is important to prove the existence of interstate fiscal disparities in the US prior to 
implementing an Equalization program similar to Canada’s. Not just that, he emphasizes 
the need to take a closer look at how “fiscal capacity” is defined; with preference for per 
capita income or its other variants.  Clearly, Table 3.2 is in agreement with Stark; the 
table shows net fiscal transfers (benefits) accruing largely to U.S states based on fiscal 
capacity. This is not the case for Canada. As proof, when we reconcile sub-national 
income distribution in Table 3.1 with fiscal transfers in Table 3.2, we find that most of the 
wealthy US states appear in both tables with similar rankings
30
. This is not true for 
Canadian provinces; for instance, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan which rank second 
and third in Table 3.1 lose those rankings in Table 3.2. 
 
 
                                                          
29
 A total of 36 US states turn out with positive RNFT values. The following nine states have negative 
RNFT values, in addition to the five reported in Table 3.3: California, Minnesota, Virginia, Oregon, 
Colorado, Illinois, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.  
 
30
 The Appendix section contains per capita income, relative per capita income, net fiscal transfers and 
relative net fiscal transfers (for the 1990-1992 and 2007-2010 periods) for all US and Canadian jurisdictions 
ranked on the basis of relative per capita income. 
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3.5.1.3 Equalization System 
Figure 3.4 below shows Canadian provincial Equalization receipts for the 2001-2002 and 
2012-2013 fiscal years. Quebec stands out as the largest beneficiary for both years under 
consideration. As pointed out under the review of literature, politics sometimes overrides 
fairness-equity considerations in intergovernmental fiscal permutations. Figure 3.4 
vividly confirms this with Quebec being the conspicuous highest recipient. This confirms 
that Quebec is “home to a longstanding separatist movement, being the chief beneficiary 
of Canada’s Equalization program” (Stark, 2009). 
 
Figure 3.4: Equalization Rights as a Percentage of Total 
 
  Source: Author (based on data from the Department of Finance Canada).   
 
In comparison to Figure 3.4 for Canadian provinces, Figure 3.5 provides a listing of US 
federal taxes minus spending between 1990 and 2009 as a % of 2009 GDP. Clearly, the 
poor states in red shades (e.g. Mississippi, New Mexico and West Virginia) resurface as 
the largest recipient, while affluent ones like Delaware and New Jersey (in deep green 
colour) are again two of the least recipients. Again, this lends some support to this 







capita for prosperous and poor regions. Intuitively, this implies that there is a differential 
impact of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in the US, compared to Canada.   
 
Figure 3.5: Federal Taxes minus Spending (% of 2009 GDP, 1990 -2009) 
 
   Source: The Economist Online 
 
3.5.1.4 Trade Openness        
Table 3.3 below shows trade openness expressed as total exports as a percentage of GDP 
for the 2008-2010 period. The US state of Louisiana and the Canadian province of New 
Brunswick each emerges the top candidate in each jurisdiction in terms of regional 
economic openness at 17.5% and 40.5%, respectively. Hawaii and Nova Scotia, at 1.1% 
and 13.3%, are the least open economies.  
 
These statistics reveal that Canada is far more dependent on international trade than the 
US. This finding is consistent with a large body of literature on both the determinants of 
country size and trade openness. Generally speaking, smaller countries tend to have more  
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Table 3.3: Trade Openness for US and Canadian Jurisdictions (2008-2010) 
Panel A: Top Five Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction Trade Openness (%) Jurisdiction Trade Openness (%) 
Louisiana 17.5 New Brunswick 40.5 
Texas 15.3 Saskatchewan 39.1 
Washington 15.0 Newfoundland and Labrador 38.1 
Vermont 14.5 Alberta 31.9 
South Carolina 11.7 Ontario 27.6 
Panel B: Bottom Five Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction Trade Openness (%) Jurisdiction Trade Openness (%) 
Hawaii 1.1 Nova Scotia 13.3 
New Mexico 2.2 British Columbia 14.6 
Wyoming 2.5 Prince Edward Island 15.6 
Colorado 2.7 Quebec 19.6 
Oklahoma 3.2 Manitoba 21.9 
Notes: Figures in Panel A are in descending order; figures in Panel B are in ascending order. Data are averaged over the 2007-2010 period. Trade 
openness is exports as a percentage of GDP. 
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open trade policies.  For example, Alesina and Wacziarg (1997) provide empirical 
evidence that country size is negatively related to trade openness. Their regression results 
show that when other determinants of openness are held constant, doubling population is 
associated with a 9 percentage points reduction in the trade to GDP ratio. They conclude 
that “to the extent that market size influences productivity, large countries can ‘afford’ to 
be closed, while small countries face stronger incentives to remain open” 
 
Other reasons have also been adduced for this. For instance, Doern and Stoney (2010) 
summarize a contemporary school of thought based on the notion of (i) a large and rising 
trade and current account deficits and (ii) a stagnant or declining standard of living in the 
past decade which has made domestic protectionist policy popular in the US.  
 
Regardless, we point to a quick caveat. As discussed under the data section in 3.4.1, while 
Canadian provincial exports and imports data are available for the period considered in 
this thesis, state-level imports data are only available from 2010 to 2013. Our trade 
openness measure is therefore based on exports only; imports are not included. With 
imports included, we expect a different picture; this may not be dramatically different 
though. 
 
3.5.2 Summary Statistics 
In this section, we present summary statistics for the key variables. Panel A of Table 3.4 
is based on the 1999-2010 sample (with trade openness included); Panel B is based on the 
1987-2010 sample (without trade openness). From Panel A, the upper and lower 
boundaries of real GDP per capita in levels (and relative real GDP per capita) are $68, 
847 and $18, 976 (and 157% and 65%) respectively. Absolute and relative per capita 
incomes do not differ significantly with $68, 847 and $17,816 for the former, and 178% 
and 64% for the latter (see both panels). The mean and median per capita incomes are 
$43,305 and $42,498, respectively (Panel A). Panel B, based on the full sample, shows 
lower mean and median incomes at $36,791 and $36,048, respectively. Again, we see the 
impact of lower per capita incomes in the earlier periods on average income over the 
entire study period. As well, the presence of outliers in the sample explains the mean-
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median income differentials in both panels. Precisely, resource-driven increases in per 
capita income for jurisdictions like Alberta and Alaska. The observed differentials are not 
significant though and should not adversely impact our estimation and inferences.  
 
As discussed earlier, our net fiscal transfers measure shows a minimum of -18.7% in both 
panels, and -1.8% and 6.7% in the upper and lower panels, respectively. This implies that 
with the study sample enlarged, net fiscal transfers to the least recipient increased. The 
same is applicable to the alternative measure of transfers – relative net fiscal transfers.  
We expect our dynamic panel estimation procedure to provide more insights on this. The 
other two measures of fiscal transfers in this chapter – personal current transfer receipts 
and relative personal current transfer receipts – do not behave differently from the two 
principal measures discussed above. A standard deviation of 9.3% for the trade openness 
agrees with our initial analysis in section 3.5.1 above.  
 
Last but not least, our two control variables reveal some interesting trends. At 318% and 
60%, the difference in capital stock (as a share of output) for the largest and least capital 
intensive regional economies, respectively, is quite revealing.  Similarly, educational 
attainment at 38.5% and 7.3% for the highest- and lowest-achieving jurisdictions seems to 
corroborate the finding on capital stock, albeit to a lesser degree. Higher educational 
attainment for the population is generally considered to be growth-promoting.  
 
The Solow growth model, interpreted through the lens of the convergence hypothesis, 
predicts that during the adjustment to steady state, economies with a lower capital stock 
will grow faster than those with higher capital stocks. As discussed under the literature 
review section, recent endogenous growth propositions do not agree with the notion of 
convergence. To get a better understanding of these issues, we present a formal 
econometric framework in the next section. Detailed analysis on the observed patterns for 
capital stock and educational attainment is available under sections 2.3.4 in chapter 2. 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for Key Variables 
Panel A:  
Measure RGDP ($) RRGDP (%) PCT ($) RPCT (%) NFT (%) RNFT (%) CAP (%) EDU (%) OPN (%) 
Mean 43,305 96 4,866 101 -10.8 1.5 104 24.5 9.9 
Median 42,498 93 4,765 100 -10.7 1.3 91 24.7 6.4 
Std. Deviation 9,511 18 1,423 14 2.8 3.2 37 5.7 9.3 
Minimum 18,976 65 1,842 63 -18.7 -5.7 60 10.2 0.8 
Maximum 68,847 157 8,684 138 -1.8 15.9 318 38.5 45.5 
                                
Panel B:  
Measure RGDP ($) RRGDP (%) PCT ($) RPCT (%) NFT (%) RNFT (%) CAP (%) EDU (%) 
Mean 36,791 96 4,026 100 -10.8 1.5 103 22.3 
Median 36,048 93 3,645 97 -11.0 1.1 93 22.5 
Std. Deviation 11,215 19 1,495 15 3.1 3.5 32 6.0 
Minimum 17,816 64 1,753 63 -18.7 -5.7 60 7.3 
Maximum 68,847 178 8,684 139 6.7 20.3 318 38.5 
Notes: Panel A based on 1999-2010 sample (with trade openness included); 60 observations for each year for a total of 720 observations. Panel B based 
on 1987-2010 sample (without trade openness); 60 observations for each year for a total of 1,260 observations. RGDP stands for real GDP per capita 
levels; RRGDP is relative real GDP per capita; NFT is net fiscal transfers; RNFT is relative net fiscal transfers; PCT is per capita personal current 
transfer receipts; RPCT is relative personal current transfer receipts; CAP is capital stock as a percentage of GDP; EDU is educational attainment; and 






3.5.3 Absolute and Relative Income Analysis  
In this section, two different variants of the per capita income-fiscal transfers nexus are 
presented. Figures 3.6 shows both variables expressed in their original units on the left 
side and in relative terms on the right, respectively.  
 
Figure 3.6: Absolute and Relative Income Analysis 
  
Both charts reveal upfront that fiscal transfers and income are negatively correlated. A 
higher marginal impact for the relative income-relative transfer relationship (as captured 
by a steeper slope of 2.54, compared to 1.07 for the comparator) signals that the relative 
measures may provide our estimation work with better predictive abilities. More so, R-
squared value of 22.5% for the relative measures (compared to 8.6% for the absolute 
ones) clearly provides a stronger justification for the use of relative fiscal transfers and 
relative per capita income in this chapter. 
 
3.5.4 Correlation Matrix 
Table 3.5 shows the correlation matrix for all key variables. A cursory look at the matrix 
shows that multicollinearity is not a problem, with the notable exception of the NFT-
RNFT nexus – with 90% in correlation coefficient value. Even so, we worry less because 
both variables do not enter any of the specified models simultaneously; we only use one 
at a time to perform sensitivity analysis, with results compared with the alternative 
measure.
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Table 3.5: Correlation Matrix for Key Variables 
Panel A 
Variable  RGDP RRGDP NFT RNFT PCT RPCT CAP EDU OPN 
RGDP 100% 
        RRGDP 86% 100% 
       NFT -38% -47% 100% 
      RNFT -59% -49% 82% 100% 
     PCT 31% -2% 25% -19% 100% 
    RPCT -20% -14% 25% 33% 35% 100% 
   CAP -21% 13% 7% 22% -40% 11% 100% 
  EDU 66% 41% -37% -68% 35% -34% -51% 100% 
 OPN -30% 6% -8% -37% -34% 25% 78% -56% 100% 
Panel B 
Variable RGDP RRGDP NFT RNFT PCT RPCT CAP EDU 
RGDP 100% 
       RRGDP 62% 100% 
      NFT -29% -47% 100% 
     RNFT -38% -47% 90% 100% 
    PCT 60% -2% 12% -10% 100% 
   RPCT -8% -15% 31% 35% 34% 100% 
  CAP -11% 8% 3% 23% -27% 12% 100% 
 EDU 69% 37% -42% -58% 49% -26% -45% 100% 
Notes: Panel A based on 1999-2010 sample (with trade openness included); 60 observations for each year for a total of 720 observations. Panel B based 
on 1987-2010 sample (without trade openness); 60 observations for each year for a total of 1,260 observations. RGDP stands for real GDP per capita 
levels; RRGDP is relative real GDP per capita; NFT is net fiscal transfers; RNFT is relative net fiscal transfers; PCT is per capita personal current 
transfer receipts; RPCT is relative personal current transfer receipts; CAP is capital stock as a percentage of GDP; EDU is educational attainment; and 
OPN is trade openness.  
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To conclude our discussion on descriptive statistics and preliminary exploratory analysis, 
we see that prior to any sophisticated use of controls, the data clearly show some 
preliminary evidence for the important issues discussed so far in this chapter. Again, 
while such correlation (or lack thereof) may be consistent (or inconsistent) with our priors 
as well as the literature reviewed earlier, one has to be careful interpreting this, especially 
in light of the issue of endogeneity, which is one the issues we are hoping to resolve in 
the next session through the use of the system and difference GMM estimation 
techniques. We discuss the GMM strategy a little further below. 
 
3.5.5 The GMM Strategy 
The Arellano-Bond strategy implements a GMM equation; in this case, the model is set 
up as a system of equations, one for each time period. That way, different instruments 
relate to a different equation. Arellano and Bond recommend dynamic panel models 
estimation using a first-differentiated GMM estimator; they state that this will help 
capture the lagged endogenous variable as an explanatory variable. In other words, the 
regression equation is first-differentiated in each period in order to eliminate individual 
specific effects. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) point out the 
deficiency in the Arellano-Bond strategy; they say if the variables are close to a random 
walk, the lagged levels would constitute rather poor instruments for first differenced 
variables. Arellano and Bover, and Blundell and Bond, therefore modify the difference 
GMM estimator to incorporate lagged levels and lagged differences – called system 
GMM. The System GMM estimator is obtained at a cost involving a set of additional 
restrictions on the initial conditions of the process generating y (Baum, 2013).  
 
Blundell and Bond’s argument above essentially points to the fact that with a finite 
sample size, the first-differentiated GMM estimator could lead to biased results since the 
reliability of Yit−1   and Yit−2  as instruments cannot be guaranteed under a scenario where 
real GDP per capita, net fiscal transfers and openness are continuous. Arellano and Bover 
and Blundell, and Bond (1998), show that the system GMM estimator generates good 
instruments by combining both the standard set of equations with additional set of 
equations, all in first-differences, with lagged levels deemed as suitable. 
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3.6 Estimation Results 
3.6.1 Growth-Fiscal Transfers Nexus 
We present the results of the various estimators for the baseline and alternative 
specifications. We briefly look at the classical OLS estimator applied to the baseline 
model, followed by the alternative specifications. In light of the results obtained, and in 
order to refine such, we modify our estimator step by step, moving first to the FEM 
before the two-step difference GMM technique. We then end with the system GMM. 
Table 3.6 shows the estimation results for our baseline and alternative specifications 
using the FEM; Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report the two-step difference GMM (DIFF-GMM) 
and the two-step system GMM (SYST-GMM) estimators; Table 3.9 reports the restricted 
SYST-GMM and instrument proliferation control. We focus first on the growth-fiscal 
transfers nexus, and later examine the trade openness and AIT debates. 
 
3.6.1.1 OLS Results 
One quick caveat: our model cannot be estimated consistently using simple OLS due to 
endogeneity between real GDP per capita and net fiscal transfers; as well as between real 
GDP per capita and trade openness. Prior to the use of the FEM and GMM models, our 
OLS
31
 estimator provides evidence for the negative effect of fiscal transfers on per capita 
income, with estimated coefficient of -1.341 on NFT in specification 3. This is the only 
model where either of the two variants of fiscal transfers will be statistically significant 
out of all six specifications. It turns out that the coefficients on the interaction term in all 
six specifications are not statistically significant.  
 
Given the central objective of this chapter,  we rely on the more advanced Arellano-Bond 
(1991) and Blundell-Bond (1998) linear GMM estimators which, as discussed earlier, 
generate internal instruments based on their lag values. That is in addition to providing 
more efficient estimates over least square methods in the presence of heteroscedastcity in 
error variance. Nonetheless our OLS and FEM help in providing an upper and lower 
benchmark, with which the finite sample performance of the GMM estimators is 
                                                          
31
 Appendix 3.12 presents the OLS results. 
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evaluated. This is based on the notion that a good estimate of the true parameter should 
lie somewhere between the two extremes established by both estimators. This provides a 
way to seamlessly evaluate the unbiasedness of the GMM estimators. 
 
3.6.1.2 FEM Results 
The lagged dependent variable under our OLS approach is endogenous to the fixed 
effects, causing dynamic panel bias. The omitted variables end up biasing upward the 
estimated relationship between lagged GDP and current GDP. This in turn biases 
downward the estimated speed of convergence; OLS erroneously attributes predictive 
power that belongs to the fixed effects to the lagged dependent variable. The need to 
account for jurisdictional fixed effects to capture unobserved and persistent regional 
variations that influence long-run per capita income (and at the same time are correlated 
with observed per capita income) is well established in the growth empirics literature (e.g. 
Islam, 1995; Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and 
Yared; 2005 and 2008; and Shibamoto and Tsutsui (2011).   
 
Our FEM regressions are based on a panel data model with a distinct time-invariant 
jurisdictional effect term and a time-specific term. We estimate an autoregressive model 
with structural change in the autoregressive coefficient, with jurisdictional fixed effects 
and year effects. We use the FEM and not the random effects estimator because clearly, 
based on the specified model, there are omitted variables that are correlated with model 
variables.   The FEM helps control for such omitted variable bias. In addition, it allows 
for variation among the observations in the sample data in response to jurisdiction-
specific fixed effects and as a result, it takes into account within-jurisdiction variations.   
 
As a quick check, we conduct a formal Hausman test to validate the specification and 
estimation of a FEM; this basically tests whether the unique errors (𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡) are correlated 
with the regressors or not. We specify the null hypothesis that the preferred model is 
random effects, while the alternative specifies a FEM (Green, 2008). The null hypothesis 
of no fixed effects is rejected. Likewise, the standard F-test for the joint significance of 
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jurisdiction dummies is conducted and we conclude that unobserved heterogeneity is 
present and OLS estimation yields biased and inconsistent estimates. 
 
Based on Equation 3.8 from section 3.3.2, our panel framework is based on a FEM 
presented in Equation 3.13 below: 
 
Yit = α +  βXit +  𝜎i +  𝜈t + εit              (3.13) 
 
where the value of  Yit is determined by a group of explanatory variables (Xit) and two 
unobservable characteristics which account for time-invariant jurisdiction-specific effect 
(𝜎i) and jurisdiction-invariant time-specific effect (𝜈t).  
 
In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, different real GDP per capita levels may be 
attributed to two different jurisdictions with the same net fiscal transfers. This may be due 
to some common factors which affect income per capita, and are also correlated with net 
fiscal transfers. The intercept for each jurisdiction includes the effects of all omitted 
variables that are specific for each year but remains constant over time; such include 
certain deterministic factors (e.g. historical, political, geographical, cultural, climatic and 
linguistic factors. With the omission of individual effects, OLS estimates will be biased 
when individual effects are correlated with the independent variables.  
 
As an alternative, we use the FEM in our panel data environment to account for such 
heterogeneity bias. With a FEM though, all time-invariant variables drop out as the 
inherent transformation wipes out such variables. We therefore do not include the 
jurisdiction dummy since it is time invariant. The panel data framework therefore helps to 
disentangle the time invariant jurisdiction-specific effects and to capture the relationships 
between the relevant variables over time. 
 
Our FEM is based on the OLS deviations from the means of each jurisdiction in the 
sample. Biased coefficients may be produced if T is small and Yit−1 is correlated with 𝜎i; 
this is the first major problem with the OLS technique above. Omitted variables and other 
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shocks, which for some reason are not modeled, may appear in the error term. In that 
case, the regressor and the error are positively correlated, resulting in the violation of the 
assumption that the OLS estimator is consistent when the regressors are exogenous 
(Roodman, 2009).  
 
Table 3.6 below presents the FEM results. While the OLS baseline specification reports 
0.952 in estimated coefficient for Yit−1,  the FEM returns a coefficient value of 0.515; this 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. It becomes immediately noticeable that the OLS 
estimator produces a higher absolute coefficient value for Yit−1, compared to the FEM. 
This is not surprising given our one-way FEM under a DPD framework in a small T, large 
N environment. Nickel (1981) explains this by the fact that the demeaning process 
whereby the individual mean value of y and that of x are subtracted from the respective 
variable leads to the regressor being correlated with the error. 
 
The lower estimate from the FEM is in line with the conclusion of Roodman (2009) and 
Bond (2002). Roodman believes that a credible estimate of the lagged value of the 
dependent variable should lie below 1:00 because greater values may signify an unstable 
dynamic, which tends to show divergence away from equilibrium values with increasing 
speed. Bond says a candidate consensus estimator will lie between the OLS and FEM 
estimates or at least will not be significantly higher than the former or significant lower 
than the latter. He reinforces this based on the notion that it constitutes useful checks on 
results from theoretically superior estimators. 
 
Under OLS, a higher coefficient value confirms that Yit−1 and the error are positively 
correlated, resulting in an upwardly biased estimate – a penalty for the violation of a 






Table 3.6: FEM Estimation Results 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRRGDP lnRGDP 
Log of lagged RGDP 
  
0.807***  0.717***  
 
0.712*** 





























 Log of lagged RGDP x NFT 


















 Capital stock 0.036* -0.038* 0.050 0.052 -0.035* 0.095** 
 
[0.019] [0.020] [0.045] [0.049] [0.019] [0.045] 
Educational attainment 0.045 0.051 1.508*** 1.407 0.318 0.874** 
 
[0.083] [0.082] [0.502] [0.526] [0.303] [0.435] 
Constant 0.038 0.039 1.111** 2.057 -0.033 2.474*** 
 
[0.028] [0.030] [0.514] [0.761] [0.087] [0.812] 
Year dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of jurisdictions 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 
R-Squared 0.544 0.545 0.930 0.931 0.556 0.946 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%.  RGDP stands for relative GDP per capita; RRGDP stands for relative real GDP per capita; NFT stands for net fiscal transfers; RNFT 




This will lead to an inflated estimate for the coefficient of Yit−1 because predictive power 
is wrongly attributed to Yit−1, when this actually belongs to 𝑣i; this is the chief cause of 
endogeneity (Roodman, 2009). This will constitute a major setback given our objective of 
examining the conditional convergence hypothesis.  
 
The FEM, also called the within group estimator, helps to apply a mean deviation to each 
variable in order to partial the cross-sectional fixed effects from the data. No doubt, the 
FEM strategy is a major achievement over OLS. However, this strategy still does not get 
rid of the dynamic panel bias mentioned earlier. We could address this problem by (i) 
using the difference GMM to remove the fixed effects by transforming the data or (ii) by 
directly instrumenting Yit−1 and other endogenous variables like fiscal transfers and trade 
openness. More than anything, this is one major concern that motivates a GMM strategy.  
 
3.6.1.3 GMM Estimators 
Before we begin our DPD analysis, we restate Equations 3.8 and 3.9 again below: 
 
lnRGDP𝑖𝑡 =
β0 + 𝛽1 (𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽2 (𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑖𝑡)  + 𝛽3  (𝑁𝐹𝑇. 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 (EDUit) +
𝛽5 (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡)  + 𝛽6 (AIT)   + JU𝑅𝑖 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝑡 + μit           (3.14) 
 
𝑙𝑛RGDP𝑖𝑡 =
α0 + 𝛼1 (𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼2 (𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼3  (𝑂𝑃𝑁. 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼4 (EDUit) +
𝛼5 (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡)  + JU𝑅𝑖 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝑡 + μit                               (3.15) 
 
We have identified in the preceding section that the following major econometric issues 
are associated with estimating these equations: (i) the net fiscal transfers, trade openness 
and the two control variables are assumed to be endogenous (since causality may run in 
both directions for each variable, these regressors may be correlated with the error term) 
(ii) the time-invariant jurisdiction specific fixed effects may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables (iii) our panel dataset has a short time dimension (T =6) relative to 
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a larger jurisdictional dimension (N =60) and (iv) the presence of 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 in the model is 
ground for autocorrelation.  
 
The FEM could help address problem (ii) above, but not (i) and (iii). The GMM estimator 
provides a one-stop shop strategy that addresses all these issues. The GMM developed by 
Hansen (1982) uses a set of moment conditions to produce an asymptotically efficient 
GMM estimator. There are two versions: the difference and system GMM estimators. 
They basically use fewer assumptions about the underlying data-generating process and 
more complex techniques to isolate useful information (Roodman, 2009).  Usually 
attributed to Arellano and Bond (1991), the DPD approach was actually pioneered by 
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), based on the notion that the 2SLS method 
described in the preceding section does not take full advantage of all of the sample 
information – especially the potential orthogonality conditions (Baum, 2013). 
 
3.6.1.4 GMM Results and Diagnostic Tests 
Table 3.7 displays the results of both the two-step difference GMM (DIFF-GMM) and the 
two-step system GMM (SYST-GMM) estimations. The first three columns present results 
for the former; the last three columns for the latter.  As noted under the notes to the table, 
relative real GDP per capita and RNFT are used in all six specifications.  The first 
specification under each technique does not include the interactive term; the other four 
do. 
 
As indicated earlier, an appropriate dynamic model specification must include a lagged 
dependent variable to control for the prior period's income level. These coefficients are 
used to check for the validity of our estimates.  Bond (2002) argues that a candidate 
consensus estimator will lie between the OLS and FE estimates or at least will not be 
significantly higher than the former or significant lower than the latter. The coefficient 
values of 0.447 (DIFF-GMM) and 0.963 (SYST-GMM) both agree with Bond’s claim, 




Table 3.7: Difference and System GMM Results 
  
                                                                 
Two-Step Diff 
GMM      
                                                                   
Two-Step Sys 
GMM     
  [1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP 
Log of lagged RRGDP 0.447*** 0.532*** 0.547*** 0.962*** 0.963*** 0.958*** 





2.286*** -0.033 -0.099 -0.037 
  0.343 [0.469] [0.444] [0.202] [0.205] [0.193] 
Log of lagged RRGDP x RNFT   -0.242 -0.302   -0.365 -0.195 
    [1.061] [1.072]   [0.335] [0.412] 
Capital stock -0.058** -0.055** -0.042** 0.018* 0.016 0.017 
  [0.027] [0.021] [0.020] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] 
Educational attainment 0.056 0.041 0.087 0.051 0.043 0.073 
  [0.094] [0.110] [0.365] [0.063] [0.054] [0.108] 
Constant       -0.029 -0.025 -0.030 
        [0.024] [0.221] [0.045] 
Year dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No No No 
Number of observations 300 300 300 360 360 360 
Number of jurisdictions 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Number of instruments 56 76 91 74 100 119 
Specification Tests             
Sargan Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen Test (p value) 0.375 0.855 0.995 0.894 1.000 1.000 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) ( p-value) 0.044 0.024 0.019 0.003 0.004 0.003 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) ( p-value) 0.685 0.705 0.659 0.344 0.362 0.502 
 Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10%. All estimations based on the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction to the standard errors.
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The other four specifications (i.e. 2 and 3 under DIFF GMM and 2 and 3 under SYST 
GMM) do not produce significantly different results, compared to the baseline models. 
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are very close to what we see under 
the two specifications discussed earlier (0.532 and 0.547 for DIFF GMM and 0.963 and 
0.958 for SYST GMM). These are equally statistically significant at the 1% level. We 
notice also that the coefficients on RNFT are statistically significant at the 1% level and 
also come out with negative signs under the DIFF GMM models; they are not significant 
statistically under SYST GMM. 
 
Again, this provides evidence for the negative effect of fiscal transfers on per capita 
output. The interaction terms between lagged per capita GDP and fiscal transfers are not 
statistically significant under the four scenarios modeled; they are economically 
significant though within the context of the discussion in this chapter. We therefore do 
not have evidence to comment on the degree to which lagged income is linked to 
economic growth through fiscal transfers in Canada and the US. The first result supports 
the hypothesis that there is a relationship between net fiscal transfers and GDP per capita, 
albeit a negative one. By implication, the latter result means we have no evidence on the 
combined effect of fiscal transfers and lagged income on GDP per capita.    
 
These results clearly help to establish one thing: the major concern that motivated a 
GMM strategy in the first place is addressed. In all, results from our four alternative 
specifications complement one another. It would amount to a difficult task choosing one 
specification over the other prior to dealing with the issue of instrument proliferation, 
which we discuss in detail later in this section. Prior to that, we discuss the results of the 
various specification tests below.  
 
We report the p-values for the following four diagnostic tests in the lower panel of the 
table: Hansen test, Sargan test, Arellano – Bond test for first order autocorrelation AR(1) 
and second order autocorrelation AR(2) tests. We conduct the Sargan/Hansen test for 
joint validity of the instruments; the validity of GMM is based on the assumption that the 
instruments are exogenous. If the model is exactly identified, it will be impossible to 
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detect invalid instruments, but when it is over-identified, a test statistic for the joint 
validity of the moment conditions falls naturally out of the GMM framework (Roodman, 
2009). A higher p-value on the Sargan/Hansen test is indicative of a better fitted model. 
 
The AR test is specified as a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation; this is applied to the 
differenced residuals.  The presence of significant AR(2) is a diagnostic test of the 
validity of the instruments. In a way, this compliments the standard Sargan–Hansen test 
of overidentifying restrictions. We expect the residuals of the differenced equation to be 
serially correlated, but if the assumption of serial independence in the original errors is 
upheld, then the differenced residuals should not exhibit significant AR(2) behaviour 
(Baum, 2013).  Usually, the test for AR (1) process in first differences leads to a rejection 
of the null hypothesis; this is not surprising given that the term ei,t−1  is common to these 
two equations: Δeit = eit−ei,t−1 and Δei,t−1= ei,t−1−ei,t−2 = ei,t−1 . Because it is able to detect 
autocorrelation in levels, we conclude that the test for AR (2) in first differences is more 
important (Mileva, 2007). 
 
The DIFF-GMM estimation process uses 56, 76 and 91 instruments for specification 1, 2 
and 3, respectively; the SYST-GMM on the other hand uses 74, 100 and 119 instruments 
in the same order. Our first comment is that the number of instruments used in each case 
was lower than the number of observations; this provides the first cursory evidence that 
we may not have run into any issues related to identification.  Obviously, the difference 
GMM produces fewer instruments for the same specification, compared to the system 
GMM. This explains why the number of observations is less by a complete set for the 
difference GMM.  For simplicity in our reporting, we discuss the performance of the 
various diagnostic tests for the baseline specification, and only include the others when it 
is necessary to point out something worth mentioning.  
 
The Sargan tests return p-values of 0.000 for both estimators; the Hansen tests produce p-
values of 0.375 and 0.894. The Hansen test p-values are fairly large and are in no way 
close to 1:00. As noted by Roodman, in reference to Anderson and Sorenson (1996) and 
Bowsher (2002), the GMM estimators often generate moment conditions prolifically, 
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leading to several problems in finite samples – meaning that the Hansen test may then be 
weakened so much that it generates “implausibly good p-values of 1.00”.  
 
As initially stated, a higher p-value on the Sargan test is indicative of a better fitted 
model. The value of 0.00 here does seem to lend us any support. Roodman, however, 
warns that if non-sphericity is suspected in the errors, the Sargan statistic can be expected 
to be inconsistent.  In that case, he suggests a theoretically superior over-identification 
test to be based on the Hansen statistic from a two-step estimate. Based on this 
recommendation, we conclude that the Hansen test fails to detect any problem with the 
validity of the instruments used in our baseline estimation; less so for the Sargan test. 
Also, the issue of instrument proliferation remains a concern and will be addressed in the 
next section. 
 
Next on the list of our battery of tests is the AR(2) in disturbances. Based on 0.044 (AR1) 
and 0.685 (AR2) and 0.003 (AR1) and 0.344 (AR2) values for the DIFF-GMM and 
SYST-GMM, respectively, the tests of disturbances fail to reject the respective nulls. 
These tests therefore support the validity of the instruments used in our model.   
 
In all, we conclude that the various diagnostic tests fail to detect any problem with the 
validity of the instruments used in our baseline estimation; the major concern that 
motivated a GMM strategy is now addressed. Also, we realize that in addition to the 
validation provided for the DIFF-GMM and SYST-GMM, we certainly need to carry out 
further robustness checks before concluding that the specified models are correctly 
instrumented and estimated coefficients are reliable for inference. This especially 
becomes necessary given the degree of instrument proliferation under all six 
specifications. 
 
3.6.1.5 Under-identification, Instrument Proliferation and Weak Instruments 
Looking at Table 3.7 again, the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable for all three 
specifications under both the DIFF-GMM and the SYST-GMM are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Based on the reported standard errors, we see the efficacy of 
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the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction in action for SYST-GMM, compared to 
the DIFF-GMM models. Clearly, this provides some justification for the SYST-GMM, 
over the DIFF-GMM. However, we are careful to not base our preference of one 
estimator over the other solely on the basis of the results they give.   
 
Roodman (2009) advises that before using System GMM, the required assumptions 
should be pondered. Roodman states thus, “The validity of the additional instruments in 
System GMM depends on the assumption that changes in the instrumenting variables are 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects”. System GMM avoids dynamic panel bias by 
instrumenting endogenous explanatory variables with their lagged values; this turns the 
endogenous regressors to exogenous ones and by so doing helps to satisfy the required 
identifying moment conditions.  
 
Roodman hints that instrument proliferation can overfit endogenous variables, and as 
such, fail to expunge their endogenous components. The downside, when this happens, is 
that it weakens the power of the Hansen test in detecting this issue. As advised by 
Roodman, a perfect Hansen statistic of 1:00 is a telltale sign: a way out here is to test for 
robustness to severely reducing the instrument count, including a reduction in the lags 
used in GMM-style instruments, and collapsing instruments in the xtabond2 environment. 
 
We therefore perform a battery of tests on the key issues of under-identification, 
instrument proliferation and weak instruments.  Instrument proliferation in the system 
GMM, according to Roodman (2009), leads to biased estimates as a result of model over-
fitting – since the endogenous components of endogenous explanatory variables remain 
unexpunged. Bazzi & Clemens (2013) establish that the results of most growth 
regressions that use the dynamic panel approach are qualified due to the problem of 
underidentification and weak instrumentation. They state further that even after reducing 
the number of instruments, both problems may persist. Roodman (2009) warns that 
“instrument proliferation in system GMM may generate results that are invalid, yet 
appear valid because of a silently weakened Hansen over-identification test”. He offers 
three strategies to reduce the instrument set: (i) restrict the number of lags for the GMM-
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style instruments (ii) collapse the instrument set into a smaller dimension matrix and (iii) 
combine (i) and (ii). We pursue the first option of restricting the number of lags; all six 
models in Table 3.7 are then re-estimated.  
 
We start the modeling exercise with lower order lags as instruments and gradually 
increase the order. In each scenario, we notice that the various specification tests improve 
significantly with higher order lags. It is worth mentioning that results for the fifth lag 
show remarkable overall model performance, with convincing signs that the issue of 
instrument proliferation has been addressed. Table 3.8 below reports the outcome for the 
SYST-GMM model – with results from the third to the seventh lags included for clarity.  
 
As clearly displayed in Table 3.8, all six specifications are the same in that they all 
include the interaction term between the lagged dependent variable and fiscal transfers. 
The only two differences are: (i) year dummies are included in three specifications and 
excluded from three in an alternate fashion and (ii) columns 1 and 2 are based on third 
and fourth order lags; columns 3 and 4 are based on fifth and sixth order lags; and 
columns 5 and 6 are based on sixth and seventh order lags, respectively. The table shows 
that the number of instrument reduces significantly as a result of the restriction in the 
number of instruments. For instance, when we compare results under columns 2 and 3 of 
the SYST-GMM under Table 3.7 with Table 3.8, we observe that the instrument count 
has reduced from 100 and 119 for the former to 43 and 54 for the third and fourth lags, 
respectively, for the latter table. When compared even further with the fifth and sixth lags 
only, our instrument count falls to 19 and 25. For the sixth and seven lags, the number of 
instruments falls to eight and 13; in this case though, we exercise great care
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Table 3.8: Two-Step System GMM (Restricted Lags) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP 
Log of lagged RRGDP 0.973*** 1.041*** 1.020*** 0.964*** 0.905*** 1.078** 
  [0.035] [0.064] [0.057] [0.070] [0.128] [0.504] 
RNFT 0.243 0.121 0.575*** 0.875*** 0.292 -1.408 
  [0.149] [0.211] [0.185] [0.254] [0.596] [3.853] 
Log of lagged RRGDP x RNFT 0.649 0.203 2.387 3.148 0.978 -0.862 
  [0.521] [0.691] [2.141] [2.014] [3.000] [3.518] 
Capital stock 0.017 -0.013 0.022 0.059** 0.114 -0.063 
  [0.011] [0.026] [0.028] [0.026] [0.116] [0.381] 
Educational attainment 0.113 -0.171 0.034 0.439 0.465 -2.082 
  [0.076] [0.223] [0.157] [0.305] [0.471] [5.286] 
Constant -0.043 0.072 -0.027 -0.172* -0.227 0.639 
  [0.027] [0.088] [0.051] [0.093] [0.212] [1.827] 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No No No 
Number of observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 
Number of jurisdictions 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Number of lags used 3&4 3&4 5&6 5&6 6&7 6&7 
Number of instruments 43 54 19 25 8 13 
Specification Tests             
Sargan Test (p value) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.730 0.681 
Hansen Test (p value) 0.008 0.234 0.171 0.204 0.513 0.587 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) ( p-value) 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.027 0.131 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) ( p-value) 0.296 0.334 0.174 0.283 0.613 0.392 
 Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10%. All estimations based on the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction to the standard errors.
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to guide against instrument over-pruning. We discuss below the changes observed across 
the various specification tests. 
 
First, the p-values of the Sargan tests improved significantly across three specifications, 
compared to the all-zero values in Table 3.7. This ranges between 0.002 and 0.730. 
Roodman (2009) amplifies this by concurring that instrument proliferation causes model 
over-fitting, which in turn generates biased estimates because it fails to rid the concerned 
explanatory variables of their endogenous components. He adds that this usually 
manifests through high p-values for the Hansen tests –often close to 1. After our re-
estimation, the Hansen test p-values all decrease in value across the board; from 
minimum and maximum values of 0.894 and 1.000 under the SYST-GMM group of 
specifications in Table 3.8 to 0.008 and 0.587 in Table 3.9, respectively. This is novel, 
and indeed validates Roodman’s proposition above. Both AR (1) and AR (2) tests also 
improve under all specifications in Table 3.8. 
 
The estimated lagged real per capita GDP coefficient is quite sensitive to the choice of lag 
length. For instance, going from the fifth and sixth to the sixth and seventh lags leads to a 
fall in the values of the lagged dependent variable from 1.020 to 0.905 – for specifications 
3 and 5. Similar to the lagged dependent variable, the coefficient on net fiscal transfers 
also becomes statistically significant at the 1% level under specifications 3 and 4; it is not 
statistically significant under the other four specifications. Across all specifications, the 
coefficient on the interactive term is not significant. 
 
The other explanatory variables also appear highly sensitive to lag length with changes in 
magnitudes and directions of impact common across both groups. Our capital stock 
control variable turns out to be statistically and economically significant under the fifth 
and sixth lags with the year dummies included; educational attainment is not statistically 
significant across all specifications. In all, our results show that the SYST-GMM handles 




To conclude this section, the diagnostics in Table 3.8 are not radically different from 
those presented in Table 3.7. However, results in the former show significant 
improvements in the various specifications, in addition to lending support to the validity 
of instruments in our SYT-GMM specifications. In all, our results suggest that the main 
results remain consistent, with marginal changes in the predictive abilities of the 
coefficient estimates. 
 
3.6.2 Summary of Results and Policy Implications 
In this section, we discuss the implications of the various estimation results so far.  
 
3.6.2.1 Further Analysis 
From the analysis so far, the SYST-GMM estimator seems to behave well. This is based 
on at least four facts: (i) precision of coefficient estimates (ii) instrument validity (iii) 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust covariance matrix and (iv) dynamic 
stability. This does not come as a surprise. As severally discussed, the two-step GMM 
provides a covariance matrix that is robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and 
unlike the one-step system GMM, provides a robust Hansen J-test for over-identification 
(Mileva, 2007). Bond et al. (2001) also lend their voice; they say though both estimators 
become asymptotically equivalent when the disturbances are spherical, the two-step 
system GMM produces more efficient estimators, compared to one-step system GMM.  
 
Based on Table 3.8 above, the two most preferred models are specifications 4 and 5. We 
choose both because the coefficient on lagged per capita income is under unity and the 
problem of instrument proliferation is taken care of. Depending on what it is we want to 
achieve, models 4 and 5 have some unique properties that give them both an edge, in 
some way, over the other. For instance, specification 4 includes the year dummies in 
addition to having a statistically significant coefficient on the RNFT variable. On the 
other hand, with only the sixth and seventh lags used, resulting in only eight instruments, 
the specification tests on model 5 perform much stronger than what we see in model 4. 
We see a major trade-off in action here; dealing with the econometric problem of 
endogeneity results in statistical insignificance for some key variables. The coefficients 
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on lagged GDP per capita in models 4 and 5 are 0.964 and 0.905, respectively; they are 
both economically and statistically significant at the 1% level. Surely, we will find the 
two uniquely desirable properties in model 4 above quite useful under the policy analysis 
section below. 
 
3.6.2.2 Implications for Policy 
The central objective of our chapter is to investigate the impact of fiscal transfers on 
economic growth and redistribution. At the same time, we hope to address the problems 
that arise as a result of the endogenous nature of net fiscal transfers in the specified 
model. Clearly, our results on the fiscal transfers-growth question are in two parts. Based 
on the selected models, our DPD-method produces a coefficient of 0.875 on the RNFT 
variable in specification 4; specification 5 produces a statistically insignificant 
coefficient. In contrast, the non-DPD FEM estimators produce statistically significant 
coefficients ranging from -2.272 to -2.381 for the RNFT-based specifications. All listed 
coefficients are economically and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
While the above FEM results clearly agree with Checherita et al. – that on average, net 
fiscal transfers impede output growth – the statistically significant SYST-GMM technique 
suggests the opposite. Furthermore, we find the exact opposite (for both FEM and SYST-
GMM) when we model relative transfers simply as the ratio of disposable income to 
personal income – like Checherita et al. This does not come as a surprise. Our analysis 
and Checherita et al.’s are similar in two fundamental ways: (i) like Checherita et al., the 
fiscal transfers variable in our analysis is constructed relative to the national average and 
(ii) fiscal transfer is the ratio between household disposable income and household 
primary income; the only difference though is that we measure fiscal transfers as 
percentage change; not just as a ratio of two incomes like Checherita et al. Like them, our 
GMM technique takes into account the endogenous nature of net fiscal transfers.  
 
Notwithstanding the many similarities between our analysis and Checherita et al.’s, ours 
focuses on Canada and the US, while theirs look at Europe.  This is one factor that could 
explain the seeming divergence. Also, the range of period for data and a host of 
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idiosyncratic issues may have played a role in what we see. As noted by Baum (2013), 
“Although the DPD estimators are linear estimators, they are highly sensitive to the 
particular specification of the model and its instruments: more so in my experience than 
any other regression-based estimation approach”.  
 
We equally compare our results with Bayoumi and Masson – a US-Canada regional study 
discussed under the review of literature. They employ OLS on 48 US states and 10 
Canadian provinces; they find the coefficient on pretax income to be 0.781 (with a 
standard error of 0.028) and 0.608 (with a standard error of 0.025) for the US and Canada, 
respectively. In other words, fiscal transfers reduce income inequalities by 22 cents in the 
dollar and 33 cents in the dollar, on average, for these countries, in the stated order. Even 
though we are not able to directly compare our results with Bayoumi and Masson’s due to 
the different models, data, periods considered and the fact that our focus is on real GDP 
per capita (while theirs is income inequalities), our both results are highly instructive.  
 
To further aid policy analysis, we take a closer look at net fiscal transfers to the regions. 
To achieve this, we divide the full sample into two, on the basis of the RNFT variable. 
Based on the summary statistics presented earlier in this chapter, relative net transfer 
ranges from -5.7% to 20.3%, with mean and median values of 1.5% and 1.1%, 
respectively. This suggests that the highest contributor pays about 5.7% of its primary 
income, while the highest recipient gets over 20% of its income. We therefore split the 
sample on the basis of the median
32
 value of 1.1%.  In light of this, jurisdictions with 
median values above 1.1% are named below-average jurisdictions, while those below are 
tagged above-average jurisdictions.  
 
We go a step further and use another yardstick to achieve this dichotomy: jurisdictions 
with positive RNFTs are called net recipients while those with negative values are called 
net contributors. We then conduct our formal econometric test using the OLS, FEM and 
SYST-GMM estimators.  Regression results across all estimators show that the estimated 
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coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are very significant. In addition, the 
coefficients fall within the upper-lower bounds established by the OLS and FEM 
estimators.   
 
The GMM technique produces similar results to what we have in Table 3.8, albeit the 
RNFT variable and interaction term are statistically insignificant in all cases. The non-
DPD based estimators however yield statistically significant coefficients, thus aiding in 
definitive policy analysis. Considering the persistence and consistency in the FEM 
outcomes, in particular, we base our policy analysis for the most part on this technique; of 
course, we tangentially discuss the DPD outcome to get the complete picture. Another 
reason we focus on the fixed effects strategy is because in all of the four specifications, 
the subsamples become so truncated that estimation based on the GMM technique is 
inefficient. 
 
The FEM produces -2.467, -2.051, -1.205 and -2.354 for the lagged per capita output 
coefficients for our below-average, above-average, net receiving and net contributing 
jurisdictions, respectively.  This clearly establishes a two-way negative impact of net 
fiscal transfers on real GDP per capita: i.e. while higher taxes have a negative impact on 
economic growth in the donor jurisdictions, higher net fiscal receipts equally have a 
negative effect in the receiving regions. Apart from the signs, the values of -1.205 and -
2.354 for the receiving and donor jurisdictions, respectively, also show that the impact of 
net fiscal transfers on growth is greater for the latter group than the former. Clearly, this 
result is profound and merits further discussion.  
 
This is a clear incidence of “immiserising growth” (Bhagwati, 1958).  In other words, not 
only does fiscal transfer have a detrimental effect on growth in general, economic growth 
in receiving jurisdictions decline by less than in contributing regions. This is similar to 
Checherita et al.’s finding on “immiserising convergence”. According to Checherita et 
al., “fiscal transfers impede output growth in both samples, they have a stronger growth-
reducing effect on richer regions”.  
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Hypothesis 6 is based on the precise nature of the tradeoff between redistribution and 
growth. As stated earlier, while inequality may provide an incentive to redistribute, we 
need to establish the magnitude and direction of the impact of redistribution on growth. A 
priori, we expect a positive correlation between fiscal transfers and growth, based on the 
notion that intergovernmental transfers rely principally on per capita income as an 
indicator of fiscal capacity. Not just that, fiscal flows are also expected to impact growth 
and redistribution in prosperous and poor regions differently.  We should be cognizant of 
the inherent limitations in this conclusion however, considering that our GMM estimation 
technique which explicitly models the endogenous nature of net fiscal transfers does not 
produce definitive results. Regardless, we are comfortable concluding that fiscal transfers 
have a significant and direct negative impact on income per capita growth. This 
conclusion is in agreement with the preliminary exploratory analysis (section 3.5.3) that 
higher net benefits are associated with lower regional income levels and vice versa (see 
Figure 3.6). Even so, we expect this finding to be more amplified for Canadian provinces, 
compared to US states, for reasons related to the specifics of each country’s fiscal union, 
as discussed earlier.  
 
We reiterate here again that Canada has a relatively stronger arrangement of using federal 
fiscal flows to redistribute income across regions, compared to the US with no formal 
framework in place to transfer resources from prosperous states to less prosperous ones.  
While Canada uses both Equalization payments and other transfer payments to equalize 
fiscal capacities from province to province, the US federal government uses the Grants-
in-Aid, a subsidy-type program that is accompanied by federal regulations, to extend its 
power into state and local affairs (Fraser Institute, 2013). We will look at this in detail 
under the analysis on the Canada-only and US-only samples in section 3.6.3. 
 
We now use the coefficient of the interaction variable to test for the impact of lagged 
income on economic growth, through the fiscal transfer channel. The two specifications 
carrying an interactive term produce statistically insignificant results in all cases in Table 
3.9. We conclude that there is no evidence that lagged income distribution has affected 
 148 
 
the intensity of the impact fiscal transfers have on growth. The same conclusion applies 
even under the OLS, FEM and DIFF-GMM. 
 
One major policy implication of the above result is that while regional fiscal disparity 
may be bad for growth, policy designs that focus on taxes and transfers may even cause 
more harm than good. Drawing specific conclusions on the negative effect of 
redistributive policies is indeed a dilemma. As pointed out by Okun (1975) in his popular 
book, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff, economic efficiency is achieved at a 
cost: inequalities in income and wealth. Okun underscores, yet again, the trade-off facing 
policy makers: a clear choice between an efficient economy or an egalitarian society. This 
implies that certain economic policies designed to reduce regional fiscal disparities may 
end up producing weakened economic efficiency as unintended consequence – due to 
negative production incentives. 
 
Bleaney et al. (2001) provide a benign solution to Okun’s dilemma by suggesting that 
investments in public goods could produce pro-growth and pro-equality effects, 
simultaneously. Checherita et al. also caution that governments can use a range of tools, 
in addition to fiscal transfers, to foster regional convergence (e.g. investment in 
infrastructure and human capital formation, and corporate subsidies differentiated by 
region). The equivalents of these variables in our chapter are physical capital stock, 
educational attainment and trade openness.  
 
A major policy lesson from our results is that care should be taken before drawing a line 
on the pro-growth or anti-growth stance of fiscal redistributive policies. As discussed 
under the Ostry et al. framework under the review of literature, the dynamics of the 
inequality-redistribution-growth nexus can often assume varying degrees of complexity. 
By way of policy recommendation, we suggest that policy makers first unbundle the 
different components of a redistributive fiscal policy and weigh carefully the pros and 
cons of each specific component, before making a decision on the optimal redistributive 
policy for a regional economy. It is also important to note that whatever conclusion we 
reach here is inherently qualified due to the issue of endogeneity between fiscal transfers 
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and per capita GDP, which is beyond the control of the fixed effects technique. Taken 
together, the evidence provides mixed support with respect to the DPD and FEM 
techniques. 
 
In many ways, our conclusion in this section is related to the discussion on economic 
diversity in the next chapter. First, to the extent that government budget revenues in many 
jurisdictions are determined by changing economic structures, sectoral composition and 
changes in the economic structure will be relevant for fiscal policy because sectoral 
specialization can be expected to have consequences for the transmission of fiscal policy 
and other macroeconomic shocks.  Given the volatile nature of commodity prices, 
sectoral specialization in resource-dependent economies will also likely drive potential 
growth and business cycle dynamics, at least to the extent that different commodity price 
regimes persist. Societies are heterogeneous, both in their income-earning abilities and 
preferences; economies are equally different in their structures and productive capacities. 
We therefore examine these links between economic growth and natural resources, in an 
environment where economic diversity plays a major role. 
 
3.6.3 Trade Openness and AIT Policy 
In this section, we shift our attention to the trade openness- growth and AIT-income links. 
Table 3.9 reports our trade openness regressions; Table 3.10 reports the results of AIT 
regressions.  
 
3.6.3.1 Trade Regressions 
As stated earlier, our analysis on trade openness focuses on the 1999-2010 period because 




α0 + 𝛼1 (𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼2 (𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼3  (𝑂𝑃𝑁. 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼4 (EDUit) +




Table 3.9 presents the OLS, FEM and SYST-GMM results. Under the SYST-GMM, we 
see clearly that the number of instruments drops from 23 to 6, and from 31 to 8, when the 
lag length is raised from 0 to 3, respectively. As discussed in the previous section, the 
various diagnostics also improve drastically once the issue of instrument proliferation is 
addressed. The Sargan, Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests all validate our results 
once we move from 0 to 3 for instrument lags. Our AR (2) p-value, unfortunately, is 
unavailable due to the smallness of T; so is the difference-in-Hansen p-value for one of 
the restricted models. 
 
All coefficient estimates on trade openness turn out to be statistically insignificant. The 
same goes for the interaction term between the lagged dependent variable and our trade 
openness measure. Under Hypothesis 7, on average, we expect a higher degree of trade 
openness to be associated with higher GDP per capita. As well, the interaction term 
between trade openness and lagged income should have a higher marginal impact, 
compared to the impact of trade openness alone. These results refute our hypotheses, but 
support the battery of studies on the inconclusive evidence regarding the trade-growth 
debate.  
 
For instance, Eaton and Kortum (1999) and Keller (2001) support the conditional income 
convergence notion on the basis that trade liberalization helps international technology 
diffusion when technical knowledge is a component of the goods and services traded. 
Parente and Prescott (2000) on the other hand argue that income convergence might not 
occur as a result of certain constraints on technological adoption. A quick caveat will 
suffice. Our measure is narrowed down to the ratio of exports to GDP as discussed under 




Table 3.9: Regression Results for Trade Openness 
  OLS1 OLS2 FEM1 FEM2 SGMM1 SGMM2 SGMM3 SGMM4 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP 
Log of lagged RRGDP 0.977*** 1.007*** 0.538*** 0.728*** 0.960*** 1.088*** 0.818  0.456 
  [0.030] [0.045] [0.151] [0.184] [0.077] [0.095] [0.753] [0.871] 
Openness -0.014 -0.047 -0.107 -0.123 0.064 -0.077 0.097 0.556 
  [0.082] [0.094] [0.165] [0.164] [0.081] [0.091] [0.739] [0.829] 
Log of lagged RRGDP x Openness   -0.246   -1.208**   -0.701   3.779 
    [0.174]   [0.515]   [0.606]   [5.763] 
Capital stock 0.015 0.022 0.024 0.035* 0.005 0.02 -0.001 -0.028 
  [0.015] [0.016] [0.020] [0.019] [0.017] [0.019] [0.026] [0.168] 
Educational attainment 0.027 0.014 0.502* 0.514** 0.115 -0.048 0.301 0.591 
  [0.112] [0.121] [0.252] [0.248] [0.190] [1.445] [0.612] [0.690] 
Constant -0.014 -0.015 -0.160*** -0.168*** -0.036 0.007 -0.088 -0.178 
  [0.040] [0.040] [0.059] [0.059] [0.068] [0.054] [0.164] [0.286] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No No No 
Number of observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Number of jurisdictions     60 60 60 60 60 60 
Number of instruments         23 31 6 8 
Number of lags used         0 0 3 3 
Specification Tests                 
R-squared 0.959 0.960 0.302           
Sargan Test (p value)         0.000 0.000 0.207 0.433 
Hansen Test (p value)         0.187 0.160 0.248 0.509 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) ( p-value)         0.042 0.024 0.254 0.787 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) ( p-value)         n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%.  A-B stands for Arellano-Bond; OPN for trade openness; RRGDP for relative real GDP per capita; and SGMM for two-step system 
GMM estimator. All GMM estimations based on the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction to the standard errors.
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3.6.3.2 AIT Policy 
As discussed under model specification, one of the objectives of our chapter is to estimate 
a measure of the impact of the AIT policy on regional economic growth in Canada; we 
hope to do so by taking advantage of the fact that the US states were not party to this 
policy. With the Canadian sample exposed to the AIT policy treatment post-1995 but not 
in the pre-1995 period, the US sample therefore qualifies as not having been exposed to 
any treatment pre- or post-1995.  
 
The timing of the signing of AIT, we agreed, may be correlated with other economically 
relevant milestones in Canada. The DiD approach, by including the US states in the 
analysis, is helpful in singling out the effect of AIT more precisely.  As discussed under 
model specification, AIT is a year dummy with 1 for post-AIT period and 0 for pre-AIT 
period. As additional control variables, we add a Canada dummy (which applies to the 
whole sample for Canada), a Canada slope dummy (which is the interaction of the 
Canada dummy with the lagged dependent variable) and the AIT slope dummy (the 
interaction of the AIT dummy with the lagged dependent variable).  
 
Prior to any formal analysis by regressions, we show in Figure 3.7 below the evolution of 
real GDP per capita (pre-AIT and post-AIT) for Canada and the US. The figure
33
 
confirms, anecdotally, the tendency for Canada to catch up with the US. Table 3.10 
(displayed after Figure 3.7) corroborates the observation in the figure. The table shows 
the results of the DiD strategy under OLS, FEM and various specifications for the SYST-
GMM. As already discussed under the diagnostic tests and estimation issues for fiscal 
transfers and trade openness above, the same trend is observed for the specification tests. 
After crossing from 3 to 5 for the number of instruments, the various tests improve 
drastically. 
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Among other factors, Canada-US exchange rate dynamics may have some influence on what is seen in 
Figure 3.7. However, considering that the chart is based on real per capita income, and not current per 




Figure 3.7: Per Capita Income for Canada and the US (1981-2010) 
 
 
Hypothesis 8 states that the combined effect of the AIT policy and lagged income on 
GDP per capita is much stronger than the individual effect of the AIT policy on GDP per 
capita. Therefore, we expect that while the AIT policy is associated with higher GDP per 
capita, on average, the interaction term between the AIT policy and lagged income will 
have a higher marginal impact, compared to the impact of the AIT policy alone. It turns 
out that the AIT dummy is not statistically significant across all specifications. 
Hypothesis 8a is not confirmed; we need further evidence to prove that the AIT policy 
has any growth and distributional impacts on Canadian jurisdictions.  
 
On the other hand, our AIT slope dummy, i.e. the interaction between the lagged 
dependent variable and the AIT dummy, is significant under the FEM and SYST-GMM 
with a lag length of five. It comes out with a positive sign for the former and a negative 
sign for the latter. Coefficient values are 0.290 and -0.183 with 5% and 1% statistical 
significance, respectively. This implies that under FEM, there is evidence of the linkage of 





































































































































  Table 3.10: AIT Policy Estimation Results with the DiD Approach 
Estimator OLS FEM SGMM1 SGMM2 SGMM3 SGMM4 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP 
Log of lagged RRGDP 0.952*** 0.541*** 0.949*** 0.972*** 1.111*** 1.131  
  [0.021] [0.070] [0.035] [0.060] [0.046] [0.049] 
AIT dummy 0.001   0.009 0.013 0.029 -0.023 
  [0.018]   [0.021] [0.037] [0.058] [0.045] 
Log of lagged RRGDP x AIT dummy 0.002 0.290** 0.015 -0.040 -0.092 -0.183* 
  [0.031] [0.120] [0.041] [0.081] [0.122] [0.104] 
Capital stock 0.017 0.001 0.008 -0.0004 -0.022 0.007 
  [0.016] [0.020] [0.019] [0.028] [0.054] [0.050] 
Educational attainment 0.080 0.060 0.079 0.083 -0.110 -0.202** 
  [0.052] [0.087] [0.075] [0.109] [0.104] [0.088] 
Constant -0.036** -0.031 -0.027 -0.020 0.050 0.049 
  [0.018] [0.024] [0.027] [0.029] [0.050] [0.053] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No No No No 
Number of observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 
Number of jurisdictions   60 60 60 60 60 
Number of instruments     75 27 13 12 
Number of lags used     0 3 5 5 
Specification Tests             
R-squared 0.960 0.365         
Sargan Test (p value)     0.000 0.001 0.425 0.295 
Hansen Test (p value)     0.857 0.062 0.427 0.291 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) ( p-value)     0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) ( p-value)     0.353 0.354 0.244 0.245 
 Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant  at 
1%, 5% and 10%.  SGMM1, SGMM2 and SGMM3 treat educational attainment as the only strictly exogenous variable; SGMM4 assumes both 




policy has inhibited growth in a SYST-GMM environment. This result is profound and this 
makes it necessary to provide some further comments below.  
 
It remains a fact that the early 1980s in North America was marked by a more aggressive 
international trade policy, especially with respect to free trade agreements. Among others, 
negotiations toward a free trade agreement between Canada and the US began in 1986, 
and culminated in the signing of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CUSFTA) in 1988. Shortly after that, precisely in 1995, Mexico was incorporated and 
the three countries jointly executed the NAFTA. The AIT agreement also took effect in 
1995. Cox (1995), Wall (2003) and Romalis (2007) provide evidence to support the fact 
that CUSFTA and NAFTA are both trade-promoting and welfare-improving among 
member countries.  
 
Hiroshi (2013) investigates the welfare effect of forming free trade agreements in an 
international oligopoly model with cost heterogeneity and concludes that the inherent 
complexities complicate the welfare effect of FTAs and could decrease consumer surplus 
in member countries.  Krueger (1999, 2000) advises that there is no evidence to show that 
NAFTA has had any impact on intra-North American trade; Darku (2011) concludes that 
the distributional impact of the benefits of free trade agreements may either help reduce 
or further widen the income gaps of member countries.  
 
All of these findings and conclusions make it necessary to point to one quick caveat at 
this point. Agreed, we leverage an important capability of the DiD strategy in estimating 
the coefficient of our AIT dummy: the fact that US states were not party to the AIT 
policy. As argued under the section on model specification, the timing of the signing of 
AIT may be correlated with other economically significant developments in Canada. 
Indeed, NAFTA and AIT came into effect in 1995. No doubt, this coincidence will 
obscure our measure of the extent to which the AIT policy has influenced income growth 
in Canada. We definitely need to control for this in some way before we can draw any 




A good empirical strategy to deal with the above concern will be to get both Mexico-US 
and Canada-Mexico sub-national export and import data. While the Canada-Mexico 
portion of the data is available, albeit from 1999 onwards, the Mexico-US part is not 
available. This concern is therefore difficult to address in our empirical work and 
qualifies the results. A more thorough treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
3.6.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion 
In this section, we conduct detailed sensitivity analysis of our central results, in order to 
confirm how robust the different patterns of relationships are to permutations of the 
original sample and model.  Amplifying Baum, yet again, the DPD estimators are linear 
estimators, but highly sensitive to the particular specification of the model and its 
instruments. We explain below alternative regressions designed to deal with potential 
problems of functional specifications, econometrics and short panel bias.  
 
3.6.4.1 Alternative Fiscal Transfers Measures 
As discussed under data/variables, a concern with this work is that variable definitions 
could affect results. We therefore examine the robustness of our results to alternative 
measures of net fiscal transfers. To do this, we define fiscal transfers as personal current 
transfer receipts – as previously explained. To maximize space and further explore other 
issues yet unaddressed, we treat educational attainment as a strictly exogenous variable. 
Based on the composition of personal current transfer receipts, compared to the 
conventional fiscal transfers used so far in this chapter, we model this variable in both 
ways – endogenously as a GMM-style variable and as a strictly exogenous IV-style 
variable.  
 
Results are robust to the alternative measure of fiscal transfers. Using personal current 
transfer receipts as a measure of net transfers produces a somewhat complicated outcome. 
First, only one out of all three SYST-GMM specifications produces a statistically 
significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Second, the other two 
coefficients come out with negative signs, a rarity so far in this chapter, albeit not 
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statistically significant. Only the FEM produces a statistically significant coefficient on 
the RNFT variable. At -0.312, this is probably the smallest marginal impact of fiscal 
transfers on output that we have seen so far in the analysis. See Table 3.11 below. 
 
The result above is probably an indication of the significant difference between personal 
current transfer receipts and other conventional measures of fiscal transfers so far 
employed in the study. For instance, the Bureau of Economic Analysis maintains that 
estimates of personal current transfer receipts are prepared for approximately 50 
subcomponents of transfer receipts. In addition, approximately 95 percent of the estimates 
of transfer receipts are derived from direct measures of the receipts at the state level; this 
proportion is even said to be lower for current estimates and rises as more complete 
source data become available. 
 
3.6.4.2 Logarithmic and Quadratic Functional Forms 
As a final sensitivity test, we estimate a variety of different functional specifications. We 
realize that it is also quite possible that the fiscal transfer-growth nexus is non-linear. 
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhoffer and Miller (2004) deal with this issue extensively. To test for 
this plausibility, we model two different functional forms: logarithmic and quadratic. For 
the former, we use the log form for all non-binary variables in the model, while we square 
net fiscal transfers for the latter. The notion of modeling the impact of fiscal transfers on 
per capita income in a quadratic fashion is based on two things. First, it allows for greater 
flexibility in modeling the possible direct relationship. Second it allows us to postulate 
that there are diminishing returns to government fiscal transfers. In other words, the 
incremental gain in per capita income falls for higher levels of fiscal transfers. In each 
case, we use the different estimation techniques.  
 
In turn, we offer some explanation for the two functional specifications. The coefficient 






Table 3.11: Fiscal Transfers as Personal Current Transfer Receipts 
Estimator OLS FEM SGMM1 SGMM2 SGMM3 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP 
Log of lagged RRGDP 0.866*** 0.166 0.726*** -0.591 -0.327 
  [0.080] [0.230] [0.175] [0.969] [1.632] 
RPCT -0.002 -0.312*** 0.006 0.166 0.038 
  [0.017] [0.071] [0.038] [0.107] [0.062] 
Log of lagged RRGDP x RPCT 0.084 0.427* 0.209 1.509 1.259 
  [0.073] [0.245] [0.168] [0.947] [1.533] 
Capital stock 0.020*** -0.004 0.022*** 0.066*** 0.041 
  [0.007] [0.021] [0.008] [0.018] [0.055] 
Educational attainment 0.068 0.185 0.065 0.050 -0.114 
  [0.048] [0.092] [0.66] [0.171] [0.126] 
Constant -0.033 0.257*** -0.043 -0.239* -0.074 
  [0.022] [0.070] [0.040] [0.137] [0.122] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No No No 
Number of observations 360 360 360 360 360 
Number of jurisdictions   60 60 60 60 
Number of instruments     100 16 16  
Number of lags used     0 5 5 
Specification Tests           
R-squared 0.960 0.421       
Sargan Test (p value)     0.000 0.003 0.004 
Hansen Test (p value)     0.999 0.055 0.021 
Diff-in-Hansen Test (p-value)     0.866 0.810 0.658 
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1) ( p-value)     0.003 0.002 0.010 
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2) ( p-value)     0.368 0.284 0.258 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%.  RPCT stands for relative personal current transfer receipts. SGMM 1 and SGMM2 treat educational attainment as the only strictly 
exogenous variable; System GMM 3 assumes both RPCT and educational attainment are strictly exogenous. All estimations based on the Windmeijer’s 
(2005) finite sample correction to the standard errors.
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As always, increasing the lag length from 0 to 5 results in improved diagnostic tests, but 
loss in statistical significance for some of the variables. The dynamic panel results are 
quite robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses. When we use the estimates from the FEM 
estimators to judge the unbiasedness of the SYST-GMM estimator in Tables 3.12 and 
3.13 (below), the parameter estimate of the lagged dependent variable, though significant, 
falls out of the upper and lower bound established by the OLS and fixed effects 
estimators.  
 
These estimates range between 1.061 and 1.025 for the logarithmic model and 0.979-
1.059 for the quadratic version. Corresponding FEM estimates are 0.932 and 0.530. The 
p-values of the Sargan test and the Hansen test do not suggest that the instruments used 
are not valid; we could not conclude that the estimator suffers from the weak instrument 
problem. This weak performance of the SYST-GMM estimator certainly does indicate 
that perhaps these functional forms do not depict the true nature of the relationship 
between these variables.  This notion may be supported, in particular, by the fact that a 
large part of the reviewed empirical literature does not consider quadratic forms at all, 
while logarithmic versions are always limited to the dependent variable and the lagged 
dependent variable. 
 
The FEM coefficient estimates for the RNFT variables are negative, and statistically and 
economically significant under both functional specifications, with -2.376 for the 
quadratic form and -2.167 for its logarithmic equivalent. Yet again, the results provide 
evidence that net fiscal transfers impede output growth in the receiving regions. 
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Table 3.12: Logarithmic Version 
Estimator OLS FEM SGMM1 SGMM2 SGMM3 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP 
Log of lagged RRGDP 0.961*** 0.547*** 1.061*** 1.025*** 1.025*** 
  [0.018] [0.076] [0.063] [0.170] [1.170] 
RNFT -0.016 -2.167*** -0.029 -0.731 -0.731 
  [0.146] [0.396] [0.270] [2.036] [2.036] 
Log of lagged RRGDP x RNFT -0.136 -0.129 -0.025 1.763 1.763 
  [0.262] [0.837] [0.641] [2.829] [2.829] 
Log of capital stock 0.022*** -0.025 -0.024 -0.132 -0.132 
  [0.008] [0.035] [0.038] [0.232] [0.232] 
Log of educational attainment 0.011 -0.040 -0.053 -0.256 -0.256 
  [0.011] [0.069] [0.065] [0.508] [0.507] 
Constant 0.023 -0.042 -0.058 -0.323 -0.323 
  [0.015] [0.091] [0.083] [0.652] [0.652] 
Year dummies Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No No No 
Number of observations 360 360 360 360 360 
Number of jurisdictions   60 60 60 60 
Number of instruments     44 14 14 
Number of lags used     3 6 6 &7 
Specification Tests           
R-squared 0.962 0.549       
Sargan Test (p value)     0.002 0.087 0.087 
Hansen Test (p value)     0.128 0.291 0.291 
A-B Test for AR(1) ( p-value)     0.002 0.025 0.025 
A-B Test for AR(2) ( p-value)     0.351 0.400 0.400 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%.  All estimations based on the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction to the standard errors
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Table 3.13: Quadratic Version 
Estimator OLS FEM SGMM1 SGMM2 SGMM3 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRRGDP 
Lagged lnRRGDP 0.932*** 0.530*** 0.979*** 1.059*** 0.982 
  [0.020] [0.080] [0.032] [0.129] [0.690] 
RNFT -0.302** -2.376*** -0.009 0.037 -5.751 
  [0.150] [0.427] [0.233] [0.598] [9.546] 
Lagged lnRRGDP x RNFT 0.428 0.981 -0.057 1.007 5.813 
  [0.262] [1.147] [0.718] [1.163] [9.233] 
RNFT squared -18.931 102** -20.963 91.726 -2.593 
  [19.812] [39.95] [22.026] [98.625] [225.52] 
Lagged lnRRGDP x RNFT squared 2.194 -10.137** 2.233 -8.422 2.980 
  [1.945] [3.877] [2.171] [9.508] [24.139] 
Capital stock 0.014** -0.030* -0.002 -0.009 -0.303 
  [0.007] [0.018] [0.016] [0.039] [0.829] 
Educational attainment 0.061 0.368 -0.011 0.039 -3.195 
  [0.056] [0.300] [0.155] [0.404] [9.111] 
Constant -0.022 -0.040 0.015 0.011 1.410 
  [0.022] [0.085] [0.056] [0.146] [3.310] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No No No 
Number of observations 360 360 360 360 360 
Number of jurisdictions   60 60 60 60 
Number of instruments     58 30 17 
Number of lags used     3 5 6 
Specification Tests           
R-squared 0.964 0.570       
Sargan Test (p value)     0.000 0.001 0.268 
Hansen Test (p value)     0.455 0.079 0.238 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) ( p-value)     0.003 0.007 0.460 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) ( p-value)     0.440 0.452 0.403 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant  
at 1%, 5% and 10%. All estimations based on the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction to the standard errors.
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3.6.5 Canada-Only and US-Only Samples 
Knowing beforehand that the assumptions meriting the use of the system GMM are 
not likely to be met under a relatively small N, we re-estimate models 1-6 in Table 3.8 
using our Canada sample only; followed by the US-only sample. This is in order to 
take advantage of our DPD environment, and especially to facilitate direct comparison 
of our estimates with similar studies in Canada. The outcome does not surprise us.  
With the fifth and sixth lags used, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
turns out to be insignificant. Apart from personal current transfer receipts in Table 
3.10 above, this is the first time this would happen in the entire modeling process. The 
Sargan (0.005) and Hansen (1.000) tests also perform poorly showing clear signs of a 
large number of instruments (25) relative to number of observations. Lower lags do 
not fare better.  
 
Only when instruments between the sixth and seventh lags are used do we have a 
statistically significant lagged per capita income; expectedly, the Hansen p-value 
stands at 1.000 under this scenario.  Obviously, combining a lagged dependent 
variable and fixed effects under a sample as a small as our Canadian example here 
provides enough justification that we have invariably introduced a short panel bias. 
Without any doubt, the appropriate remedy here lies in using a static panel method to 
model this part of the study or as already done, focus on the more robust combined 
sample which allows for the proper DPD operations.  
 
We repeat the above exercise for the US
34
 only sample. Again, no surprises; the model 
performance across all six specification improves drastically – given the increase in N 
from 10 to 50. The reported coefficients on lagged per capita income are largely 
comparable to what we have under the combined sample in Table 3.8, with the US 
ones fairly large compared to the combined sample: 1.194 and 1.868 for the former 
and 0.964 and 1.078 for the latter, respectively. The estimated models perform well on 
all specification tests. 
 
                                                          
34
 We do not report estimation results for the Canada-only and US-only samples because while the 
former is largely inconsistent for the reasons mentioned, the latter compares reasonably well with the 
combined sample which is already discussed in detail. 
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3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the role of fiscal transfers in explaining regional per capita 
income level in Canada and the US. Using a dynamic panel of Canada-US data, we 
estimate the importance of redistributive flows by regressions which estimate the 
relationship between personal income after federal taxes and transfers, and pretax 
personal income. This gives a direct measure of the degree to which fiscal transfers 
impact on average regional incomes. Furthermore, we leverage the DiD methodology 
to capture the effect of the AIT policy, pre- and post-1995. Other by-products include 
estimates of the impacts of trade openness, educational attainment and physical capital 
stock on economic growth. 
 
In particular, we introduce a number of refinements in the estimation methods in order 
to increase the reliability of our econometric estimates. Given the endogenous nature 
of fiscal transfers and trade openness in the specified model, traditional panel data 
estimators such as the FEM is inconsistent because it often eliminates the error term 
by a de-meaning transformation that renders the estimators inconsistent. Our only 
option is the instrumental variable strategy; in order to correct for the biases created 
by lagged endogenous variables and the simultaneity of growth determinants, we take 
maximum advantage of the estimators developed for DPD models – the difference and 
system GMM. 
 
Using the Solow Growth model as the benchmark, a number of central and lower level 
hypotheses are specified to guide the outcomes of the empirically modeled scenarios. 
It is hypothesized that fiscal transfers based on personal income after taxes and 
transfers and pretax personal income are a potent fiscal tool used to analyze the effects 
of redistribution. Needing to establish the magnitude and direction of the impact of 
redistribution on growth, on average, higher net fiscal transfers are proposed to be 
associated with higher GDP per capita. Not only that, it is also expected that fiscal 
flows would impact growth and redistribution in prosperous and poor regions 
differently, with higher net fiscal transfers leading to higher GDP per capita for net 
contributing jurisdictions, and lower GDP per capita for net receiving jurisdictions. 
Apriori, trade openness and the AIT policy are expected to be associated with higher 
GDP per capita. 
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Among other things, the results help address the major concern that motivated a GMM 
strategy in the first place. Results from all alternative specifications complement one 
another. We find evidence for the negative effect of fiscal transfers on per capita 
income; no evidence to comment on the degree to which lagged income distribution is 
linked to future economic growth through fiscal transfers in Canada and the US – the 
interaction terms between lagged per capita GDP and fiscal transfers are not 
statistically significant under the four scenarios modeled.   
 
Based on the reported standard errors, the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample 
correction clearly suggests the SYST-GMM performs better than the DIFF-GMM 
models.  After conducting a battery of tests on the key issues of under-identification, 
instrument proliferation and weak instruments, we settle for the two most preferred 
DPD models. These are chosen because the coefficient on lagged per capita income is 
under unity in each case, thereby solving the problem of instrument proliferation. 
Lagged GDP per capita coefficients of 0.964 and 0.905 are estimated, respectively. 
 
Back to the central objective of the study, the DPD-based method produces a 
coefficient of 0.875 on the RNFT variable, while the non-DPD FEM estimator 
produces coefficients that range from -2.272 to -2.381. We conclude that while the 
FEM results clearly agree with Checherita et al. that net fiscal transfers impede output 
growth,  the SYST-GMM technique suggests the opposite. The exact opposite is the 
case when we model relative transfers simply as the ratio of disposable income to 
personal income. We draw a fundamental conclusion: the DPD estimators are highly 
sensitive to the particular specification of the model and its instruments. This cautious 
note guides all policy recommendations in this chapter. 
 
To further aid policy analysis, we divide the full sample into below-average, above-
average, net receiving and net contributing jurisdictions. With estimated coefficient 
values of -2.467, -2.051, -1.205 and -2.354 for the fiscal transfers coefficients,  we 
establish a two-way negative impact of net fiscal transfers on real GDP per capita. We 
conclude that while higher taxes have a negative impact on economic growth in the 
donor jurisdictions, higher net fiscal receipts equally have a negative effect in the 
receiving regions: a clear incidence of “immiserising growth”.  The coefficient of the 
interaction variable is further used to test for the impact of lagged income on 
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economic growth and redistribution through fiscal transfers. With statistically 
insignificant results, we conclude that there is no evidence that lagged income 
distribution has affected the intensity of the impact of fiscal transfers on growth.  
 
The hypothesis that on average, a higher degree of trade openness is associated with 
higher GDP per capita is refuted. Likewise, the hypothesis that the interaction term 
between trade openness and lagged income should have a higher marginal impact on 
growth, compared to the impact of trade openness alone, is also refuted. These support 
the battery of studies on the inconclusive evidence regarding the trade-growth debate. 
With the AIT dummy not statistically significant across all specifications, the 
hypothesis that the AIT policy has any growth or income distributional impacts on 
Canadian jurisdictions is refuted. The interaction between the lagged dependent 
variable and the AIT comes out with coefficient values are 0.290 and -0.183 for the 
FEM and the SYST-GMM, respectively.  
 
We conclude that under the FEM, there is evidence of the linkage of lagged income 
distribution to future economic growth through the AIT policy, while the same policy 
inhibits growth in a SYST-GMM environment. We quickly point to the caveat that the 
coincidence in the timing of the signing of AIT in Canada and the execution of 
NAFTA may obscure our measure of the extent to which the AIT policy has 
influenced income growth in Canada. It is recognized that addressing this concern 
through Mexico-US and Canada-Mexico sub-national export and import data is 
important.  
 
The results under sensitivity analysis do not produce radically different outcomes. 
With the notable exception of where personal current transfer receipt – an alternative 
measure of fiscal transfers – produces a somewhat small coefficient estimate, results 
from other robustness tests are fairly consistent with what is reported under estimation 
results. Regardless, this has a practical implication. Any intergovernmental transfers, 
whether or not explicitly designed to help equalize the fiscal capacities of sub-national 
governments, will have redistributional implications. This is because one thing is 
common to all transfer programs: they involve a flow of resources from the center to 
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regional governments. Therefore, appropriate designs of transfer systems should 
recognize that transfer programs may have conflicting objectives or unintended 
consequences which may affect their potency. 
 
A major policy lesson from this chapter is that while regional fiscal disparity may be 
bad for growth, policy designs that focus on taxes and transfers may even cause more 
harm than good. Drawing specific conclusions on the negative effect of redistributive 
policies is therefore a dilemma. Policy makers are advised to first unbundle the 
different components of a redistributive fiscal policy and weigh carefully the pros and 
cons of each specific component, before making a decision on the optimal 
redistributive policy for a regional economy. 
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Chapter 4    Economic Diversity and the Resource 
Curse: A Dynamic Panel Model 
4.1 Introduction 
Economic diversification remains a recurring theme in public policy debates; it is 
popularly believed to be the cure to the “resource curse” challenge. The benefits of 
diversification, as well as the importance of key economic, demographic, geographic 
and institutional factors that explain it, remain widely acknowledged. However, 
explaining the specific reasons why diversification helps some economies to succeed 
where others fail remain a mirage. To further complicate things, most empirical 
investigations of the relationship between economic growth and diversity provide 
inconclusive evidence.  
For instance, concerns continue to be raised on the far-reaching effects of commodity 
price shocks on resource-dependent economies across the world. To the extent that 
volatile prices have affected government revenues, output and capital investment, the 
popular policy debate on whether or not economic diversification can help in escaping 
the resource curse is back in many resource-rich and resource-dependent jurisdictions. 
 
The diversification-growth question in regional economic analysis remains open, as 
most econometric studies provide weak evidence – mainly because results depend 
largely on the parameters of interest. While some see economic diversification as a 
long-term economic growth strategy that can help mitigate unforeseen problems in the 
event of structural economic changes, such as the decline of a region’s resource base, 
others argue that diversification is a costly and unnecessary form of government 
intervention (Macaspac, 2007).   
 
While the importance of a jurisdiction’s economic structure – e.g. resource-abundance 
and regional comparative advantage – cannot be overemphasized in light of the above, 
many regional economic development policy experts believe economic diversity is a 
potent tool that can help achieve the twin goals of economic growth and stability. 
Unsurprisingly, others disagree (e.g. Akpadock, 1996); they argue that diversification 
does not always bring about economic stability and growth. According to Smith and 
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Gibson (1998), indiscriminate diversification does not necessarily deliver economic 
stability. 
Sub-national level studies are important in complementing the understanding of 
regional economic development. To the extent that regional economic diversity allows 
global integration and technological progress to shift economic landscapes, national 
economic policies continue to have differential sub-national impacts. Our approach 
provides an opportunity to review best practices and successful policies of various 
regional jurisdictions in Canada and the US, with a view to helping to improve 
performance at the national levels. Using a sub-national framework creates a robust 
platform which, among other things, incorporates an institutional setting with regional 
economic development policies, administrative systems, and the nuances of 
intergovernmental relations.  
 
This thesis focuses on the sub-national level because for Canada and the US, many 
important spatial and economic characteristics at the sub-national level are expected to 
vary sharply from what is observed at the national levels. This becomes even more 
important because a sub-national framework also serves as a laboratory for testing 
direct policy interventions that enable poorer jurisdictions to benefit from national 
economic growth. That is in addition to ensuring that fairness, equity and efficiency 
are balanced, while the issue of spatial disparity is addressed. 
 
This chapter aims at contributing to the debate on economic diversity, resource curse 
and economic growth across Canadian and US jurisdictions by using the most recent 
techniques of dynamic panel data (DPD) models. The objectives are three-fold and we 
achieve them by estimating a conditional growth model in a regional context. First, we 
closely examine the relationship between economic diversification and growth for 
Canadian and US jurisdictions over the 1987-2010 period.  
 
Humphreys et al. (2007), Collier and Venables (2007), Gelb (2010) and Gelb and 
Grasmann (2010), among others, postulate that economic diversification is a potent 
long-term strategy that can help resource-endowed and resource-dependent 
jurisdictions escape the curse.  Ample facts show (e.g. Ahmadov, 2012) based on 
empirical studies, that many of the jurisdictions that follow this trajectory have little or 
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nothing to show for diversification, as a policy option. This study therefore examines 
the effect of diversification on growth. This becomes important considering the 
different conclusions, both on empirical and theoretical grounds, from old and extant 
research studies (e.g. Attaran, 1986; Baldwin and Brown, 2004; and Essletzbichler, 
2007). 
 
Our second objective is to employ an empirical growth model to explain growth in 
real per capita income at the US state and Canadian provincial level as a function of 
natural resources and a set of variables drawn from the existing literature. Sachs and 
Warner (1995) argue that an indirect consequence of natural wealth is the resource 
curse. Contemporary evidence on the curse yields a conundrum (Collier and Goderis, 
2007); most recent studies conclude that the transmission mechanism of the curse is 
more important. We will take a closer look at the transmission channel. 
 
By looking at the twin issues of diversification and the resource curse, our chapter 
contributes to this debate, albeit from a Canada-US regional perspective. This 
becomes even more significant considering our use of the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator, one of the most recent DPD techniques used in empirical 
regional growth analyses. 
 
In summary, our chapter contributes to the conditional theories of economic 
diversification and the resource curse. Given that these regions share many common 
characteristics and also exhibit huge differences in economic structures and 
performances, we take advantage of our DPD methodology to control for the 
jurisdiction-specific features that might obscure our key research questions. This 








4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Resource Curse Analysis 
The resource curse has two common explanations in the literature: (i) economic and 
(ii) political-institutional. The pioneering research of  Corden and Neary (1982) forms 
the basis of the theory of Dutch disease. The “Dutch disease” – a situation that leads 
to a diminished importance of the manufacturing sector due to the crowding out effect 
of natural resources – is the major economic explanation of the curse.  
 
Corden and Neary (1982) use a two-factor, two-good model to explain what can cause 
a decrease in the competitiveness of the trade-exposed manufacturing sector. They 
assume a small open economy with three sectors: a non-tradable sector (service 
sector), an import-competing manufacturing sector and a resource sector . Corden and 
Neary conclude that the resource boom will affect the rest of the economy through 
two channels: the effect of movement of manufacturing resources and the expenditure 
effect. This leads to a lagging export sector which suffers through what they call de-
industrialization.  
 
Starting with the famous work of Sachs and Warner (1995), which formally 
established the resource curse; their results support a dynamic version of the Dutch 
disease model by showing that on average, resource-abundant countries lag behind 
countries with less resources. Using the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP as a 
proxy for natural resource endowment, and 1971 as the base year, they control for 
other determinants of economic growth such as initial per capita income, trade policy, 
government efficiency, and investment rates. This has become the most commonly 
cited work in the resource curse literature. 
 
Auty and Mikesell (1998) in the book, “Sustainable Development in Mineral 
Economies”, examine the problems faced by mineral-rich countries in achieving 
sustainable development – compared to their mineral-deficient neighbours. Focusing 
on nine countries – Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Jamaica, Namibia, Papua 
New Guinea, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago – Auty and Mikesell offer a compelling 
argument on why nurturing the economic and social conditions that sustain economic 
growth is more important than the sustainability of mineral production itself.   
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The second popular explanation is the political-institutional explanation. This model 
blames the existence of the curse on rent-seeking behaviour. Robinson et al. (2006) 
present a formal political-economy framework of the resource curse by arguing that in 
order to understand whether or not natural resources are a blessing or a curse, it is 
imperative to analyze the political incentives that resource endowments generate – 
through a careful analysis of the interaction between institutions and resources. In 
order to fully analyze the effects of temporary and permanent resource booms, they 
use a two-period probabilistic model to consider some stock of natural resources with 
an intertemporal path of prices subject to exogenous price variation – capturing the 
environment faced by small developing economies subject to international commodity 
price variations.  
 
Robinson et al. (2006)’s analysis reveals a complex relationship between resource 
extraction and the political environment. Where there are weak political institutions, 
resource booms will lead, through the political process, to inefficient resource 
allocations. They conclude that the extent to which the predictions in their model 
generate the curse is determined by the quality of institutions since countries with 
strong institutions benefit from resource booms, while those without suffer from the 
curse. Lane and Tornell (1999) and Torvik (2002) explain this further using 
theoretical models of rent seeking. Isham et al. (2005) look at this issue from the 
perspective that resource rents may create a wealthy class of elites who may be 
opposed to welfare-improving economic and political reforms.  
 
While corruption and rent seeking, for obvious reasons, are less prevalent in 
developed countries (compared to their developing counterparts), Ross (2001) 
cautions that resource-dependent jurisdictions may tax their residents less heavily, and 
in turn, tax payers may be indifferent to politicians’ accountability and representation. 
In our case, Ross’ note becomes important when we consider Alberta and Alaska, two 
important oil and gas jurisdictions in Canada and the US, respectively, that do not levy 
sales tax – an important component of consumption tax.  Béland and Tiagi (2009) 
conclude that for any given revenue target, the incentive to tax residents decreases 
when natural resource rents are easily accessible. Putnam (1993) and Inglehart (1997) 
amplify this sentiment; they argue that this produces a bunch of citizens who care less 
about how accountable politicians are. 
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In an attempt to improve on the influential work of Sachs and Warner, Mehlum et al. 
(2006) contrast the findings of Sachs and Warner that institutions are not decisive for 
the resource curse by using the latter’s data and methodology to test their (Mehlum et 
al.’s) hypothesis that institutions are actually decisive for the resource curse. Using the 
average growth rate of real GDP per capita from 1965 to 1990 as the dependent 
variable, and an unweighted average of five indexes which ranges from zero to unity 
(rule of law index, bureaucratic quality index, corruption in government index, risk of 
expropriation index and government repudiation of contract index) as a proxy for 
institutional quality, they demonstrate that countries with good institutional quality 
will not experience any resource curse as natural resources only inhibit economic 
growth in countries with ‘grabber friendly’ institutions and not in countries with 
‘producer friendly’ institutions. 
 
Mehlum et al. (2006) go beyond the regressions of Sachs and Warner by providing an 
alternative explanation for the understanding of the resource curse through the 
inclusion of an interaction term: [resource abundance] x [institutional quality], that 
captures their model prediction which states that it is only when institutions are weak 
that resource abundance is harmful to growth. In addition to finding a positive 
coefficient for the interaction term as stated in their apriori expectations, the empirical 
results equally show that countries with institutional quality index higher than the 
threshold value of 0.93 do not experience the resource curse. As such, 15 out of the 87 
countries included in the regression have institutional quality strong enough to 
neutralize the resource curse – which is manifested through a negative growth impact 
of a marginal increase in resources. 
 
To the extent that good institutions reinforce the adoption of robust measures which 
result in a policy mix that reflects differences in economic structure that can mitigate 
the disruptive effects of business cycles, we model diversity in a similar way 







4.2.2 The Case for Economic Diversification 
Gelb (2010) asks two important questions? Why diversify in the first place? Why try 
to move away from a sector of very strong comparative advantage? He, in turn, 
answers:  
 
The motive may simply reflect the proposition that export diversification is associated 
with higher long-run growth. However, resource exporters are different in many 
dimensions, including population, labor force and skills, location, levels of income, 
reserves, and the potential for other resource-based activities. These will shape 
diversification priorities and policies. 
 
Regional economic diversification has been shown as a potent tool for advancing 
technological progress, innovation, positive technology externalities and other sources 
of agglomeration economies (Jacobs, 1969; Feldman and Audretsch, 1999). It prompts 
firms to compete for scarce resources, and in the process, promotes innovation (Porter, 
1990). 
 
As stated earlier, evidence on the diversity-growth debate is inconclusive. While 
Attaran (1986), for instance, fails to find any relationship between diversity and per 
capita income growth at the state level, Attaran and Zwick (1987) conclude that such 
relationship does, in fact, exist at the county level for the State of Oregon. Frenken et 
al. (2007) and Bishop and Gripaios (2010) use employment growth in place of per 
capita income growth, and conclude with divergent views.  
 
Hackbart and Anderson (1975) look at the diversity-growth argument from the point 
of view of stability. They suggest that economic diversity makes regions less 
susceptible to the volatility inherent in business cycles. Dissart (2003) shares the same 
view. The central argument of these researchers is that stability is conducive for 
regional economic growth to the extent that displaced workers from other sectors of 
the economy can be easily absorbed by a diverse economy, compared to a highly 
specialized one. Bishop and Gripaios (2010) say specialization has a negative impact 
on growth, while the economic diversity effect is heterogeneous across sectors; 
Frenken et al. (2007) summarize their results thus: related variety enhances 
employment growth, while other types of agglomeration economies do not matter.  
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From the foregoing, the importance of the resource-diversity-growth debate in helping 
shape the direction of policy in resource-based economies cannot be overemphasized. 
This chapter fits into the various discussions so far because it is an extension of many 
of the studies cited above. Gelb (2010) makes an important contribution to the 
resource-diversity debate by pointing out the following “three main complications” in 
the debate: (i) how to deal with the endogeneity of measures of resource abundance 
and resource dependence (ii) how to measure outcomes (income levels, growth rates 
or broader development indicators) and (iii) how to allow for country heterogeneity. 
Thankfully, our sub-national focus and GMM estimation strategy enable us to deal 
with all three issues seamlessly, in addition to providing updated results. 
4.3 Theoretical Setup 
4.3.1 Measuring Economic Diversification 
There is no single explicit framework that constitutes a base for empirical or 
theoretical work on economic diversification. Depending on the theoretical foundation 
explored, different measures and concepts can be used as economic diversity 
indicators (Macaspac, 2007; Ahmadov, 2012; and Pede, 2013). Popular models that 
help explain economic diversity measures in the literature include: industrial 
organization, economic development theory, portfolio theory, regional business cycle 
theory, trade models, location theory, economic base theory and input-output analysis.  
For instance, Hoover and Giarratani (1985) postulate that industrial clusters benefit 
from agglomeration economies due to specialization and regional competitive 
advantages; giving rise to the popular location theory, based on spatial economics and 
clusters.  
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is popularly used to measure market structure 
or concentration in industrial organization – a field in economics that focuses on the 
strategic behaviour of firms, and their interaction to determine the structure of 
markets. Named after the economists who derived it, HHI is constructed based on the 
individual share of each firm in a market. The robustness of the index depends on the 
number of firms and the market share of each. The HHI lower bound approaches zero 
for competitive industries with a large number of firms; the index value is 1 for a pure 
monopoly scenario. In our case, a lower value of the HHI represents higher economic 




Originally developed by Markowitz (1959), but later refined by Conroy (1974, 1975), 
this financial assets-based portfolio theory likens every economic sector in a region to 
individual regional investment, thereby allowing a combination of sectors to be treated 
as a portfolio of investments. This allows the mean return to be used as a proxy for 
expected returns, while risk is denoted by the variance, resulting in the set of mean-
variance efficient portfolios. This provides a simple portfolio-theoretic framework to 
examine economic diversification. 
 
Following Pede (2013), we test the impact of economic diversity on growth by using 
five popular formulations of diversity indices, which are based on the sectoral 
distribution of employment in a regional economy. More on these measures later. 
 
4.3.2 The Resource Curse Paradigm 
For a very long time, natural resources were considered beneficial to economic 
growth. The resource-growth nexus attracted a lot of attention after Sachs and Warner 
(1995) showed that an increase of one standard deviation in natural resource intensity 
(on average 16% of GNP) leads to a reduction of about 1 percent per year in economic 
growth. This has come to be known as the “resource curse”.   
 
The controversy generated by Sachs and Warner’s results is understandable on a 
major premise: economic theory predicts that capital (of which natural resources is a 
component) has a positive effect on growth. However, the central question in the 
modern resource curse literature has gone beyond whether or not natural resources 
negatively impact economic growth as earlier argued ; it is now largely about the 
conditionality of the curse on some other factors.  The approach in this thesis will 
closely follow Mehlum et al. (2006); we investigate the transmission mechanism of 
the curse by including a variable which serves as the interaction term that captures the 
precise effect of economic diversity, thereby answering the question of whether or not 
the curse can be avoided by diversified economic structures.  
 
In addition to interacting diversity with the natural resource variable, we also include a 
number of control variables in our empirical growth model. This seamlessly fits into 
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the discussion so far because institutional quality is among the popular variables 
identified in the literature as potential determinants of economic growth. For the most 
part, studies on the resource curse have focused largely on resource-endowed 
developing countries; more recent ones continue to look at both developed countries 
and their sub-national jurisdictions. Given the status of the US and Canada as two 
wealthy and highly advanced countries, we expect that differences in regional 
economic structures will lead to variations in the resource effect; this will depend on 
the extent to which our interaction term helps confirm or refute this claim. 
 
4.3.3 The Resource-Diversity-Growth Link 
As discussed under sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 above, we do not have a single explicit 
theoretical framework that constitutes a base for empirical and theoretical work on the 
resource-diversity-growth nexus. The Solow growth model presents a theoretical 
framework for understanding the sources of economic growth, and the consequences 
for long-run growth of changes in the economic environment.   
 
In line with the practice in the growth empirics literature, we implement an informal 
growth regression which allows us to include a larger set of explanatory variables 
which capture not only the main explanatory variables, but controls and interaction 
term. Our panel analysis of the empirics of economic growth is a major advance, 
compared to Barro-type cross-sectional and static panel regression techniques.  Based 
on the growth empirics method of Mankiw et al. (1992) which makes the Solow 
model directly testable, the following growth equation will be estimated: 
 
y𝑖,𝑡 = βlnY𝑖,0  +  λX𝑖,𝑡 + σZ𝑖,𝑡 +  μ𝑖,𝑡  
 
   (4.1) 
 
where y is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, X comprises of the usual traditional 
economic variables that account for growth, while Z captures the additional growth 
determinants based on endogenous growth propositions (Romer, 1986; Mankiw et al., 
1992; and Barro, 1991). 
 
As previously discussed under the conditional convergence hypothesis, we expect Y𝑖,0 
to play a major role in determining regional growth differentials across jurisdictions. 
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In line with Solow (1956), jurisdictions with higher Y𝑖,0 values are expected to have 
slower growth rates, compared with those with lower income per capita levels. These 
issues will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
 
4.3.4 Research Hypotheses 
This chapter aims at contributing to the debate on economic diversity, resource curse 
and economic growth by using the most recent techniques of DPD models. The theory 
of economic growth identifies a number of critical determinants of growth.  Our 
empirical growth model explains growth in real per capita income at the Canada-US 
regional level as a function of natural resources, economic diversity and a set of 
variables drawn from the existing literature.  Our hypotheses on the impact of 
economic diversity on growth are based on five popular formulations of diversity 
indices, which are based on the sectoral distribution of employment in a regional 
economy. The resource curse component is based on the hypothesis that an indirect 
consequence of natural wealth is the resource curse. Contemporary evidence on the 
curse yields a conundrum; we therefore take advantage of our DPD framework to test 
the hypothesis that economic diversity is a cure for the natural resource curse. 
 
Following the literature review and theoretical framework above, we advance the 
following hypotheses to test the research questions in this chapter: 
 
Hypothesis 9 
H0: There is no relationship between economic diversification and economic 
growth 
H1: There is a positive relationship between economic diversification and 
economic growth 
 
As previously discussed, the intuition here is that economic diversification is an 
economic growth strategy that can help mitigate unforeseen problems in the event of 
structural changes in a regional economy.  Higher degree of economic diversity is 






H0: There is no relationship between resource abundance and economic growth 




H0: There is no relationship between the outcome of the interactions between 
resource abundance and economic diversity, and economic growth. 
H1: The outcome of the interactions between resource abundance and 
economic diversity is the key determinant of the existence, or otherwise, of the 
resource curse. 
 
In a way, this hypothesis will help us to uphold or refute the conjecture that economic 
diversification is a potent strategy that can help resource-endowed jurisdictions escape 
the curse.  Our empirical analysis should shed more light and allow us whether or not 
it is only when regional economies are diversified that resource abundance is not 
harmful to growth. The coefficient on the interaction term between natural resources 
and economic diversity is a key factor. 
4.4 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
4.4.1 Data Sources 
Our data are compiled from the following sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(Regional Economic Accounts), Statistics Canada (Provincial Economic Accounts and 
Labour Force Survey), World Bank (National Accounts Data), OECD (National 
Accounts Data Files), Economic Freedom of North America (Fraser Institute) and the 
Bank of Canada (Rates and Statistics – Annual Average Exchange Rates.  
 
As previously discussed, the Entropy index is based on the industrial organization 
theory, which means that we do not benchmark its calculation on any particular 
economy. Statistics Canada compiles annual employment data by industry from its 
monthly Labour Force Survey (LFS), while the Current Population Survey (CPS) is a 
monthly survey of households conducted by the Bureau of Census for the Bureau of 
Labour Statistics in the US.  Both surveys provide a comprehensive body of data on 
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the labour force, employment, unemployment, persons not in the labor force, hours of 
work, earnings, and other demographic and labour force characteristics.  
 
The surveys cover a detailed group of industries: the goods-producing industries and 
the services-producing industries. Within each category are major sectors. The 
employment in these major sectors is broken down even further, using the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  The NAICS provides a consistent 
industry classification system for economic analysis across the three NAFTA partners 
– Canada, Mexico and the US Prior to the NAICS, the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system had been in use for 60 years in the US NAICS has twice 
the number of aggregate industry groupings as SIC. The highest level of NAICS 
classification is called the sector, and corresponds roughly to the division in SIC. 
There are 20 broad sectors in NAICS, compared to only 10 divisions in SIC. Through 
the NAICS-SIC concordances, the conversion from SIC to NAICS has increased 
detail in the services-producing industries, with new sectors such as Information; 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services; and Administrative and Support and 
Waste Management and Remediation Services, and established a new sector, 
Accommodation and Food Services. 
 
We exploit a large annual panel data set spanning eight three-year intervals from 1987 
to 2010 and covering all 10 Canadian provinces and 50 states of the US GDP data for 
the 1987-1997 period for all 60 jurisdictions are based on the SIC system, while 1998-
2010 data are based on the NAICS.   
4.4.2 Data Issues 
Prior to rolling up the sub-sectors to reflect the number of sectors needed for our 
analysis, we do have some cases of missing data in the initial dataset. A variety of 
reasons are responsible for missing data. It should be kept in mind that the 
employment levels in some industries are fairly small, and therefore subject to a 
greater risk of sampling errors. As a result, these figures are not as reliable as more 
aggregated numbers. In fact, where the employment level is less than 500, Statistics 
Canada reports the number as zero. Less than 10 jobs for US states is reported as (L), 
but the estimates for this item are included in the total. Data labelled as (D) are not 
shown to avoid disclosure of confidential information, but the estimates for this item 
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are included in the total. (NA) represents completely unavailable data for the year in 
question.  
 
We use the following specific 3-year averages: 1987 – 1989; 1990 -1992; 1993 – 
1995; 1996 -1998; 1999 – 2001; 2002 – 2004; 2005-2007; 2008 -2010.  This gives rise 
to N = 60; T = 8. In the regression itself, T becomes 7 because we lose one complete 
data set to per capita real GDP growth rate calculation. This amounts to 60 
observations for each period, and when multiplied by 7, we have 420 observations. 
Even though some of the aforementioned categories come up in many of the sub-
sectors, we are fortunate to have final figures available at a more aggregated industry 
level. The only exception in our dataset is the US state of Delaware with a (D) value 
for the mining share of employment in 2010. One is surprised that an important and 
relatively highly aggregated sector like mining (which comprises of activities related 
to oil and gas, in addition to traditional exploration for minerals, development of 
mineral properties and mining operations) would still show up with a confidentiality 
caveat.  
 
For the 2010 missing mining share of employment data for Delaware, we weigh the 
option of deleting the entire row (i.e. the 2008 - 2010 average for Delaware) against 
using some estimation procedure to arrive at a ‘fair” value for this data point. Since 
we are conscious of the need to maximize sample size given our relatively short panel 
size, we purse the latter strategy. We use the average of the six preceding data points 
(i.e.1990 -1992; 1993 – 1995; 1996 -1998; 1999 – 2001; 2002 – 2004 and 2005-2007) 
to arrive at the 2008 -2010 average. The additional one observation gained here (in 
addition to the very robust balanced panel status of our data), we believe, is worth the 
trade-off. As discussed in the preceding chapter, we go with Islam’s (1995) generally 
accepted method of short period-averaged panels. 
 
4.4.3 Construction of Variables  
4.4.3.1 Per Capita Real GDP  
We exploit a large annual panel data set covering all 50 US states and 10 Canadian 
provinces. The analysis is based on real GDP per capita obtained from the US Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (Regional Economic Accounts) and Statistics Canada 
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(Provincial Economic Accounts and Labour Force Survey). Canada’s per capita GDP 
data are converted into US dollars using annual Canada-US average nominal 
exchange rates.  
 
4.4.3.2 Natural Resources 
Another issue equally important in the resource curse literature is the debate about 
which resource proxies to use. Among other things, the notion exists that abundant 
natural resources in a region may not necessarily translate to a large share of exports, 
employment or income. In the words of Pendergast et al. (2010), “as a country 
develops other sectors of its economy, the share of natural resources in exports, 
employment and wealth should fall”.   
 
Since the pioneer work of Sachs & Warner in 1995, the share of primary production in 
exports (or in GDP) has been the most widely used measure. For instance, Mehlum et 
al. (2006) follow Sachs and Warner. This measure is not without shortcomings. Bulte 
et al. (2005) point out that as a flow, this proxy will be inadequate as a measure of a 
jurisdiction’s real stock of natural resources. The problem inherent in choosing more 
precise resource abundance stock measures, however, is the difficulty in measuring 
them, in addition to the fact that the “possible effects through which the curse takes 
place cannot be expected to happen until the resources are extracted” (Torres et al., 
2013).  
 
A number of papers have assessed the robustness of resource curse correlation to 
alternative measures of resource abundance and dependence, as well as the estimation 
methods employed (e.g. Gylfason, 2001;  Ding and Field, 2005; Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh, 2007; Pendergast et al., 2010; Boyce and Emery, 2011 and James and 
Aadland, 2011).  Gylfason proposes three proxies: (1) the share of primary exports in 
total exports (or in GDP); (2) the share of employment in primary production in total 
employment; and (3) the share of natural capital in national wealth.  
 
Ding and Field (2005) use World Bank’s estimation of natural capital (i.e. natural-
resource capital as a percentage of total capital or as a percentage of the population) as 
a measure of a country’s resource endowment.  For their cross-country study, 
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Pendergast et al. use fuel exports per capita, ores/metals exports per capita and 
forestry production per capita. Using data for US states over the 1970-2001 period, 
Boyce and Emery derive the share of employment in the exhaustible resource sector 
as mining employment divided by total employment for each state.   
 
In light of the above, we follow Gylfason, Boyce and Emery and Sachs and Warner 
and use the following two alternative measures of natural resources: (1) mining as a 
share of GDP and (2) mining as a share of total employment. Data on mining as a 
share of GDP are sourced from Statistics Canada (Labour Force Survey) and the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis ((Regional Economic Accounts) based on the NAICS 
estimates of GDP by industry for the provinces and the states. Industry definitions 
follow the NAICS codes.  
 
GDP by industry measures the output of an industry minus the value of intermediate 
inputs required in the production process. It is an output-based measure of industrial 
activities and is also referred to as the value-added of an industry. GDP by industry 
represents the value that a sector adds to the raw inputs it uses in the production 
process, which is an important aspect of the sector’s contribution to the reference 
economy. The NAICS identifies 20 major economic sectors (at the two-digit NAICS 
level): five goods-producing industries and 15 services-producing industries. 
 
Some explanation of the mining sector is instructive here. According to Statistics 
Canada, this sector comprises establishments primarily engaged in extracting naturally 
occurring minerals. These can be solids, such as coal and ores; liquids, such as crude 
petroleum; and gases, such as natural gas. The term mining is used in the broad sense 
to include quarrying, well operations, milling (for example, crushing, screening, 
washing, or flotation) and other preparation customarily done at the mine site, or as a 
part of mining activity. Establishments engaged in exploration for minerals, 
development of mineral properties and mining operations are included in this sector. 
Establishments performing similar activities, on a contract or fee basis, are also 
included.  The mining sector, therefore, provides a benchmark for the economic 




In the end, we assess the robustness of the resource curse correlation to our alternative 
measures of natural resources and estimation methods.  
 
4.4.3.3 Human Capital Stock 
Our first control variable (which also serves as the alternative institutional quality 
measure), educational attainment, is defined as the percent of persons 25 years and 
over who have completed at least a Bachelor's degree. The use of the 25+ population 
is plausible since it focuses on adults age 25 years and over, when education has been 
completed for most people. Educational attainment is closely related to the skills and 
competencies of a country's population, and could be seen as a proxy of both the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the stock of human capital. Estimates of 
educational attainment provide a reasonable proxy for the stock of human capital and 
should be useful for a variety of empirical work (Barro and Lee, 2012). This variable 
is already discussed extensively under chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
4.4.3.4 Physical Capital Stock  
Mankiw et al. (1992) show that physical capital accumulation is an important 
determinant of economic growth. The variable of interest here is 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 , our measure 
of the capital stock endowments in jurisdiction i at time t. 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of capital 
stock to real GDP. In line with Yamarik and Hall and Jones, we construct our capital 
stock series using the PIM. This variable is already discussed extensively under 
chapters 2 and 3, respectively.  
 
4.4.3.5 Economic Diversity 
While economic diversity continues to be promoted as a major tool for policy makers 
in achieving stability, low unemployment and economic growth, Wagner (2000) posits 
that the diversity-diversification-growth link depends on the conceptual and empirical 
differences between diversity and diversification.  Malizia and Ke (1993) and Siegel 
et al. (1993a, 1993b, 1995a and 1995b) see the difference between diversity and 
diversification from a static-dynamic perspective.  Attaran (1986) defines diversity as 
“the presence in an area of a great number of different types of industries”. For Siegel 
et al., economic diversification, as a process, should lead to an increase in the state of 
diversity over time.  In Wagner’s words, “Examining and testing the link between 
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diversity and growth and stability, and diversification and growth and stability depend 
on the definitions of diversity and diversification”.  
 
Among others, empirical analysis of trade and specialization patterns uses simple 
statistical tools and complex econometric methods; although there is no consensus on 
which index is the best proxy for diversity or specialization (Palan, 2010). Of the 
many possible approaches available to examine a regional economy’s degree of 
relative industrial specialization, comparing the distribution of employment across 
industries in the region with that of the nation is one popular strategy. Under this 
arrangement, the sectoral composition of the nation’s employment is dynamic, and 
therefore defines the limits of diversification. It is thus expected that a region’s 
employment will be more specialized (and by implication less diversified) than that of 
the “parent” nation. In a way, this framework essentially reflects the degree of 
similarity between regional and national industrial structures – and is based on the 
notion that the national economy is fully diversified. 
 
In regional economic analysis, it is common practice to model diversity using 
employment distribution across industry sectors. We use employment data covering 
10 industry sectors from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Regional Economic 
Accounts) and Statistics Canada (Labour Force Survey). Our employment variable is 
the annual employment in full-time equivalents, a common indicator for industry 
structure. Some authors (e.g. Palan, 2010) suggest the use of an alternative variable 
(which is less prone to productivity biases) as a way of testing the robustness of both 
indices. A top candidate here is GDP. However, we offer two arguments for why 
employment does better than GDP: (i) GDP itself is likely susceptible to measurement 
errors and exchange rate biases (ii) the choice of variables should not significantly 
impact our inferences since our focus is specifically on measurement methods and not 
specialization per se (Palan 2010). Nonetheless, we construct these indices based on 
GDP in order to assess robustness. Results are presented along with the main measure 
later in the chapter. 
Different variations and constructions of these indices abound; we consider five 
diversity measures in all. In order to assess the robustness of our results to the 
different varieties, we use five leading indices – two versions of the Ogive Index, 
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Entropy Index, Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and the Krugman Index – to help 
measure the distribution of employment across 10 industry sectors. 
35
. We do 
recognize also that our diversity measures are sensitive to the number of industries 
used in constructing the indices. We therefore include four and six broad categories 
for the goods- and services-producing sectors, respectively. Among other things, this 
strategy has the added advantage of achieving greater data aggregation, thereby 
helping overcome the problem of missing data (especially employment data) for some 
of the selected jurisdictions.  
The 10 sectors are presented in Table 4.1 below: 
 
                              Table 4.1: Selected NAICS Industry Sectors       
a)      Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting   
b)      Mining 
    c)      Construction 
   d)     Manufacturing 
   e)      Wholesale trade 
   f)       Retail trade 
   g)      Transportation, warehousing and utilities 
 h)      Finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing 
i)        All other services, except public administration 
j)        Government and government enterprises   
Notes: The estimates of employment for 1998-2006 are based on the 2002 NAICS; the estimates for 
2007-2010 are based on the 2007 NAICS. In line with the various changes to the NAICS over time, we 
combine some sectors and slightly modify sector names for others in order to allow for uniformity 
between certain Canadian and US sectors. For instance, the finance and insurance sector (NAICS code 
1000) and the real estate and rental and leasing sector (NAICS code 1100) are combined. As discussed 
above under natural resources, the mining sector comprises of establishments primarily engaged in 
extracting naturally occurring minerals. These can be solids, such as coal and ores; liquids, such as 
crude petroleum; and gases, such as natural gas. The agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting sector in 
Canada captures the same information as the forestry, fishing and related activities sector in the US; we 
use the former name since it is more encompassing. 
 
4.4.4 Further Analysis of Diversity Indices  
Palan (2010) compares and discusses the characteristics of various specialization 
indices across 51 industries in 24 European countries by classifying the indices into 
two broad categories.  She reiterates that heterogeneity levels not only vary between 
these groups, but also within. Her conclusion is that policy makers should exercise 
                                                          
35
 See notes under Table 4.1 below for clarifications. 
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great care in the choice of indices included in empirical economic diversity studies – 
for valid inferences. 
 
Palan uses these two groups: (i) absolute specialization measures and (ii) relative 
specialization measures.  The first group (also called specialization indices) is based 
on the notion that a region is considered specialized if a small number of industries 
exhibit high shares of the overall employment of the country (Palan, 2010). In other 
words, this describes absolute specialization. This would be the case for the Canadian 
province of Saskatchewan, for instance, which specializes in the production of 
minerals, oil and gas, and food. Or the US state of Alaska, where the dominant 
economic activity is oil and gas. The Entropy, Hirschman-Herfindahl and both 
versions of the Ogive indices discussed above fall under this category. 
 
On the other hand, the relative specialization measures (also called heterogeneity 
indices) are based on the deviation of a region’s industry structure from the average 
industry structure of the reference group of regions. As measured in this chapter 
(through the Krugman Index), this measure sheds more light on the comparative 
advantages that exist in different regional economies, compared to the reference 
group. By way of analogy, consider the two Canadian provinces of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan (or the US states of Texas and North Dakota). Saskatchewan is 
relatively more specialized in potash mining than any other province (state), although 
the absolute share of this industry in the Saskatchewan economy is low. Bottom line: 
specialization indices and heterogeneity indices reveal high and low degrees of 
specialization, respectively, when a region is specialized in industries which the other 
countries are also specialized in (Palan, 2010). 
 
The absolute specialization measures use equal distribution of employment shares 
across all industries as the reference level. In other words, we see the dynamic 
structure of a regional economy, without taking cognizance of changes in other 
regions over time. Relative specialization indices, on the other hand, are based on the 
average economic structure of all the regions being investigated. 
 
The five diversity indices used in this chapter are based on the distribution of 
employment across the 10 industry sectors listed in Table 1 above. These indices have 
 187 
 
become popular in empirical regional specialization studies (e.g. Traistaru, Nijkamp 
and Longh; 2002, Ezcurra, Pascual and Rapún ; 2006, and Palan; 2010) because of the 
relative ease with which they are computed. This is in addition to the relative ease 
with which data are accessed.  
The five diversity indices are explained further below: 
4.4.4.1 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
HHI is one of the most commonly used indicators of specialization.  Initially used as 
an indicator of market concentration in the industrial organization literature (Scherer, 
1980), others have used it in economic diversity and macroeconomic specialization 
studies (e.g. Tauer, 1992; Davis, 1998; Storper et al., 2002; and Beine and Coulombe, 
2007). HHI shows the degree of dominance of a certain industry in a regional 
economy. Accordingly, a decline in the index connotes greater diversification, while 
an increase indicates greater specialization.  The index decreases with the number of 
industries and increases when the gap between industry sizes increases. 
 
It is expressed as follows: 
 
HHI𝑖 = ∑i=1 
N Si=1 
2                               (4.3) 
 
where Si is employment share in the ith  industry.  
 
The index increases with the degree of specialization, and reaches its upper limit of 1 
when region i is specialized in only one industry. The lowest level of specialization is 
indicated by 1/N i.e. the lowest degree of specialization indicated by an 
equiproportional employment share for each industry. In our case, the lower bound is 
1/10, while the upper bound is 1. Palan (2010) echoes Hall and Tideman’s (1967) 
view that in general, the relative sizes of industries are more important than the 
absolute number of industries, for the absolute value of the HHI. This is based on the 






4.4.4.2 Ogive Index  
The basic tenet of the Ogive index derives from the notion that the more diversified a 
sector is, the less concentrated it is and the more competitive it becomes. In tune with 
Malizia and Ke (1993), therefore, it becomes plausible that a more diversified regional 
economy is that which has a more even distribution of economic activity. McLaughlin 
(1930) and Tress (1938) were one of the first to use this. There are two popular 
variants of this index; they are differentiated based on the weight attached to the 
penalty function used to measure industry share deviations from the uniform 
distribution of industry shares benchmark.   
 
The simpler version of the index is based on a penalty function of absolute values 
(Jackson, 1984; Tran, 2011). We call this the Absolute Ogive Index (OGV) and is 
given as: 




)                     (4.4) 
 
We present in Equation 4.5 a more advanced version of the Ogive index based on a 
quadratic function which in turn uses the factor (1/N) as a denominator in order to 
avoid extremely low value scenarios common with squared fractions. We call this the 
Quadratic Ogive Index (QGV) and is given as: 
 




)2/  (1/𝑁)                             (4.5) 
 
Again, N is the number of industries in the regional economy, and Si is the industry 
share of economic activity for the i
th
 sector.  The lower bound of both indices is 
obtained with equiproportional employment shares for all N industries; this gives the 
value of zero and reflects a perfect diversity case. A perfect specialization scenario 
arises at the other extreme when the upper bound of the simple and advanced indices 




Similar to the HHI above, a region with a higher sectoral economic activity shows 
greater diversity and vice versa. We therefore expect successively higher values of 
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both indices to imply successively higher degrees of specialization, again, to the 
extent that the uniform distribution of industry shares benchmark is applicable.   
 
4.4.4.3 Entropy Index 
Following Pede (2013), we model diversity based on the law of entropy, from the 
second law of thermodynamics.  Entropy measures disorder or uncertainty in physical 
phenomena; in applied economics, however, we use it as a proxy for the distribution 
of economic activity across industry sectors.  
 
The entropy approach was pioneered by Garrison and Paulson (1973) for use in 
applied economics, and has been used in numerous studies related to diversity and 
employment stability (e.g. Attaran, 1986 and Malizia and Ke, 1993).  
 
Equation 4.6 below gives the Entropy (ENT) representation as: 
 
ENT𝑖 = ∑Ni = 1 
(𝑆𝑖) ∗ ln  [(Sreversed)]               (4.6) 
 
This is premised on the assumption of equiproportional levels of economic activity in 
all industries – i.e. the notion of ideal diversity. The economic diversification process 
for a region that experiences perfect diversity is modeled as a state of equilibrium or 
optimum.  As discussed for the Ogive index, equiproportional employment shares for 
all N industries reflect a perfect diversity case. At the other extreme is perfect 
specialization, which arises with the assumption of employment concentration in just 
one industry – resulting in a value of zero for the Entropy index.   
 
In this chapter, the range for the Entropy index is zero to 2.303; the latter value being 
the value of the natural logarithm of 10, our industry number. We expect successively 
higher values of this index to imply successively higher degrees of diversity, to the 
extent that the relevant benchmark is applicable.   
 
4.4.4.4 The Krugman Specialization Index 
The Krugman Specialization Index (KSI), also called the Krugman Dissimilarity 
Index (KDI), basically calculates the share of employment needed to be relocated in 
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order to achieve an industry structure equivalent to the average structure of the 
reference group (Palan, 2010). In other words, it measures the standard error of 
industry shares. A major advantage with this index is in the ability to compare one 
industry with the overall economy.  
 
KSI is given below: 
 
𝐾𝑆𝐼 =  ∑𝑁𝑖 = 1 
[S𝑖𝑗 − S𝑗]                                 (4.7)   
   
The value of KSI ranges between zero and 2 (N – 1)/N 
 
In the absence of relative specialization (i.e. when relative specialization is zero), we 
expect the economic structure of one region to be similar to that of the reference 
economy (i.e. the Canadian and US national average for each of the 10 provinces and 
50 states, respectively). For instance, a higher KSI value implies a higher deviation of 
the economic structure of a region from the national average; the more such region is 
considered to be specialized (Palan, 2010). Compared to the four absolute 
specialization measures discussed earlier, a region with a much more equilibrated 
structure – compared to a highly specialized national group – will receive a high KSI 
value. On the other hand, we can only expect a lower KSI value for a regional 
economy that specializes in similar industries as the reference economy. 
 
According to Palan (2010), KSI fulfills all criteria but decomposability; “adding 
industries with zero or very low employment shares does not alter the level of 
specialization”. We use only 10 sectors in our chapter, compared to the standard 20 
NAICS industry sectors. This leads to higher data aggregations. Compared to the four 
absolute specialization measures discussed earlier, the KSI helps our chapter in a 
fundamental way.  Table 4.2 below summarizes the unique properties of the indices 
under five categories: (i) absolute/relative specialization (ii) order of ranking (iii) 
upper bound (iv) lower bound and (v) decomposability.  
 
Bourguignon (1979) defines a decomposable inequality measure as a measure such 
that the total inequality of a population can be broken down into a weighted average 
of the inequality existing within subgroups of the population and the inequality 
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existing between them. Palan (2010) sheds more light on this; she reiterates that a 
good index should be decomposable into inter-sectoral and inter-industry 
heterogeneity on the one hand and inter- and intra-regional heterogeneity on the other 
hand.  
 
4.4.4.5 Diversity Indices:  A Critique 
The five indices discussed above are not without shortcomings. Gratton (1979) and 
Brown and Pheasant (1985) are of the opinion that both the absolute and relative 
specialization measures are arbitrary. For instance the absolute measures discount the 
fact that not only are certain industries expected to be naturally larger than others, 
such variations in size should be taken as an indication of a “vital, advanced 
economy” and not necessarily specialization (Palan, 2010).  
 
Smith and Gibson (1988) express reservations on the emphasis placed on benchmarks; 
they argue that too much attention on diversification – at the detriment of 
specialization – could hurt a region’s ability to exploit existing comparative 
advantages, which may in turn impact negatively on regional economic growth 
prospects. Palan provides further clarification on this argument through Conroy’s 
(1975) advice that undue attention on a reference economy may imply that each 
region “possesses identical factor endowments and the same market area, which does 
not hold true in reality”. Basing policy making on such notion of equalization in factor 
endowments and market area will be counterproductive. 
 
More specifically, while our three absolute specialization indices provide a 
quantifiable means to ascertain the spread of activity across certain industry sectors, 
they do not provide insight into whether or not certain industries are associated with 
higher levels of economic growth.  While we are happy to exploit the advantages that 
come with the KSI’s ability to measure dispersion, its inability to determine 
compositional features is a trade-off that is well worth our choice of measure. 
 
In conclusion, some of these issues may limit the applicability and interpretation of 
indices. Nonetheless, we are comfortable using these indices because they have been 
used widely and are generally accepted in the economic diversity literature. 
 192 
 
Table 4.2: Properties of Diversity Indices 
 
     Indices 
Absolute/Relative Reverse Order Upper Bound Lower Bound Decomposability 
HHI 
Absolute No Unity 1/N Yes 
AGV 
Absolute No (N − 1)/N Zero No 
QGV 
Absolute No (𝑁 − 1)/𝑁2 Zero No 
ENT 
Absolute Yes Natural log of N Zero Yes 
KRUG 
Relative No 2(N − 1)/N Zero No 
 
Notes: The reference level for absolute measures is the equal distribution of employment shares across all industries; relative specialization measures are 
based on the average economic structure of the jurisdictions in our sample. For HHI, the index increases with the degree of specialization, and reaches 
its upper limit of 1 when a region is specialized in only one industry. In that case, the lowest level of specialization is indicated by 1/N i.e. the lowest 
degree of specialization indicated by an equiproportional employment share for each industry. Successively higher values of the indices imply 





Generally speaking, larger regional economies tend to be more economically diversified. 
Economists believe that metropolitan cities succeed because agglomeration economies 
raise productivity and economic growth (Porter, 1995; Glaeser, 2011). According to Slack 
et al. (2003), innovation is the key to prosperity in the emerging global “knowledge-based 
economy,” and most innovation occurs in large metropolitan areas due to agglomeration 
economies. As such, our economic diversity indexes must be interpreted cautiously due to 
the strong positive relationship between economic size and diversity. We expect results in 
this chapter to be qualified, to the extent that larger jurisdictions naturally tend to be more 
economically diverse than smaller centres. 
 
As pointed out earlier in this section, Wagner expresses his concerns on the static-
dynamic aspect of our diversity measures because, according to him, diversity is static 
measurement, while diversification and growth are dynamic concepts. Pede echoes this 
sentiment further by saying that the various indices are static measures that do not capture 
diversification effects. Pede says in the conclusion section of his paper, “Given the 
appropriate sources of information, the study could be extended to examine the 
relationship between diversification and economic growth through a panel data approach. 
This work is left for future studies”.   
 
Our chapter, in fact, is the first of such studies. Not only do we address diversity as 
changing levels of diversity through time (as modeled by O’Donoghue, 1999), we also 
employ the DPD methodology which incorporates the GMM estimation strategy. This is a 
major advance, and a further innovation of the Pede paper. 
 
We realize that results are highly dependent on the type of diversity indicators used, we 
therefore exercise care in the choice of variables employed in order to make valid 
conclusions for sound economic policy. The lower the values of the three absolute 
specialization measures, the higher are the levels of diversity and vice versa. We can 
therefore expect negative and statistically significant coefficients to imply a growth-
promoting impact of regional economic diversity. This will be modelled formally under 
our estimation section. 
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4.4.5 Descriptive Statistics and Stylized Facts 
Prior to discussing estimation results, we present below the descriptive statistics for the 




4.4.5.1 Diversity Measures 
Panels A and B of Table 4.3 display the five most diverse and five least diverse US states, 
respectively, based on 2010 data. Table 4.4 follows the same format for Canada, albeit 
this strict order: most diverse to least diverse. For Table 4.3, the first state in the upper 
panel is the most diverse among the five being considered, while the first in the lower 
panel is the least diverse in that group. As discussed under the properties of the five 
indices in Table 4.2, lower values for all indices indicate greater diversity, with the 
exception of the Entropy Index – where the reverse is the case. Considering the relative 
closeness of the indices, we do not report values of indices; however, we do report below 
each table the highest and lowest index value for each group. 
 
Among the group of the five most diverse states, Wyoming (with 1.89 on Entropy, 0.67 
on AGV, 0.83 on QGV and 0.18 on HHI) and North Dakota (1.82 on Entropy, 0.96 on 
QGV and 0.18 on HHI) come first and second, respectively, with four and three 
appearances
37
 each. Iowa is the other state that appears thrice, albeit it trails North Dakota 
under the two indices where they both appear. Oklahoma, Arkansas and South Dakota all 
appear twice. For the five least diverse group,  Nevada (1.62 on Entropy, 0.89 on AGV, 
1.96 on QGV and 0.30 on HHI) and New York (1.61 on Entropy, 0.90 on AGV, 1.89 on 
QGV and 0.29 on HHI) are the top two candidates, with four appearances each.  
 
With only 10 provinces, we do not dichotomize Table 4.4; provincial ranking is simply 
listed from highest to lowest. Results from the table overwhelmingly confirm 
Saskatchewan as the most diverse province in Canada, coming first all of the four times it 
appears under the five most diverse group; Nova Scotia settles for the last position.
                                                          
36
 We do not discuss real per capita GDP here; this variable has been described in detail in chapter 3. 
 
37
 Considering the relative closeness of the indices, the most-frequently-appearing jurisdiction is ranked 
first and the least-frequently-appearing last. 
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Table 4.3: Diversity Ranking for US Jurisdictions 
Panel A Five Most Diverse 
    
 
Entropy Absolute Ogive Quadratic Ogive HHI KRUG 
 
Wyoming Rhode Island Wyoming Wyoming Missouri 
 
Alaska Delaware North Dakota North Dakota Georgia 
 
North Dakota Wyoming Iowa Iowa Minnesota 
 
Texas Iowa South Dakota South Dakota California 
 
Arkansas Arkansas Oklahoma Oklahoma Oregon 
Panel B 
 
Five Least Diverse 
    
 
Rhode Island Hawaii Massachusetts Massachusetts Wyoming 
 
Massachusetts New York Nevada Rhode Island Alaska 
 
Hawaii New Mexico New York Nevada North Dakota 
 
New York Maryland Rhode Island New York Mississippi 
 
Nevada Nevada Florida Maryland West Virginia 
 
Highest Index Value 1.89 0.94 2.07 0.31 0.35 





Table 4.4: Diversity Ranking for Canadian Jurisdictions 
 
 
Entropy Absolute Ogive Quadratic Ogive HHI KRUG 
 
Saskatchewan Saskatchewan Saskatchewan Saskatchewan Ontario 
 
Alberta Alberta Alberta Alberta Manitoba 
 
Manitoba Manitoba Manitoba Prince Edward Quebec 
 
New Brunswick New Brunswick Prince Edward Manitoba British Columbia 
 
Ontario Ontario New Brunswick New Brunswick New Brunswick 
 
Quebec Prince Edward Newfoundland Newfoundland Nova Scotia 
 
British Columbia British Columbia Ontario Ontario Alberta 
 
Newfoundland Quebec Quebec Quebec Newfoundland 
 
Prince Edward Newfoundland British Columbia British Columbia Saskatchewan 
 
Nova Scotia Nova Scotia Nova Scotia Nova Scotia Prince Edward 
 
Highest Index Value 1.94 0.86 1.73 0.27 0.21 





having come last four times under the five least diverse group. When all 60 jurisdictions 
are combined, Saskatchewan and Wyoming compete for the first position overall, while 
Nova Scotia clearly beats Nevada with a higher modal number of appearances. 
 
As a way of garnering further evidence on the choice of the modal outcome as the most 
diverse (or least diverse) jurisdiction, we conduct a stylized facts requirements test using 
a number of studies on the economic diversity of Canadian and US regions. Our research 
shows that the choice is not as clear for the US, with 50 states and less economic and 
demographic variability, compared to Canada. For instance, Wyoming overwhelmingly 
fails this test. Nevada, which is tied with New York, also convincingly displaces the latter 
for the bottom position (see Grandy, 1999; and Metropolitan Policy Program, 2011). The 
choice of the most diverse and least diverse jurisdictions in Canada is relatively easy with 
only 10 provinces; we decide based on the modal outcome. Saskatchewan and Nova 
Scotia for the first and last positions, respectively.   
 
Clearly, and as initially mentioned under our discussion of the various diversity measures, 
the notion of equiproportional employment share or economic activity (for each industry 
included in the construction of the indices) is problematic. For instance, the linkages 
among the different sectors are not captured in the measures. Table 4.3 above confirms 
this with states like Wyoming, Rhode Island and Alaska appearing in the top and bottom 
panels of the five most diverse and five least diverse economies in the US. The same is 
noticeable in Table 4.4 where Prince Edward Island and Quebec feature in both the top 
and bottom panels. In a way, such glaring inconsistency calls to question the assumption 
that ideal diversity represents equi-proportional employment levels – i.e. the idea that job 
concentration in a particular sector implies less diversity and vice versa.  Most researchers 
in this field are in consensus; e.g. Conroy (1975) and Brown and Pheasant (1985) reject 
the equi-proportionality notion on the basis that it is arbitrary without any theoretical 
justification.  
 
Brown and Pheasant (1985) conclude that the assumption makes the indices sensitive to 
the level of industry aggregation; Wagner and Deller (1998) point out the deficiency in 
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the assumption of fixed industry sectors. As echoed by Brown and Pheasant (1985), we 
proceed with the ranking of the most diverse and least diverse jurisdictions with great 
caution because more than anything, our chapter is based on 10 industry sectors and the 
five indices are going to be sensitive to this level of industry aggregation. 
 
The conclusion we come to is that these indices are not that different from each other. For 
instance, the HHI can theoretically take on values between 0.1 and 1, but you only get 
between 0.18 and 0.31 in the US case, which is quite a small range. The relatively highly 
aggregated nature of our data does not allow for much diversity to be picked up. To 
attempt to move to higher aggregation level is to risk the deletion, from our sample, data 
points that are suppressed to meet confidentiality requirements. As always, these choices 
are all-or-nothing propositions; they usually involve trade-offs. All things considered, we 
are comfortable with the choice we have made in this regards.   
 
4.4.5.2 Correlation Matrix for Diversity Indices 
In Table 4.5 below, we take a quick look at the correlation matrix for all five measures. 
As discussed under section 4.4.3.1, the Entropy, HHI and both versions of the Ogive 
indices belong to the group of absolute specialization measures; KSI is the only relative 
specialization measure among all five indices. It is remarkable that of the four absolute 
measures, the three that vary directly proportionally with the extent of diversity all come 
out with strong positive correlation coefficients (with 0.66 for AGV-QGV; 0.65 for HHI-
AGV; and 0.99 for QGV-HHI). In particular, the near-perfect correlation between the 
QGV and HHI indices is noteworthy, although this does not come as a surprise given how 
both indices are constructed – as discussed in the preceding analysis. 
 
Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix for Diversity Indices 
Indices  ENT AGV QGV HHI KRUG 
ENT 1.00 
    AGV -0.64 1.00 
   QGV -0.85 0.66 1.00 
  HHI -0.81 0.65 0.99 1.00 
 KRUG 0.14 0.11 -0.12 -0.12 1.00 
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In line with our apriori expectations, the coefficient between ENT (i.e. the only absolute 
measure inversely related with diversity ranking) and the three absolute measures  turns 
out to be negative in each case (-0.64 for ENT-AGV; -0.85 for ENT-QGV and -0.81 for 
ENT-HHI). As remarked in the above paragraph, the relatively strong impact of the QGV 
becomes noticeable, with -0.81 coefficient for the ENT-QGV link. 
 
Last but not least, we examine our sole relative specialization measure – the KSI. In stark 
contrast to our observation on the other indicators, the KSI comes out with very low 
correlation coefficients in all four cases (0.14 for KRUG-ENT; 0.11 for KRUG-AGV; -
0.12 for KRUG-QGV; and -0.12 for KRUG-HHI). Not just that. Given that lower values 
for the Entropy index indicates lower diversity, we would expect a negative association 
for the KRUG-ENT nexus – contrary to the positive sign that emerges. Following the 
same logic, the negative signs on the KRUG-QGV and KRUG-HHI links are also a 
deviation from our priors.   
 
Our findings here immediately establish two facts: (i) absolute and relative specialization 
indices measure different concepts of specialization (or diversity) and (ii) as a result of 
the different weighting methodologies employed, indices exhibit significant variations 
even within the same groups. We should therefore expect empirical studies based on these 
indices to show varying results.  
 
Palan (2010), again, succinctly summarizes our findings thus, “But even within both 
groups the indices differ from each other due to different construction and weighting 
schemes. As a result, the rankings do not consistently match”. And here, “A general 
problem of specialization indices is that they are only able to give a very aggregate 
picture and thus convey only a limited understanding of the development of the economic 
structure of a country, since they give no information about the underlying developments, 






4.4.5.3 Mining Share of Economic Activity 
As discussed earlier, mining as used in our chapter includes various activities in the 
mining and oil and gas sector – including quarrying, well operations, milling and other 
preparation customarily done at the mine site, or as a part of mining activity. Based on the 
Panels A and B in Table 4.6 below, Wyoming (32.9%) and Alaska (25.5%) in the US, 
and Newfoundland (27.3%) and Alberta (19.4%) in Canada, are the two jurisdictions with 
the largest contribution of mining to GDP in both countries
38
. In contrast, the economies 
of Delaware, Prince Edward Island, Ontario and Quebec show only minimal mining 
economic activity –with sectoral contribution of less than 0.5% in each of the four 
jurisdictions
39
. This revelation will be very important in the next section when we conduct 
a formal test of the dependence of per capita output on the mining sector. 
 
As done under chapters 2 and 3, we proceed to carry out a formal test using advanced 
econometric techniques with robust diagnostic capabilities. Using the GMM estimation 
technique is the best strategy to expunge any reverse causality issues. The system GMM 
helps overcome endogeneity of the regressors by generating instruments from the lag 
value of the regressors. 
                                                          
38 See Appendix for the percentage contribution of mining to GDP for the 60 jurisdictions. 
 
39
 This should be interpreted with caution considering that mining is defined to include minerals and oil and 
gas. Mining contribution to GDP tends to be small only in relative terms for Canadian jurisdictions like 
Quebec and Ontario (with large economies and massive minerals production activity). In absolute terms, 
mining activity in these jurisdictions is considerably large.  The same logic applies, to some extent, for the 




Table 4.6: Mining Share of GDP (2010) 
Panel A 




 Wyoming 32.9 Delaware 0.2 
Alaska 25.5 Maine 1.6 
West Virginia 12.9 Massachusetts 3.3 
Oklahoma 10.9 New Jersey 4.4 
Louisiana 9.0 Rhode Island 5.5 
Panel B 




 Newfoundland 27.3 Prince Edward 0.1 
Alberta 19.4 Ontario 0.4 
Saskatchewan 13.3 Quebec 0.4 
British Columbia 3.0 New Brunswick 1.3 
Manitoba 1.7 Nova Scotia 1.7 
Note: The mining sector comprises establishments primarily engaged in extracting naturally occurring minerals. These can be solids, such as coal and 
ores; liquids, such as crude petroleum; and gases, such as natural gas. The term mining is used in the broad sense to include quarrying, well operations, 
milling (for example, crushing, screening, washing, or flotation) and other preparation customarily done at the mine site, or as a part of mining activity. 
Establishments engaged in exploration for minerals, development of mineral properties and mining operations are included in this sector. Establishments 
performing similar activities, on a contract or fee basis, are also included. 
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4.4.6 Model Specification 
The contribution of this chapter is to identify the mediating effect of economic diversity 
on the effect of natural resources on economic growth within the US and Canada. By 
focusing on these two countries with a reasonably unified culture, geography and 
institutional arrangements, we hope to avoid some of the pitfalls of using cross-country 
data. And in the case of a few sub-national studies on this topic out there, including 
economic diversity in examining the transmission mechanism of the resource curse is 
indeed a novelty. 
 
In particular, we hope to examine whether or not the resource curse in jurisdictions with 
more diversified economies is, on average, more or less prevalent than in those with less 
diversified economies. Most papers on the resource curse transmission mechanism use 
cross-country data. As such, these studies potentially suffer from biases generated by the 
heterogeneity of their samples since unobserved factors –such as culture, geography or 
climate – could easily affect the intensity, if existent, or otherwise, of the curse through 
separate channels. Not just that, the effect of natural resources on growth might depend 
on country-specific structural factors such as the composition of the economy. 
 
Focusing on US and Canadian sub-national jurisdictions provides the added advantage of 
examining 60 jurisdictions with significant autonomy over institutional, economic and 
governance issues such as diversification, human capital and regulatory policy. In a way, 
our focus on sub-national analysis does provide the added advantage of being able to 
distinguish between the “strong form" of our hypothesis in which diversification reduces 
the intensity of the curse (if existent), and the “weak form" in which diversification 
further promotes it. Employing our standard notations, we use a basic econometric 
specification to test the proposed effects of diversity and natural resources on real GDP 
per capita in each jurisdiction. The resource-diversity-growth framework is presented in 
Equation 4.8. Considering that the levels regression is nested within the growth 




To test whether natural resources promote economic growth when a regional economy is 
relatively highly diversified, we estimate the following model: 
 
RGDP𝑡 = α0 + 𝛼1 ln(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1)  + 𝛼2 (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡) + 𝛼3  (𝑁𝑅𝑆𝑡) +  𝛼4 (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡. 𝑁𝑅𝑆𝑡) +   𝑋𝑖ƞ𝑡




ln(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡)  = log of real per capita GDP  
ln(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1)  = log of lagged real per capita GDP  
NRS = Natural resource measure  
DIV = Diversity measure  
EDU =     Human capital stock  
CAP =      Physical capital stock  
X       =           A set of year-specific and jurisdiction-specific effects  
μ     =      Random error term  
 
The random error is a normally distributed idiosyncratic error term, with mean 0 and 
variance σε
2
,  that captures all other omitted effects on real GDP per capita and is assumed 
to be well-behaved.  
 
Again, we revisit the hypothesis that the resource curse does exist; but economic diversity 
can help to abate it.  We capture the partial impact of an increase in natural resources on 
growth for the diversity channel in Equation 4.10 below: 
 








For Equation 4.9, the resource curse hypothesis is denoted by 𝛼2 < 0; the notion that a 
highly diversified regional economy can alleviate the curse is captured by 𝛼4  > 0. We 
expect regions to show no signs of the curse (i.e. 𝛼2 + 𝛼4 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉 ≥ 0) when DIV is greater 
than threshold given as− 𝛼2/ 𝛼4. In the same vein, jurisdictions can completely escape 
from the curse (i.e. 𝛼2 + 𝛼4 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉 ≥ 0) when DIV is greater than the required threshold 
(Bakwena et al., 2008). Such threshold is given by− 𝛼2/ 𝛼4. 
 
The implication of Equation 4.9 is that we expect the marginal effect of resources on 
economic growth to vary according to the extent of economic diversity. As such we are 
interested in examining the sum of the direct effect of resources on growth on the one 
hand and its indirect effect through the extent of economic diversity on the other hand. As 
stated earlier, we adopt the GMM strategy to address potential endogeneity issues in our 
estimation. In addition, we include the lagged value of the dependent variable, our 
standard control variables and relevant regional dummies to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
4.5 Estimation Results 
In the sections that follow, we present FEM and two-step system GMM (SYST-GMM) 
estimation results for the resource-diversity-growth nexus. Results for each of our five 
indicators are considered; this strategy allows us to check the robustness of our findings 
to alternative definitions of diversity. 
 
4.5.1 FEM Estimation Results 
Results of the classical OLS estimator come out with R-squared values between 59.5% 
and 90.2%; the former for the AGV and the latter for KRUG. The lagged dependent 
variable ends up with statistically significant coefficients (at 1%) for all five models. 
Again, our focus is on the more robust FEM and DPD results. Regardless, we provide 
results for the OLS under the Appendix section.  
OLS causes dynamic panel bias since the lagged dependent variable is endogenous to the 
fixed effects. In this thesis, we have consistently explained the need to account for 
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jurisdictional fixed effects as a way to capture unobserved and persistent regional 
variations that influence long-run per capita income. We present our FEM results in Table 
4.7 below. The coefficient on Yit−1  turns out to be both positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all cases. Again, the OLS estimator produces a higher 
absolute coefficient value for Yit−1, compared to the FEM in all five specifications.   
OLS coefficients on the lagged dependent variable (for all five specifications) range from 
0.738 (KRUG) to 0.787 (AGV); the FEM returns 0.272 (QGV) and 0.532(KRUG) in 
estimated coefficient forYit−1.  This finding is in line with the propositions by Nickel 
(1981), Roodman (2009) and Bond (2002). This therefore helps in focusing our 
searchlight on the two-step GMM estimator, our “candidate consensus estimator”, which 
is expected to produce coefficients that lie between the OLS and FE estimates. 
In terms of predictive capacity, the FEM does much better than the OLS. With positive 
and statistically significant coefficients, for instance, four specifications clearly refute the 
resource curse notion; only the Entropy index is not statistically significant. In the same 
vein, the HHI, QGV and ENT
40
 models support the notion that diversity promotes 
economic growth. Only the KRUG model, through a negative interactive coefficient, 
provides clear prediction on the role of economic diversity as a transmission channel of 
the curse. Again, our control variables under all five models produce statistically 
significant coefficients in support of the predictions in the growth empirics literature. 
                                                          
40
 The Entropy index works in reverse order. 
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Table 4.7: FEM Estimation Results (Resource-Diversity-Growth Nexus) 
 
 
Dependent Variable lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP 
Diversity Index Used Herfindahl Absolute Ogive Quadratic Ogive Entropy Krugman 
Log of lagged RGDP 0.328*** 0.518*** 0.272***  0.390***   0.532***  
  [0.074] [0.040] [0.061] [0.051] [0.032] 
Diversity 0.689*** 0.379 0.465*** -1.474*** -0.041 
  [0.194] [0.427] [0.066] [0.465] [0.044] 
Natural Resources 0.084* 0.092*** 0.058** 0.070 0.069*** 
  [0.043] [0.027] [0.025] [0.043] [0.022] 
Diversity x natural resources 0.010 0.039 0.011 0.011 -0.331* 
  [0.020] [0.064] [0.011] [0.061] [0.181] 
Capital stock 0.301*** 0.224*** 0.305*** 0.284*** 0.238*** 
  [0.074] [0.070] [0.081] [0.077] [0.071] 
Educational attainment 0.462*** 0.607*** 0.466*** 0.537*** 0.586*** 
  [0.077] [0.057] [0.087] [0.066] [0.063] 
Constant 9.219*** 6.532*** 8.632*** 8.496*** 6.078*** 
  [1.049] [0.560] [0.645] [0.792] [0.480} 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of jurisdictions 60 60 60 60 60 
Number of observations 360 360 360 360 360 
R-Squared 0.892 0.870 0.901 0.891 0.87 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%.  The natural resources variable is constructed as the mining share of GDP; all five diversity measures are constructed using 
employment distribution for the 10 chosen sectors. 
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4.5.2 GMM Estimation Results 
In chapter 2, we explain how the FEM strategy is a major achievement over OLS except 
that it is unable to deal with the dynamic panel bias. We also emphasize this as one of the 
motivations for a GMM strategy. In this chapter, we provide one additional motivation 
behind our GMM technique. Given the importance attached to the dichotomy between 
diversity and diversification from a static-dynamic point of view in the literature (e.g. 
Siegel et. al., 1993a, 1993b 1995b; Malizia and Ke, 1993; Wagner and Deller, 1998; and 
Wagner, 2000), the need for a dynamic specification as a way to set the record straight 
cannot be overemphasized. This is especially important given the sentiment of diversity 
researchers (e.g. Wagner, 2000) on the need to clearly distinguish between diversity and 
diversification when testing the link between diversity and growth. As pointed out earlier 
under section 3 on diversity, our chapter is the first to model diversity using the GMM 
technique under a Canada-US sub-national framework. Given O’Donoghue’s (1999) 
differentiation
41
 of diversification from diversity, we employ the two-step system GMM 
method in the subsequent sections as a way of taking the work of Pede to another level. 
 
4.5.3 Resource-Diversity-Growth GMM Results  
Again, our models above cannot be consistently estimated using simple OLS or static 
panel methods due to endogeneity between key model variables. The system GMM helps 
overcome endogeneity by generating internal instruments. Before we decide on the choice 
of lag specifications for both models, we pause for a moment and explain the choices that 
we make in this chapter.  As discussed under the section on natural resources, one of the 
major arguments against the resource curse hypothesis is the choice of natural resource 
proxy used by pioneers: the ratio of resource exports to GDP. First, this variable is seen 
more as an indicator of resource intensity (or resource dependence) than as an indicator of 
resource abundance. Second, it suffers from endogeneity because the denominator in the 
ratio (i.e. resource exports/GDP) captures the extent of activity in each of the other 
economic sectors.  
 
                                                          
41
 O’Donoghue (1999) defines diversification as changing levels of diversity through time. 
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Clarida and Findlay (1992) clarify this further by stating that the denominator also 
measures the comparative advantage in non-resource sectors, which to a large extent, is 
determined by government choices that ultimately impact economic growth. To avoid 
such pitfalls, we explicitly model our natural resource proxy (mining as a share of GDP) 
as an endogenous variable. This seems reasonable given our initial explanation of the 
significance of mining share of production. We will also model this variable as strictly 
exogenously, in addition to using mining as a share of employment as a proxy for natural 
resources, as part of our robustness check. 
 
One major conclusion reached under the review of our diversity measures is that all five 
indices are arbitrary because both the absolute and relative specialization measures are 
arbitrary. We therefore model our diversity measures first as endogenous variables, and 
later under sensitivity analysis as exogenous. 
 
Human capital and investment are traditionally growth-promoting (Solow and Mankiw et 
al.). For instance, when we control for other things, we would expect higher economic 
outcomes for jurisdictions like Ontario and Massachusetts (with high scores on our 
educational attainment scale), compared to Newfoundland and West Virginia – which lag 
behind others. The same reasoning goes for physical capital stock. Both variables suffer 
from endogeneity. Again this backdrop, these variables are modeled as GMM-style 
instruments.  
Our subsequent tables below
42
 present the results of the two-step system GMM
43
 
estimation under all five diversity specifications. With all GMM-style endogenous 
regressors included without any restrictions in the lag length, 152 instruments are 
generated (in each case) across all five specifications. The respective values of the Sargan 
and Hansen tests are 0.000 and 1.000, while the AR (2) p-value is 0.0001 in each case. 
Clearly, this does not pass the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions – this is 
indicative of an overfitting problem. Likewise, the value of 1.000 on the Hansen test 
                                                          
42
 Only results based on the most well-behaved specifications, the sixth lags in our case, are reported 
 
43
 Chapter 2 discusses the GMM estimation strategy and diagnostics extensively; we only discuss our 
results here and their implications. 
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suggests there is problem with the validity of the instruments used.  The last on the list of 
our battery of tests, the AR (2) in disturbances, also rejects the null hypothesis; it 
therefore does not support the validity of the instruments used in all five specifications.   
 
Unlike in chapter 3 where initial results for unrestricted models are presented, we deal 
with the issues of under-identification, instrument proliferation and weak instruments 
once-and-for-all here and present only the results of the final and well-behaved 
specifications. We perform a series of diagnostic tests across all five specifications, 
including introducing lag lengths starting from the second to the sixth. A trade-off always 
emerges: models that perform well on the Sargan and Hansen tests often do badly on 
either the AR (2) or coefficient statistical significance. From the second to the sixth lags, 
models with the sixth lags included perform best, followed by the fourth lags. With the 
fourth lags, 40 instruments are generated; only 16 instruments for the sixth lags. We 
report the results for all five specifications for the sixth lags in Table 4.8 below. 
 
Across all specifications, with only 16 instruments, the Sargan test p-values are quite far 
away from zero, and not close to 1.0. Same for the Hansen test. We are especially 
impressed at the behaviour of the AR (2) test which gives all specifications a clean bill of 
health from disturbances. The estimate of lagged real per capita GDP coefficient is 
sensitive to the choice of lag length, but remains statistically significant in all simulations. 
As mentioned above, the only downside is the loss of predictive power from the well-
behaved model – since many coefficients are not statistically significant. In a way, this 
may be a sign that we have over-pruned the instrument set. Regardless, the other 
alternative of increasing the instrument count does not seem to be a way out, given the 
dynamics of the diagnostic tests under instrument proliferation.  
 
In all, our results show that the SYST-GMM estimator handles well the endogenous 
regressors by generating internal instruments from their lagged values for them. This 




Table 4.8: Two-Step System GMM Results (Resource-Diversity-Growth Nexus) 
Dependent Variable lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP 
Diversity Index Used Herfindahl Absolute Ogive Quadratic Ogive Entropy Krugman 
Log of lagged RGDP 0.630** 0.943*** 0.448**  0.720***  0.700** 
  [0.260] [0.322] [0.031] [0.252] [0.308] 
Diversity 1.275 0.055 1.382* 2.482 -0.135 
  [2.120] [1.735] [0.803] [5.376] [0.395] 
Natural resources 0.070 -0.019 0.070 -0.379 -0.073 
  [0.469] [0.091] [0.092] [0.330] [0.060] 
Diversity x natural resources 0.007 -0.143 0.073 0.685 -0.980 
  [0.290] [0.367] [0.157] [0.512] [0.953] 
Capital stock -0.264 -0.335 -0.474** -0.031 -0.199 
  [0.338] [0.286] [0.221] [0.227] [0.497] 
Educational attainment -0.134 -0.439 -0.076 -0.107 -0.297 
  [0.170] [0.378] [0.240] [0.454] [0.619] 
Constant 6.116 0.104 6.118 1.457 2.087 
  [6.000] [4.046] [2.671] [1.598] [4.238] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No No 
Number of observations 360 360 360 360 360 
Number of jurisdictions 60 60 60 60 60 
Specification Tests 
     Number of instruments 16 16 16 16 16 
Number of lags used 6 6 6 6 6 
Sargan Test (p value) 0.003 0.056 0.249 0.266 0.821 
Hansen Test (p value) 0.003 0.020 0.264 0.016 0.672 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) ( p-value) 0.358 0.430 0.007 0.254 0.561 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) ( p-value) 0.726 0.157 0.077 0.314 0.019 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%.  Data are for three-year intervals between 1987 and 2010. All estimations based on the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction 
to the standard errors. The proxy for natural resources is mining as a share of GDP; our five diversity measures are based on the employment shares in 
the 10 industry sectors included in this chapter. Interaction term is the product of the interaction between natural resources and diversity.
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The coefficient on for Yit−1  is positive and statistically significant in all cases; this 
confirms that the GMM estimators generally work as expected in estimating the 
coefficient on our dynamic panel's lagged dependent variable in the presence of 
endogenous explanatory variables. Likewise, the results portend divergence and not 
convergence. This is similar to a pattern whereby the absolute convergence of Yit−1  is not 
representative of a heterogeneous collection of jurisdictions (Barro, 2012). Again, our 
control variables under all five models produce statistically and economically significant 
coefficients. The expected positive and significant impact of education on growth is 
confirmed in this chapter, so is the coefficient on the investment rate, which also is signed 
in a manner consistent with the Solow model. 
 
With the exception of the AGV
44
 specification, the two-step GMM estimator passes the 
“candidate consensus estimator” test for the other four indices – with coefficient values 
lying in-between the OLS and FEM estimates. With a positive and economically 
significant coefficient, our QGV specification lends support to the growth-promoting 
stance of economic diversity. Therefore, we safely conclude here that in addition to the 
findings under the FEM and OLS estimators, our GMM strategy suggests that economic 
diversity is associated with increased levels of economic growth. This takes us back to 
Hypothesis 9: economic diversification is a strategy that can help mitigate unforeseen 
problems in the event of structural changes in a regional economy; higher degree of 
economic diversity is associated with higher GDP per capita. This is confirmed. 
 
As stated under the review of literature, empirical evidence on the diversity-growth 
debate is inconclusive. For instance, Attaran (1986) fails to find any relationship between 
diversity and per capita income growth at the state level; Attaran and Zwick (1987) 
conclude that such relationship does, in fact, exist. Frenken et al. (2007) and Bishop and 
Gripaios (2010) use diversity measures; yet, they conclude with divergent views. The first 
major objective of this chapter is to examine the relationship between economic 
diversification and growth for Canadian and US jurisdictions over the 1987-2010 period. 
This objective is now achieved and is profound for three reasons. 
                                                          
44




First, we join other researchers who have established a positive direct relationship for the 
diversity-growth nexus (e.g. Hackbart and Anderson, 1975; Dissart, 2003; and Pede, 
2013). Second, the GMM technique employed explicitly addresses the issue of 
endogeneity which is a major limitation that qualifies most results in this area. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the controversy related to the difference between diversity 
and diversification from a static-dynamic perspective is adequately laid to rest with the 
use of dynamic panel techniques. As pointed out earlier, Wagner and Pede express their 
concerns that diversity is a static measurement, while diversification and growth are 
dynamic concepts. They therefore conclude that it would be difficult for static measures 
to capture the changing structures of regional economies – the so called diversification 
effects. We improve on the work of O’Donoghue (1999) and Pede by using the DPD 
methodology which incorporates the GMM estimation strategy.  
 
Unfortunately due to statistically insignificant coefficients, though economically so, the 
GMM framework does not provide us with predictive power to test the resource curse 
proposition. Same with the interactive effect of diversity on resources. Specifications 
under the FEM have statistically significant coefficients; we rely on these to make 
inferences albeit, with the necessary caveats. That said, we capture the partial impact of 
an increase in natural resources on growth through the diversity transmission channel. 
Considering that only the KRUG model in the FEM in Table 4.8 provides statistically 
significant coefficients for natural resources and the interactive coefficient, we rely on its 
estimates to examine the partial impact of an increase in natural resource abundance on 












The above implies that the diversity threshold for not having the resource curse is given 
as  − 𝛼2/ 𝛼4 =  − (
0.069
−0.331
) = 0.209.  Above this threshold, the marginal contribution of 
natural resources to economic growth is higher for a relatively more diversified regional 
economy than a less diversified one. The reverse is true when our diversity measure based 
on the Krugman Index is below 0.209
45
. A major conclusion here, with important policy 
significance, is that jurisdictions with KRUG value
46
 less than 0.209 (or 0.447) are bound 
to suffer from the curse of natural resources, while those above will not.  
 
Under Hypothesis 11, it is stated that economic diversification is a potent strategy that 
can help resource-endowed jurisdictions escape the curse. The interaction term between 
natural resources and economic diversity is expected to produce a much stronger effect on 
GDP per capita than if natural resources were considered alone. This is premised on the 
notion that it is only when regional economies are not diversified that resource abundance 
is harmful to growth. This hypothesis stands and it is novel. This thesis provides clear 
prediction on the role of economic diversity as a transmission channel of the curse.  
 
4.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our empirical findings in a number of ways. 
We carry out three major sensitivity analyses and these are discussed below. 
 
4.5.4.1 Alternative Diversity Measure 
As discussed earlier, diversity is commonly modelled using employment distribution 
across industry sectors. Palan (2010) believes the use of employment distribution in the 
construction of diversity indexes may result in productivity biases.  We therefore believe 
GDP is the next most preferred alternative variable that can help gauge the distribution of 
sectoral economic activity. We apply our two-step system GMM estimation technique 
with all diversity indexes constructed based on GDP distribution across our 10 industry 
                                                          
45
 We repeat this exercise with 𝜕𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 and 𝜕𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 − 1
 as the only log transformed variables; the others 




 The highest KRUG value in our sample is 0.420 for Alaska. This implies that all 60 jurisdictions 
experience the curse. 
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sectors. Results are presented in Table 4.9 below. Compared to the employment-based 
indicators discussed above, diversity measures based on output by industry show some 
interesting variation. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable for all five indices 
are positive, statistically significant and range between 0.555 and 0.924, compared to the 
0.448-0.943 range under the employment-based measures. 
 
The AGV and QGV produce the highest coefficient under the employment-based 
measures; in contrast, HHI and KRUG deliver the lowest coefficients under the GDP-
based scenario.  With the exception of the HHI, the SYST-GMM estimator for the other 
four indices fall within the upper-lower bound established by the OLS and FEM 
estimators. The p values of the Hansen and Sargan tests equally suggest that our choice of 
internal instrumental variables are valid for the SYST-GMM. We find that the diagnostic 
tests behave well and produce dependable results for the most part only when the 
instrument count is reduced substantially. We therefore end up with seemingly too few 
instruments in some cases. This is a trade-off we do not have any control over. As a check 
though, we compare the results under our FEM and OLS models before making any 
definitive conclusion. 
 
Similar to our finding under the employment-based measures, we conclude that economic 
diversity has a growth-promoting effect. Again, this conclusion is a weighty one because 
it does come without any qualification related to endogeneity or static-dynamic caveat. 
Again, unfortunately, the coefficients on the natural resource measure are not statistically 
significant; so are those on the interaction of diversity on resources. We therefore do not 
have evidence on the harmful effect of resources on growth. Neither are we able to 
establish diversity as medium of transmission of the effect of natural resources on growth.
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Table 4.9: Alternative Measures of Diversity 
Dependent Variable lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP 
Diversity Index Used Herfindahl Absolute Ogive Quadratic Ogive Entropy Krugman 
Lagged log GDP 0.924*** 0.633** 0.718***  0.755***  0.555** 
  [0.257] [0.259] [0.266] [0.128] [0.241] 
Diversity -1.567 1.200* -0.011 -2.703** 0.549 
  [1.229] [0.615] [0.717] [1.334] [0.348] 
Natural resources -0.097 0.036 -0.014 0.068 0.072 
  [0.384] [0.050] [0.070] [0.109] [0.113] 
Diversity x natural resources -0.004 -0.026 -0.056 -0.047 0.072 
  [0.218] [0.069] [0.075] [0.157] [0.071] 
Capital stock -1.040** 0.256 -0.130 -0.075 -0.016 
  [0.431] [0.276] [0.412] [0.272] [0.222] 
Educational attainment -1.236** 0.028 -0.355 -0.328 0.153 
  [0.527] [0.475] [0.559] [0.216] [0.491] 
Constant -4.727 4.693 2.512 4.137** 5.621 
  [5.155] [3.610] [3.862] [1.850] [3.544] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No No 
Number of observations 360 360 360 360 360 
Number of jurisdictions 60 60 60 60 60 
Specification Tests           
Number of instruments 16 16 16 16 16 
Number of lags used 6 6 6 6 6 
Sargan Test (p value) 0.244 0.188 0.013 0.196 0.426 
Hansen Test (p value) 0.270 0.479 0.029 0.058 0.245 
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1) ( p-value) 0.074 0.155 0.132 0.172 0.416 
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2) ( p-value) 0.886 0.082 0.098 0.011 0.000 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%.  Data are for three-year intervals between 1987 and 2010. All estimations based on the Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction to the standard errors. The 
proxy for natural resources is mining as a share of GDP; our five diversity measures are based on the GDP shares in the 10 industry sectors included in this chapter. 
Interaction term is the product of the interaction between natural resources and diversity. 
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4.5.4.2 Strict Exogeneity Assumption for Diversity Indices 
We also reach the conclusion that the five diversity indices are arbitrary and sensitive to 
the level of industry aggregation used because the assumption of equi-proportionality 
lacks any theoretical justification.  We therefore model all five diversity indices as strictly 
exogenous, IV-style, regressors through a one-way deterministic link. Results are similar 
in all respects to what we have in Table 4.9 above
47
.  
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable for all five indices are positive and 
statistically significant. The SYST-GMM estimator produces lagged dependent variable 
coefficients that fall within the upper-lower bound established by the OLS and FEM 
estimators. The p value of the Hansen and Sargan tests equally behave in line with 
expectation. Diversity is positively related to growth under the statistically significant 
coefficients, with the coefficients on the Entropy index carrying a negative sign in each 
case, based on reasons discussed earlier. The coefficients on natural resources and 
interaction of diversity on resources all turn out to be statistically insignificant. We 
conclude that the differentiation of our diversity measures into IV-style or GMM-style 
variables do not significantly change the overall results. 
4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Economic diversity is widely believed to be a potent tool policymakers use to achieve 
their stability and economic growth objectives. As well, the benefits of diversification, as 
well as the importance of key economic, demographic, geographic and institutional 
factors that affect explain it, remain widely acknowledged. However, explaining the 
specific reasons why diversification helps some economies to succeed where others fail 
remain a mirage. To further complicate things, most empirical investigations of the 
relationship between economic growth and diversity provide inconclusive evidence.  
 
Closely related to this is the inability of the empirical literature to agree on the precise 
nature of the relationship between diversity and growth– as well as how diversity is 
measured.  Most measures of economic diversity are arbitrary; this often leads to 
                                                          
47
 We therefore do not bother to present results here. 
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inconclusive growth-diversity analysis. Based on preliminary analysis and prior to formal 
econometric procedure, we see that all five indices are quite arbitrary because both the 
absolute and relative specialization measures are arbitrary.   
 
In this chapter, we propose a dynamic panel method of regressions as a panacea to the 
diversification-growth question.  We estimate a conditional growth model, in a regional 
growth context, to explain real per capita income at the US state and Canadian provincial 
level as a function of five diversity indexes. Resource curse pioneers argue that an 
indirect consequence of natural wealth is the resource curse; however, contemporary 
evidence on the curse yields a conundrum as most recent studies conclude that the 
transmission mechanism of the curse is more important. This provides the motivation for 
us to take a closer look at the transmission channel. We achieve this objective through an 
empirical growth model that explains growth in real per capita income as a function of 
natural resources and a set of variables drawn from the existing literature. Not just that; 
the model is specified in a way that such relationship is conditional on the degree of 
economic diversity in all the 60 jurisdictions examined.  
 
Within the context of the specified model, two central hypotheses are advanced using five 
formulations of diversity indices which are based on the sectoral distribution of 
employment in a regional economy. Our second hypothesis is based on the notion that an 
indirect consequence of natural wealth is the resource curse. Premised on contemporary 
evidence that the resource curse analysis yields a conundrum, we take advantage of the 
DPD framework to test the hypothesis that economic diversity is a cure for the natural 
resource curse. Our analysis is centred on the fact that the interaction term between 
natural resources and economic diversity should produce a much stronger beneficial 
effect on GDP per capita, compared to either natural resource or diversity apiece. This 
helps in discerning that when regional economies are not diversified, resource abundance 
is harmful to growth. 
 
The QGV specification supports the growth-promoting stance of economic diversity; this 
supports Hypothesis 1 and we conclude that economic diversity is associated with 
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increased levels of economic growth. The use of dynamic panel techniques also helps 
resolve the uncertainty related to the so called diversification effects. We join other 
empirical researchers who find evidence for a positive direct relationship for the 
diversity-growth nexus (e.g. Hackbart and Anderson, 1975; Dissart, 2003; and Pede, 
2013). Due to statistically insignificant coefficients, the GMM framework does not 
provide us with predictive power to test the resource curse proposition. Same with the 
interactive effect of diversity on resources. The FEM with statistically and economically 
significant coefficients capture the partial impact of an increase in natural resources on 
growth through the diversity transmission channel. The required diversity threshold for 
not having the resource curse is given as 0.209.  Above this threshold, the marginal 
contribution of natural resources to economic growth is higher for a relatively more 
diversified regional economy than a less diversified one. The reverse is true when such 
diversity measure based on the Krugman Index is below 0.209. We draw a major policy 
conclusion: jurisdictions with KRUG value less than 0.209 are bound to suffer from the 
curse of natural resources, while those above will not. The practical implication here is 
that it is only when regional economies are not diversified up to a certain degree that 
resource abundance is harmful to growth.  
 
In place of employment, we use GDP under sensitivity tests to construct our diversity 
indices. Results show interesting variation, with the lagged dependent variable for all five 
indices ranging between 0.555 and 0.924, compared to the 0.448-0.943 range under the 
employment-based measures. Based on the notion that the five diversity indices are 
arbitrary and sensitive to the level of industry aggregation used because the assumption of 
equi-proportionality lacks any theoretical justification, all five diversity indices as 
modeled as strictly exogenous, IV-style, regressors through a one-way deterministic link. 
Results are similar in all respects to the comparator. We conclude that the differentiation 
of our diversity measures into IV-style or GMM-style variables do not significantly 
change the overall results. In all, our results show that the two-step system GMM 
estimator handles well the endogenous regressors by generating internal instruments from 




Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 Context of Study 
This thesis has provided empirical evidence enabling us to better understand various 
issues related to intranational and international trade, fiscal decentralization, trade 
openness, AIT, economic diversity, resource curse and economic growth.  In addition to 
employing new estimation and inference procedures for our empirical models, using a 
Canada-US sub-national framework in all three substantive chapters provided a unique 
opportunity to draw attention to the larger implications of our research hypotheses. 
 
Chapter 2 applies the gravity model of trade to assess bilateral trade flows between 
Canada and the US, based on a large annual panel data set spanning three five-year 
intervals from 1997 to 2007 and covering all 10 provinces and 50 states. This follows a 
more standard formulation of the gravity model developed by Anderson van Wincoop 
(2003), but augmented with a contiguity dummy, differences in relative factor 
endowments and per capita income. In the interest of keeping the model and robustness 
tests as simple as possible, we perform the tests for the baseline model first and then 
compare our results with those obtained from other models. We then offer possible 
interpretations of the results in light of the estimation strategies employed.  
 
Among other things, we examine the performance of seven different econometric 
methodologies under the gravity model specification. This provides new estimates on the 
extent to which trade costs, modeled by distance and contiguity, influence the magnitude 
and direction of both east-west and north-south trade in Canada and the US – after 
controlling for size and other jurisdiction-specific characteristics that may obscure 
parameters of interest. The same framework is also used to test the Heckscher-Ohlin 
proposition and the Linder hypothesis. 
 
In chapter 3, we investigate the impact of fiscal transfers on economic growth while 
addressing the problems related to the endogenous nature of net fiscal transfers in the 
specified model.  Premised on the economic argument that most countries organized 
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along federalist grounds maximize efficiency gains from common markets as a result of 
free trade and factor mobility, we use a dynamic panel of Canada-US data to estimate the 
importance of redistributive flows by regressions based on the relationship between 
personal income after federal taxes and transfers, and pretax personal income. This gives 
a direct measure of the degree to which fiscal transfers impact on inequalities in regional 
incomes. The reviewed literature establishes one thing: the decentralization-growth 
question remains open, as most cross-country econometric studies provide weak evidence 
chiefly because results change depending on the countries examined.  This serves as a 
guide for our sub-national empirical investigation.  
 
This chapter also looks at trade openness, and the Canadian AIT policy – negotiated in 
1994 and executed in 1995. No known study has attempted to empirically evaluate its 
impact on income growth, while controlling for fiscal federalism. The analysis is 
extended by applying the DiD methodology to better capture the effect of the AIT policy. 
With net fiscal transfers, trade openness and other control measures endogenous in the 
model, a number of refinements are introduced in the estimation methods in order to 
increase the reliability of our econometric estimates. In particular, the difference and 
system GMM estimators play important roles in the modeling process – under a Canada-
US sub-national panel data environment.  
 
Chapter 4 aims at contributing to the debate on economic diversity, resource curse and 
economic growth across Canadian and US jurisdictions by using the most recent 
techniques of DPD models. While some see economic diversification as a long-term 
economic growth strategy that can help mitigate unforeseen problems in the event of 
structural economic changes, others argue otherwise. Economic diversification has long 
been believed to be the cure to the resource curse challenge. While the benefits of 
diversification as well as the importance of key economic, demographic, geographic and 
institutional factors that explain it remain widely acknowledged, explaining the specific 
reasons why diversification helps some economies to succeed where others fail remain a 
mirage. Most empirical investigations of the diversification-growth relationship provide 
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inconclusive evidence, leaving the question open. Most econometric studies provide weak 
evidence, mainly because results depend largely on the parameters of interest.  
 
Resource curse pioneers argue that an indirect consequence of natural wealth is the 
resource curse. Contemporary evidence on the curse yields a conundrum; most recent 
studies conclude that the transmission mechanism of the curse is more important. A major 
motivation for this chapter lies on the need to take a closer look at the twin issues of 
diversification and the resource curse from a regional growth perspective. 
5.2 Thesis Objectives 
Below are the central objectives of chapter 2: 
 
Ours is the first chapter to use a Canada-US regional panel data framework to jointly test 
an extended gravity model, incorporating factor endowments and per capita income 
differentials. These additional variables allow us to test the Heckscher-Ohlin proposition-
type factor endowment differences and Linder hypothesis-style taste differences, 
respectively.  
 
The second goal is the attention given, again in a Canada-US panel data environment, to 
the following three econometric problems: unobserved heterogeneity, log-linearization of 
the gravity equation in the presence of heteroscedasticity, and logarithmic estimation of 
zero trade flows. Most previous studies that jointly addressed these three issues did so 
using a cross-country framework. The other few that considered them with regional data 
did so either individually for Canada or the US, but not for regions in both countries 
together.  
 
This chapter provides updated results and garners further evidence in support of the home 
bias argument. Both international and within-country border effects are estimated, with 





The central objectives of chapter 3 are: 
 
To use a dynamic panel of Canada-US data selected over three-year periods to estimate 
the importance of redistributive flows by regressions based on the ratio of personal 
income after federal taxes and transfers, and pretax personal income. This gives a direct 
measure of the degree to which fiscal transfers reduce inequalities in regional incomes.  
 
To empirically evaluate the impact of the Canadian AIT policy on income growth, while 
controlling for fiscal federalism. This analysis is extended by applying the DiD 
methodology to better capture the effect of the policy.  
 
To account for the endogenous nature of net fiscal transfers, trade openness and other 
control measures in the model. Applying both system and difference GMM estimation 
techniques that eliminate biases associated with omitted variables, endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity within a regional income framework is a major advance.   
 
To provide updated results with Canada-US sub-national data on the fiscal transfers-
growth discussion, under different fiscal policy measures and scenarios. 
 
To provide updated results with Canada-US sub-national data on the impacts of trade 
openness, educational attainment and physical capital stock on economic growth. 
 
The central objectives of chapter 4 are: 
 
To contribute to the debate on economic diversity, resource curse and economic growth 
across Canadian provinces and US states by using the most recent techniques of DPD 
models.  
 
To closely examine the robustness of five major economic diversity indices to GDP- and 
employment-based measures, as well as the relationship between economic 
diversification and growth over the 1987-2010 period.  
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To employ an empirical growth model to explain growth in real per capita income at the 
US state and Canadian provincial level as a function of natural resources and a set of 
variables drawn from the existing literature.  
 
To look at the twin issues of diversification and the resource curse, with special attention 
on economic diversity as the transmission channel of the curse. 
 
5.3 Summary of Empirical Findings 
5.3.1 Gravity Model 
Summarized, the following five principal hypotheses are advanced under chapter 2: 
 
H1: There is a positive effect of economic size on bilateral trade flows between 
trading partners.  
H2: There is a negative effect of geographical distance on bilateral trade flows 
between trading partners. 
H3: There is a stronger negative effect of the border on state-province trade, 
compared to interstate and interprovincial trade.  
H4: There is a stronger negative effect of the border on interprovincial trade, 
compared to interstate trade  
H5: There is a positive relationship between factor endowment differentials and 
bilateral trade flows.  
H6: There is a negative relationship between per capita income differentials and 
bilateral trade flows.  
 
To recap, our findings in chapter 2 are presented below:   
 
The coefficients of exporter’s GDP and importer’s GDP are approximately equal 
to 1 with OLS and FGLS, and about 2 for PPML. The fixed effects results show 




In the truncated zeros sample, the estimated effect of distance on trade flows is the 
same for OLS and FGLS at -1.077. We conclude that bilateral distance reduces 
trade by 1.1% for every percentage increase in the distance itself. Across the 
board, the PPML method has the highest effect at -1.761 when zero bilateral trade 
flows are retained. This is followed by OLS at -1.237 when zero trade flows are 
replaced. 
 
Generally speaking, the income elasticity of trade is close to the theoretical value 
of 1, with the coefficients of exporter’s GDP much higher than for importer’s 
GDP. A 1% increase in exporter’s GDP is associated with an increase in bilateral 
trade flows of 0.4%; a 1% increase in importer’s GDP will increase trade by 0.6%.   
 
The FEM finds modest effects on trade from economic sizes and distances. A 1% 
increase in exporter’s GDP is associated with an increase in bilateral trade flows 
of 0.4%. Likewise, a 1% increase in importer’s GDP will increase trade by 0.6%, 
compared to 1.2% for exporter’s GDP and importer’s GDP using the baseline 
technique.  
 
The lower estimates of the FEM, compared to other estimators shows a tradeoff: 
fixed effects account for multilateral resistance. Again, this confirms that 
unobserved heterogeneity does have a huge impact on the results of gravity model 
estimates.  
 
The hypotheses on the positive effect of economic size on bilateral trade, and the 
negative effect of distance on bilateral trade, are strongly supported. We notice 
that compared to other international gravity trade studies, the point estimate of the 
distance variable is somewhat large. One reason is adduced: the fact that most of 
North American trade goes by air and land, compared to most global trade which 
is transported by water. That is in addition to the fact that water transport is much 




Subsamples results are generally comparable with those based on the full sample, 
in terms of statistical and economic significance of coefficients. The log of 
exporter’s GDP, log of importer’s GDP and log of bilateral distance each has a 
coefficient estimate of 1.330, 1.067 and -1.657 in the baseline model, compared 
with 0.962, 0.938, and -0.875 for US-US trade and 1.010, 0.823 and -1.249 for 
Canada-Canada trade.   
 
Most notably, the point estimate of importer’s GDP for the Canada-Canada 
sample turns out to be negative when estimated with the FEM, though it is not 
statistically significantly. Also, the distance effect is higher for interprovincial 
trade than interstate trade. We attribute this to the higher population density in the 
US, compared to Canada. 
 
Our results lend support to the hypothesis that jurisdictions that share a common 
border tend to trade more. Generally speaking, it is established that the extent to 
which the presence of a border affects the intensities of economic exchange 
between a jurisdiction-pair, after controlling for bilateral distance, turns out to be 
more pronounced under the PPML than when OLS is used.  
 
The presence of a border between two jurisdictions in the sample increases 
bilateral trade flows by 38%, 111% and 38% for the OLS, PPML and FGLS 
techniques, respectively. Similar to the marginal effect for the distance variable, 
the estimated border effect is exactly the same under OLS and FGLS.  
 
The estimated coefficients of 0.299 for state-province trade and 0.362 for state-
state are highly significant, statistically and economically, and support the 
hypothesis that there is a negative effect of the border on bilateral trade flows, 
with a stronger negative effect expected on state-province trade, compared to 
interstate trade. We conclude that sharing a common border has a greater 




We establish interstate, international and interprovincial border effects of  43.5%, 
33.6% and 1.92%, respectively. Compared to McCallum’s 22-to-1, we establish a 
border effect of 17-to-1 (i.e. 33.6%-to-1.92%) for interprovincial trade. After 
controlling for scale and distance, interprovincial trade is about 17 times more 
important than international trade.  
 
This chapter lends further support to Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (2000b) home bias 
puzzle in international macroeconomics. Our results present new estimates for the 
Canada-US border effect.  
 
Equally, we establish a border effect of roughly 1-to-1 (i.e. 33.6%-to-43.5%) for 
interstate trade –compared to Anderson van Wincoop’s 1.6.  The relatively small 
interstate border effect is attributed to the smallness in size of the Canadian 
economy, compared to the US.  
 
Based on the PPML and OLS techniques, distance effects of 1.44 and 1.20 
kilometers are estimated, respectively. We conclude that the estimated distance 
effects are not significantly different from the average bilateral distance value. 
This confirms that the unrealistically high distance elasticities in our regressions 
do not help the predictive powers of the methods deployed. 
 
The Linder hypothesis is supported, while the Heckscher-Ohlin factor endowment 
proposition is refuted. It is expected that a 100% increase in per capita income 
differential will dampen trade by 7.5% and 19.4% for the low and high estimates, 
respectively.  In stark comparison, negative signs on the coefficients of both the 
human capital differential and physical capital stock differential refute the 
Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis that jurisdictions should trade more, the more 
different their factor endowments. Similar to the Linder scenario, the Heckscher-
Ohlin coefficients are economically and statistically significant, ranging from a 




5.3.2 Fiscal Transfers 
We advance the following five principal hypotheses: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between net fiscal transfers and GDP per 
capita.  
H2: There is a different impact of fiscal flows on GDP per capita for prosperous 
and poor regions. 
H3: There is a stronger effect of fiscal transfers and lagged income on GDP per 
capita, compared to the lone effect of fiscal transfers. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between trade openness and GDP per capita 
H5: The combined effect of lagged income and trade openness on GDP per capita 
is much stronger than the individual effect of trade openness on GDP per capita. 
H6: There is a positive relationship between the AIT policy and GDP per capita. 
H7: The combined effect of lagged income and the AIT policy on GDP per capita 
is much stronger than the individual effect of the policy on GDP per capita. 
 
To recap, our findings under chapter 3 are presented below:   
 
The US state of Connecticut with -14.2% net fiscal transfers (NFT) and -4.5% 
relative NFT (RNFT), and the Canadian province of Alberta with (-17.3% NFT 
and -5.7% RNFT) are the highest net contributors to the fiscal redistributive 
regimes in their respective countries for the 2008-2010 period.  
 
Likewise, Tennessee (-6.9% NFT and 3.7% RNFT) and the Atlantic province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (-2.4% NFT and 11.3% RNFT) are the highest net 
recipients.  
 
Newfoundland, the Canadian province with the highest net fiscal receipts, 
received more than its US equivalent, Tennessee, both in absolute and relative 
terms. The converse is true for Alberta and Connecticut: the former contributed 
more than the latter both in absolute and relative terms. This Gumbel-type 
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distribution, with extreme values in both directions, underscores the relative 
pointedness of the intergovernmental fiscal policy in Canada, compared to the US. 
 
The US state of Louisiana and the Canadian province of New Brunswick each 
emerges the top candidate in terms of regional economic openness at 17.5% and 
40.5%, respectively. Hawaii and Nova Scotia, at 1.1% and 13.3%, are the least 
open economies. This finding is consistent with a large body of literature on both 
the determinants of country size and trade openness – which suggests that 
generally speaking, smaller countries tend to have more open trade policies.   
 
For the largest and least capital intensive regional economies, we find 318% and 
60% capital stock differential (as a share of output) respectively. Similarly, 
educational attainment at 38.5% and 7.3% for the highest- and lowest-achieving 
jurisdictions corroborates the finding on capital stock, albeit to a lesser degree. 
These results show the high variability in our Canada-US regional sample. 
 
The OLS estimator provides evidence for the negative effect of fiscal transfers on 
per capita income, with estimated coefficient of -1.341 on NFT. Further, the OLS 
estimated coefficient for Yit−1 𝑖𝑠 0.952  , while the FEM returns a coefficient 
value of 0.515. The lower estimate from the FEM is in line with the conclusion of 
Roodman (2009) and Bond (2002) that a credible estimate of the lagged value of 
the dependent variable should lie below 1:00. These coefficients confirm the 
validity of our estimates.   
 
Based on the selected models, our DPD-method produces a coefficient of 0.875 on 
the RNFT variable in specification 4; specification 5 produces a statistically 
insignificant coefficient. In contrast, the non-DPD FEM estimators produce 
statistically significant coefficients ranging from -2.272 to -2.381 for the RNFT-




Based on the FEM, on average, net fiscal transfers impede output growth; the 
statistically significant system GMM technique suggests the opposite. We find the 
exact opposite (for both FEM and system GMM) when we model relative 
transfers simply as the ratio of disposable income to personal income – like 
Checherita et al. This shows that the DPD estimators are highly sensitive to the 
particular specification of the model and its instruments. This cautious note guides 
all policy recommendations in this chapter. 
 
The FEM produces -2.467, -2.051, -1.205 and -2.354 for the lagged per capita 
output coefficients for our below-average, above-average, net receiving and net 
contributing jurisdictions, respectively.  This clearly establishes a two-way 
negative impact of net fiscal transfers on real GDP per capita. This is a clear 
incidence of “immiserising growth” (Bhagwati, 1958).  Fiscal transfer has a 
detrimental effect on growth in general; economic growth in receiving 
jurisdictions declines by less than in contributing regions.  
 
The coefficient of the interaction variable between fiscal transfers and lagged per 
capita GDP shows no evidence that lagged income distribution has any effect on 
the intensity of the impact fiscal transfers have on growth. The same conclusion 
applies under the OLS, FEM, difference GMM and system GMM. 
 
All coefficient estimates on trade openness are statistically insignificant. The same 
goes for the interaction term between the lagged dependent variable and the trade 
openness measure. These results support the battery of studies on the inconclusive 
evidence regarding the trade-growth debate.  
 
The AIT dummy is not statistically significant across all specifications. The 
interaction between the lagged dependent variable and the AIT dummy is 
statistically and economically significant under the FEM and system GMM with a 
lag length of five: with coefficient values of 0.290 and -0.183 and 5% and 1% 
statistical significance, respectively. This implies that under FEM, there is 
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evidence of the impact of lagged income on economic growth through the AIT 
policy, while we conclude that the same policy has inhibited growth in a system 
GMM environment.  
 
Results are robust to both the logarithmic and quadratic functional specifications. 
The FEM coefficient estimates for RNFT give -2.376 for the quadratic form and -
2.167 for its logarithmic equivalent. Results provide evidence that net fiscal 
transfers used for regional redistribution impede output growth in the receiving 
regions.   
 
The use of personal current transfer receipts as an alternative measure of net 
transfers produces a somewhat complicated outcome. Only the FEM produces a 
statistically significant coefficient of -0.312 on the RNFT variable, albeit the 
smallest marginal impact of fiscal transfers on output in the entire analysis.  
 
With the fifth and sixth lags used, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
turns out to be insignificant for the Canada-only sample. Combining a lagged 
dependent variable and fixed effects under a small sample implies a short panel 
bias. We conclude that the appropriate remedy here lies in using a static panel 
method to model this part of the study. The model performance across all six 
specification improves drastically for the US-only sample – since this is fairly 
large compared to the Canada-only sample. 
 
5.3.3 Diversity-Resource Curse 
At a high level, the following hypotheses are used to test the research questions in this 
chapter: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between economic diversification and 
economic growth 




H3: The outcome of the interactions between resource abundance and economic 
diversity is the key determinant of the existence, or otherwise, of the resource 
curse. 
 
Our findings are presented below:   
 
In the US, Wyoming (with 1.89 on Entropy, 0.67 on AGV, 0.83 on QGV and 0.18 
on HHI) and North Dakota (1.82 on Entropy, 0.96 on QGV and 0.18 on HHI) 
come first and second, respectively, among the group of the five most diverse 
states. For the five least diverse group,  Nevada (1.62 on Entropy, 0.89 on AGV, 
1.96 on QGV and 0.30 on HHI) and New York (1.61 on Entropy, 0.90 on AGV, 
1.89 on QGV and 0.29 on HHI) are the top two candidates.  
 
For Canada, Saskatchewan emerges as the most diverse province, coming first all 
of the four times it appears under the five most diverse group. Nova Scotia settles 
for the last position, having come last four times under the five least diverse 
group. When all 60 jurisdictions are combined, Saskatchewan and Wyoming 
compete for the first position overall, while Nova Scotia beats Nevada with a 
higher modal number of appearances.  
 
Results on the choice of the most diverse (or least diverse) jurisdiction are based 
on the notion of equiproportional employment share or economic activity. We 
conclude that diversity measures are arbitrary because both the absolute and 
relative specialization measures, on which they are based, are arbitrary. Likewise, 
we agree that results are qualified, to the extent that larger jurisdictions naturally 
tend to be more economically diverse than smaller ones. 
 
The coefficient on for Yit−1  is positive and statistically significant in all cases; this 
confirms that the GMM estimators generally work as expected in estimating the 
coefficient on our dynamic panel's lagged dependent variable in the presence of 




The OLS estimator produces a higher absolute coefficient value for Yit−1, 
compared to the FEM in all five specifications.  OLS coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable (for all five specifications) range from 0.738 (KRUG) to 0.787 
(AGV); the FEM returns 0.272 (QGV) and 0.532(KRUG) in estimated coefficient 
forYit−1.  This finding helps in focusing on the two-step GMM estimator. 
 
In addition to the findings under the FEM and OLS estimators, our GMM strategy 
suggests that economic diversity is associated with increased levels of economic 
growth. Economic diversification is an economic growth strategy that can help 
mitigate unforeseen problems in the event of structural changes in a regional 
economy.   
 
The hypothesis that a higher degree of economic diversity is associated with 
higher GDP per capita is confirmed. We join other researchers who have 
established a positive direct relationship for the diversity-growth nexus (e.g. 
Hackbart and Anderson, 1975; Dissart, 2003; and Pede, 2013). We also improve 
on the work of O’Donoghue (1999) and Pede by using the DPD methodology 
which incorporates the GMM estimation strategy.  
 
The GMM framework does not provide us with predictive power to test the 
resource curse proposition. This is the same with the interactive effect of diversity 
on resources. We rely on the estimates of the KRUG index in the FEM to estimate 
the partial impact of an increase in natural resource abundance on growth, since it 
provides statistically and economically significant coefficients for natural 
resources. 
 
Above 0.209, the marginal contribution of natural resources to economic growth 
is higher for a relatively more diversified regional economy than a less diversified 
one. The reverse is true when our diversity measure based on the Krugman Index 
is below 0.209. This chapter provides clear prediction on the role of economic 




Under the alternative GDP-based diversity measures, our two-step system GMM 
estimation technique shows that coefficients of the lagged dependent variable for 
all five indices are positive, statistically significant and range between 0.555 and 
0.924, compared to the 0.448-0.943 range under the employment-based measures. 
Similar to our finding under the employment-based measures, we conclude that 
economic diversity has a growth-promoting effect. The coefficients on the natural 
resource measure are also not statistically significant here; so are those on the 
interaction of diversity on resources. We therefore do not have evidence on the 
harmful effect of resources on growth. Neither are we able to establish diversity as 
medium of channel of the effect of natural resources on growth. 
 
When all five diversity indices are modelled as strictly exogenous, IV-style, 
regressors, results reveal that diversity is positively related to growth under the 
Entropy index. The coefficients on natural resources and interaction of diversity 
on resources all turn out to be statistically insignificant. Modeling diversity 
indexes as IV-style or GMM-style variables does not significantly change the 
overall results. We also reach the conclusion that the five diversity indices are 
arbitrary and sensitive to the level of industry aggregation used because the 
assumption of equi-proportionality lacks any theoretical justification.   
5.4 Policy Implications 
The results in all three empirical chapters, taken together, have interesting policy 
implications. Deepening economic ties, globalization, border security, shifts in 
technology, intergovernmental fiscal dynamics, demand for natural resources and 
geopolitics continue to shape Canada-US relations.  From our analysis and discussion so 
far, we have no pretention of offering perfect policy solutions to the various issues. As 
always, each challenge must be addressed case by case, with a regional strategy. We 





Our analysis in chapter 2 shows that interstate, interprovincial and state-province borders 
represent large barriers to trade flows, since they impede the integration of markets, with 
negative welfare consequences.  Policy implications specific to chapter 2 are presented 
below: 
 
We conclude that there is a stronger negative effect of the border on 
interprovincial trade, compared to interstate trade. This has huge policy 
implications for Canada.  The share of trade in the Canadian economy has risen 
over the decades. Trade increased by 34 percentage points during the 1990s, and 
especially with NAFTA execution, which eliminated many trade-dampening tariff 
barriers between Canada and its two important trading partners—Mexico and the 
US. Any further reductions in US-Canada trade barriers will benefit Canada more 
disproportionately.  
 
In theory, it is to Canada’s advantage to continue to favour policies focused on 
furthering such integration. However, this is far from reality. For instance, 
statistics from Canadian and US border agencies show that 15 years of post-9/11 
border innovations have not brought down the costs associated with border 
crossing significantly. In addition, border security-related public expenditures 
have gone up remarkably since the 9/11 attacks. This is not surprising because 
addressing the challenges related to border thickening come at a cost. In 
recognition of the huge costs attributable to border thickening, the Canadian and 
US governments issued a joint declaration in 2011 tagged, “Beyond the Border: A 
Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness”. This 
policy is geared towards addressing the trade-off involving border security and 
trade relations.  
 
According to Moens and Gabler (2012), while the US is more concerned about 
security threats emanating from Canada, the Canadian authorities are more 
concerned about the impact of bilateral trade dampening-border security measures 
from the Americans. Such asymmetric policy preferences require cautious 
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treatment by the concerned authorities. Closely related to this is the notion that 
Canada needs to reduce its reliance on bilateral trade with the US, at the expense 
of multilateral trade with other regions of the world. Premised on the expectation 
of economic growth outside of North America, Helliwell (2002) argues that 
increasing the intensity of Canada-US economic exchanges may dampen 
Canada’s ability to pursue independent economic and social policies. A good 
policy example here is the contentious Canada-US softwood lumber trade dispute.  
Nurturing and sustaining Canada–US economic relations is one of the most 
fundamental foreign policy objectives of any Canadian leader. This is 
understandable given the importance of a healthy relationship to Canadian 
prosperity; however, the asymmetry in the influence level is a source of economic 
tension. While economic shocks emanating from the US have significant impacts 
on Canada, the reverse is not true. Further eliminating border-related trade barriers 
between both countries is therefore key to generating further opportunities for 
trade. Canada needs to continue to take advantage of the increased importance that 
the U.S. attaches to border issues to negotiate beneficial trade deals. 
 
Advances in technology and communications continue to help deepen trade and 
the intensity of economic exchanges; Canada and the US are no exception. The 
increasingly globalized market continues to provide incentives for exchanges of 
people, capital, goods, services and knowledge across borders. The direct 
implication of this is that international technology spillovers are key to increasing 
trade, enhancing productivity and raising welfare. As discussed under the review 
of literature, Canada has historically had a large gap in the level of technology per 
capita relative to the US. A study by Sharpe and Andrews (2012) concludes that 
nominal ICT investment growth in Canada in 2010 was 3.1 per cent, while the US 
had 7.1 per cent. To the extent that the Canadian and US authorities continue to 
carefully manage existing cross-border policy trade-offs for optimal results, north-





Results in chapter 2 refute the Heckscher-Ohlin proposition that jurisdictions 
should trade more, the more different their factor endowments. The international 
trade literature agrees that empirically translating the Heckscher-Ohlin theory into 
a testable form is difficult. The World Trade Organization in its 2008 review 
concluded that most of the researchers that empirically tested the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model used inappropriate methods, with irrelevant outcomes. Added to that, using 
exporter’s GDP and importer’s GDP as proxies for size in the gravity specification 
may be understating the obvious for trade flows between bilateral pairs that trade 
significantly on intermediate goods. With constant changes in the role of vertical 
specialization, using GDP as the proxy for size will possibly erode the explanatory 
power for a country-pair like Canada-US where value-chain trade is increasingly 
more important than customs-based merchandise trade – which does not capture 
well US-Canada’s broader participation in bilateral value chains. Thus, evidence-
based prediction consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin proposition that suggests 
skills, natural and physical capital determine welfare impacts of trade policy is not 
within our reach. Nonetheless, our specified model supports the argument that 
technological differences and home bias and relative factor abundance are all vital 
ingredients for sound trade policy analysis. 
Policy implications from chapter 3 are presented below: 
 
One of the major goals of fiscal transfers from central governments is to promote 
equalization of basic public services through narrowing of fiscal disparities across 
the various sub-national regions. We garner support for two propositions in this 
chapter: (i) relative net fiscal transfers as an alternative measure of fiscal transfers 
and (ii) the relative importance of fiscal capacity in both countries’ 
intergovernmental fiscal policy. By implication, therefore, the design and 
implementation of intergovernmental transfer payments will create incentives that 
have, according to Shah (2006), “strong implications for national, regional, and 
local fiscal management; macroeconomic stability; distributional equity; 




Another interesting result is that the Canadian province with the highest net 
transfers received more than its US equivalent both in absolute and relative terms. 
The converse is true. This Gumbel-type distribution, with extreme values in both 
directions, underscores the relative pointedness of the intergovernmental fiscal 
policy in Canada, compared to the US. Without over flogging issues, balancing 
both the fairness and efficiency arguments are important in any intergovernmental 
fiscal regime. It is no surprise therefore that fiscal equalization is a major 
component of any serious fiscal union, to the extent that it is purely unconditional. 
The US should take a cue from this; it remains perhaps the world’s only 
developed federalist nation with no federal equalization policy to address sub-
national fiscal disparities. Like Canada, this country can adopt an Equalization 
policy with a sound legislative framework that guides and determines the 
appropriate level fiscal capacity and fiscal need. This will present a better 
alternative to the complex and highly politicized Grants-in-Aid model. 
 
Our results on fiscal transfers reveal a clear incidence of immiserising growth. A 
major policy implication is that while regional fiscal disparity may be bad for 
growth, policy designs that focus on taxes and transfers may even cause more 
harm than good. Drawing specific conclusions on the negative effect of 
redistributive policies is indeed a dilemma. As pointed out by Okun (1975) in his 
popular book, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff, economic efficiency is 
achieved at a cost: inequalities in income and wealth. Okun underscores, yet 
again, the trade-off facing policy makers: a clear choice between an efficient 
economy or an egalitarian society. This implies that certain economic policies 
designed to reduce regional fiscal disparities may end up producing weakened 
economic efficiency as unintended consequence – due to negative production 
incentives.  
 
The dynamics of the inequality-redistribution-growth nexus can often assume 
varying degrees of complexity. Policy makers need to first unbundle the different 
components of a redistributive fiscal policy and weigh carefully the pros and cons 
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of each specific component, before making a decision on the optimal 
redistributive policy for a regional economy.  
 
Policy implications specific to chapter 4 are presented below: 
 
Results from the preliminary analysis section show that all five indices are quite 
arbitrary because both the absolute and relative specialization measures are 
arbitrary. This has immense policy implications, particularly in economic 
development. Regional economic diversification policies are often based on the 
changing the structure of a regional economy.  In a way, this challenges the 
conventional wisdom that increasing regional economic diversity is a recipe for 
economic prosperity. To the extent that diversification is the outcome of structural 
transformation, a dynamic reallocation of resources from less productive to more 
productive sectors may provide greater potential for productivity gains. While it is 
okay for policymakers to focus on diversification as a regional economic 
development policy goal, further and indiscriminate diversity of employment 
should be pursued with discretion as inherent regional diversity may be a potent 
tool, in itself, that can help offset the risks from dependence on one or a few 
industries. 
 
Our analysis in chapter 4 also reveals, through the QGV specification, the growth 
promoting stance of economic diversity; this led us to conclude that economic 
diversity is associated with increased levels of economic growth.  This has 
practical implications for how diversified economies influence the growth of 
leading industry sectors and vice versa. This also speaks to the fact that diversified 
economies support and sustain growth through various industry lifecycles. For 
instance, we established earlier in chapter 4 that larger regional economies tend to 
be more economically diversified than smaller, remote centres. Policy makers 
need to be cognizant of the fact that while industry specialization can lead to 
clustering, dependence on a limited number of industries in rural or remote 
regions can produce detrimental economic outcomes. This brings to the forefront 
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the need to constantly invest in innovation and competitiveness through 
infrastructure, technology and human capital. 
 
Last but not least, we find that above the 0.209 diversity threshold, the marginal 
contribution of natural resources to economic growth is higher for a relatively 
more diversified regional economy than a less diversified one. The direct policy 
implication here is that unlike its counterparts without natural resources, 
governments of resource-endowed regions may be indirectly faced with incentives 
to pursue growth-deterring policies. This is because resource endowments mean 
citizens expect much more from their leaders, and these leaders are in turn under a 
lot of pressure. They may end up pursuing policies that crowd out investment and 
allocate productive resources away from more profitable sectors, with diminishing 
marginal returns that impact inefficiently on the economy. 
5.5 Research Limitations 
Our gravity analysis in chapter 2 is based on annual panel data set covering all 10 
Canadian provinces and 50 US states for 1997, 2002 and 2007. The bilateral trade data 
come from three sources: (i) interprovincial trade data from Statistics Canada’s Input-
Output Division (ii) interstate trade data from the US Census Bureau’s Commodity Flow 
Survey and (iii) state-province data from Industry Canada’s Trade Data Online. 
Considering that our analysis is based on five yearly intervals, the most recent interstate 
and interprovincial trade data are for 2012, with the former released in December 2014 
and the latter in November 2015. Such non-availability restricts the ability of the study to 
capture recent dynamics in Canada-US trade relations. In the words of Baldwin (2009), 
“World trade experienced a sudden, severe and synchronized collapse in late 2008 – the 
sharpest in recorded history and deepest since WWII”. Exclusion of 2008 -2012 data 
implies that we miss capturing the dynamics of the 2008-2009 great trade collapse and the 
aftermath of the recovery. 
 
We admit under chapter 2 that for the economic size and trade cost effects predicted by 
the gravity model, one has to be careful interpreting the economic size effect as it is 
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perfectly plausible that the causation runs in the opposite direction – in which case a 
higher level of trade flows increases GDP. While the DPD framework would allow the 
lags of variables to be used as instruments, the challenge with this method is that PPML 
and related methods cannot then be used. This is a trade-off that we accept; a more 
thorough treatment of it is not pursued in order to focus on the other more critical gravity-
specific estimation issues outlined. 
 
The estimation under chapter 3 defines net fiscal transfers as the ratio of personal income 
after federal taxes and transfers to pretax personal income. This gives a direct measure of 
the degree to which fiscal transfers impact on inequalities in regional incomes. Personal 
current transfer receipt is also used as an alternative measure. The lack of comparable 
fiscal transfers data between all 10 provinces and 50 states implies that vital information 
on intergovernmental fiscal transfers – e.g. Equalization payments –are not captured. This 
is a major limitation.  
 
Furthermore, our trade openness measure is narrowed down to the ratio of exports to 
GDP as discussed under data constraints. This constitutes a major restriction on the 
predictive ability of the specified model. 
 
As discussed, the notion of equiproportional employment share or economic activity is 
problematic to the extent that the indices are sensitive to the level of industry aggregation. 
The diversity indices are based on 10 industry sectors; the five indices are going to be 
sensitive to this level of industry aggregation. Such relatively highly aggregated nature of 
our data does not allow for much diversity to be picked up. To attempt to move to higher 
aggregation level is to risk the deletion, from our sample, data points that are suppressed 
to meet confidentiality requirements. This will limit the applicability and interpretation of 








5.6 Directions for Future Research 
Among other things, the central ideas of each chapter and the main objective of the thesis 
can be extended in a number of directions. First, it is hoped that a single unified 
framework that incorporates all the major issues can be constructed to help provide better 
insights. 
 
As stated under chapter 2, our point estimates of the distance variable under the different 
estimators are unnecessarily large, compared to other international studies. This, in turn, 
affects our estimate of the width of the Canada-US border in that chapter. McCallum 
(1995) opines that high distance elasticity of trade may be because most North American 
trade goes by air and land, compared to most global trade which is transported by water. 
Also, water transport is much cheaper than other modes of transport.   
 
Clearly, among many of the factors that shape bilateral trade flows, transport costs 
constitute a major one. Canada-US sub-national transport costs data are more difficult to 
come by compared to geographic information data such as the bilateral distance between 
capital cities in both countries. This explains the choice of distance as the proxy for 
transport costs in this thesis. Apart from distance, to the extent that other transport cost 
drivers – e.g. fuel costs and transport technology – influence not just the volume of trade, 
but also the pattern and modal choice, it is important to appropriately model  these for 
robust trade policy analysis. We hope this will be looked into by future researchers. 
 
As mentioned earlier, only data on trade in goods are available; trade in services is not 
included in our estimation. The notion of Canada-US merchandise trade representing 
bilateral trade flows is nothing but simplification of reality. Also, to the extent that 
Canada-US trade is largely focused on intermediates, the use of GDP as a determinant of 
trade flows may be inadequate. Predicted results may be influenced by such simplifying 
assumptions. As a suggestion, further research should consider using the DPD framework 
– with the Heckscher-Ohlin and Linder hypotheses included – to perform a Blinder-
Oaxaca nonlinear type decomposition to filter the Canada-US border effects into 




As clearly stated in chapter 3, US states were not party to the AIT policy; this provides a 
good opportunity to leverage an important capability of the DiD strategy in estimating the 
coefficient of the AIT dummy. However, we also recognize that the timing of the signing 
of AIT may be correlated with other economically significant developments in Canada. 
This coincidence is expected to obscure any measure of the extent to which the AIT 
policy has influenced income convergence in Canada. To draw any meaningful 
conclusions from the estimates, it is important to get Mexico-US and Canada-Mexico 
sub-national export and import data. With the Canada-Mexico portion of the data partly 
available, and the Mexico-US part totally unavailable, it is recommended for future 
researchers in this area to look into this. 
 
Any meaningful policy recommendation on increased trade openness must recognize the 
equally important nature of imports and exports. Due to constraints on data availability, 
our analysis on trade openness in chapter 2 is based on exports only; imports are 
excluded. While exports are generally known to be beneficial for economic prosperity, 
imports also provide, among other things, a veritable opportunity to access foreign 
intermediate inputs that can increase firms’ competitiveness and profits. Again, future 
research in this area must look for ways to fill this lacuna. 
 
As observed in this study, inequality is a major determinant of growth, even after 
controlling for redistributive fiscal transfers.  Addressing economic growth concerns 
using fiscal redistribution as a policy tool, under the assumption that regional inequality 
will take care of itself in the process, will likely result in immiserising growth as 
established in this study. It is therefore necessary to employ an econometric framework 
with the ability to simultaneously model the impacts of redistributive fiscal transfers and 
regional inequality on economic growth, while also disentangling the various components 
and channels of the individual issues.  This will be a major contribution to the sub-




According to Wagner (2000), it is important to account for spatial autocorrelation effects 
among regions because such interdependency is very important in explaining any link 
between diversity and growth and instability. Pede (2013) equally concludes that spatial 
econometrics provides a framework for the true factors at the origin of spillovers to be 
modelled by geographical distance. We therefore recommend that future work on the 
diversity-resource-institution-growth nexus should consider applying spatial econometric 
techniques. Among other things, this strategy will add robustness by offering a basis for 


























Appendices to Chapter 2 
Appendix 2.1: Capital Cities of All 60 Jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction Capital City Jurisdiction Capital City 
Alberta Edmonton Massachusetts Boston 
British Columbia Victoria Michigan Lansing 
Manitoba  Winnipeg Minnesota Saint Paul 
New Brunswick Fredericton Mississippi Jackson 
Newfoundland & Labrador St. John's Missouri Jefferson City 
Nova Scotia Halifax Montana Helena 
Ontario Toronto Nebraska Lincoln 
Prince Edward Island Charlottetown Nevada Carson City 
Quebec Quebec City New Hampshire Concord 
Saskatchewan Regina New Jersey Trenton 
Alabama Montgomery New Mexico Santa Fe 
Alaska Juneau New York Albany 
Arizona Phoenix North Carolina Raleigh 
Arkansas Little Rock North Dakota Bismarck 
California Sacramento Ohio Columbus 
Colorado Denver Oklahoma Oklahom City 
Connecticut Hartford Oregon Salem 
Delaware Dover Pennsylvania Harrisburg 
Florida Tallahassee Rhode Island Providence 
Georgia Atlanta South Carolina Columbia 
Hawaii Honolulu South Dakota Pierre 
Idaho Boise Tennessee Nashville 
Illinois Springfield Texas Austin 
Indiana Indianapolis Utah Salt Lake City 
Iowa Des Moines Vermont Montpelier 
Kansas Topeka Virginia Richmond 
Kentucky Frankfort Washington Olympia 
Louisiana Baton Rouge West Virginia Charleston 
Maine Augusta Wisconsin Madison 
Maryland Annapolis Wyoming Cheyenne 
Notes: Among many factors that shape bilateral trade flows, transport costs constitute a major one. Canada-US sub-national transport 
costs data are more difficult to come by compared to geographic information data such as the bilateral distance between capital cities 
in both countries. This explains our choice of distance as the proxy for transport costs. Data on road distances are measured in 
kilometers based on the capital city of each jurisdiction, and are obtained from the distance data website which uses Google Maps: 
http: www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/howfar.htm. In addition to Google Maps, this site incorporates a supplementary list of cities 
from around the world to find the latitude and longitude of the two jurisdictions.  
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Appendix 2.2: Jurisdictions with Zero Trade Flows 
Year Trade Flow Type Exporter Importer 
1997 Export Alaska Nevada 
1997 Export Alaska Ohio 
1997 Export Alaska South Carolina 
1997 Export Alaska South Dakota 
1997 Export Alaska West Virginia 
1997 Export Delaware Hawaii 
1997 Export Hawaii Nebraska 
1997 Export Hawaii New Hampshire 
1997 Export Hawaii New Mexico 
1997 Export Hawaii Rhode Island 
1997 Export Hawaii West Virginia 
1997 Export Wyoming Hawaii 
1997 Import Hawaii Delaware 
1997 Import Hawaii Wyoming 
1997 Import Nebraska Hawaii 
1997 Import Nevada Alaska 
1997 Import New Hampshire Hawaii 
1997 Import New Mexico Hawaii 
1997 Import Ohio Alaska 
1997 Import Rhode Island Hawaii 
1997 Import South Carolina Alaska 
1997 Import South Dakota Alaska 
1997 Import West Virginia Alaska 
1997 Import West Virginia Hawaii 
2002 Export Alaska Delaware 
2002 Export Alaska Iowa 
2002 Export Alaska Maryland 
2002 Export Alaska Nebraska 
2002 Export Alaska New Hampshire 
2002 Export Alaska North Dakota 
2002 Export Alaska West Virginia 
2002 Export Hawaii Maine 
2002 Export Hawaii Massachusetts 
2002 Export Hawaii Montana 
2002 Export Hawaii South Dakota 
2002 Import Delaware Alaska 
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2002 Import Iowa Alaska 
2002 Import Maine Hawaii 
2002 Import Maryland Alaska 
2002 Import Massachusetts Hawaii 
2002 Import Montana Hawaii 
2002 Import Nebraska Alaska 
2002 Import New Hampshire Alaska 
2002 Import North Dakota Alaska 
2002 Import South Dakota Hawaii 
2002 Import West Virginia Alaska 
2007 Export Alaska Maine 
2007 Export Alaska South Carolina 
2007 Export Hawaii Idaho 
2007 Export Hawaii Indiana 
2007 Export Hawaii Montana 
Notes: The presence of zero trade flows in our data poses a major estimation issue. While the Newtonian 
gravitational force between two masses can be very small, but never zero, it is the case that our sample 
features zero bilateral trade flows between many jurisdiction-pairs. In the presence of such zeros, the use of 
logarithmic transformation for the dependent variable poses a problem since the logarithm of zero is 
undefined. Appendix 2 shows these jurisdiction-pairs and the corresponding years. 
 
Appendices to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1: Properties of Estimators 
Property OLS FEM GMM 
Unobserved Heterogeneity No Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No Yes 
Dynamic Panel Data No No Yes 
Second Order Serial Correlation Yes Yes No 
Note: Compared to the difference GMM, we use the system GMM extensively because it allows us to 
capture the full effect of the various policy changes modeled. Unlike the difference GMM, the system 






Appendix 3.2: Relative Income and Transfers (2007-2010 Average) 
Jurisdiction RRGDP (%) RGDP($'000) RNFT (%) NFT (%) 
Alabama 76.5 36.4 2.0 -8.4 
Alaska               145.1 68.8 2.0 -8.4 
Arizona              83.4 39.6 2.1 -8.3 
Arkansas             75.0 35.6 1.7 -8.7 
California           111.2 52.8 -1.2 -11.3 
Colorado             107.0 50.8 -0.3 -10.4 
Connecticut          136.9 65.0 -4.5 -14.2 
Delaware             131.8 62.6 -0.2 -10.4 
Florida              83.3 39.6 2.2 -8.3 
Georgia              90.2 42.8 0.9 -9.4 
Hawaii               104.2 49.5 1.2 -9.1 
Idaho                74.9 35.6 1.8 -8.6 
Illinois             107.0 50.8 -0.3 -10.4 
Indiana              89.6 42.6 0.7 -9.5 
Iowa                 96.5 45.8 1.4 -8.9 
Kansas               93.0 44.2 0.6 -9.7 
Kentucky             78.5 37.3 0.9 -9.4 
Louisiana            99.7 47.3 1.8 -8.5 
Maine                80.8 38.4 1.0 -9.3 
Maryland             112.6 53.4 -1.6 -11.7 
Massachusetts        125.8 59.8 -2.8 -12.7 
Michigan             81.5 38.7 1.0 -9.3 
Minnesota            106.3 50.5 -1.2 -11.2 
Mississippi          66.8 31.7 3.1 -7.4 
Missouri             89.3 42.4 0.9 -9.4 
Montana              77.4 36.8 0.9 -9.4 
Nebraska             102.3 48.6 1.3 -9.1 
Nevada               96.5 45.9 1.7 -8.6 
New Hampshire        98.5 46.7 1.6 -8.8 
New Jersey           118.6 56.3 -1.9 -11.9 
New Mexico           84.0 39.9 2.4 -8.1 
New York             125.3 59.5 -4.1 -13.9 
North Carolina       92.6 44.0 0.7 -9.6 
North Dakota         103.0 48.9 1.6 -8.8 
Ohio                 89.4 42.4 0.1 -10.1 
Oklahoma             82.5 39.2 1.7 -8.7 
Oregon               102.1 48.5 -0.5 -10.7 
Pennsylvania         95.6 45.4 -0.2 -10.4 
Rhode Island         96.6 45.9 0.5 -9.7 
South Carolina       75.5 35.9 2.1 -8.3 
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South Dakota         96.6 45.9 3.6 -7.0 
Tennessee            84.3 40.0 3.7 -6.9 
Texas                100.4 47.7 2.2 -8.2 
Utah                 89.3 42.4 1.1 -9.2 
Vermont              87.0 41.3 1.2 -9.1 
Virginia             109.7 52.1 -1.0 -11.1 
Washington           112.7 53.5 2.2 -8.2 
West Virginia        72.7 34.5 1.2 -9.1 
Wisconsin            93.1 44.2 0.0 -10.2 
Wyoming              143.0 67.9 1.0 -9.3 
Newfoundland 115.6 50.4 11.3 -2.4 
Prince Edward 71.8 31.3 11.2 -2.5 
Nova Scotia 79.9 34.8 5.6 -7.4 
New Brunswick 80.1 34.9 8.8 -4.6 
Quebec 85.2 37.1 1.5 -11.0 
Ontario 97.2 42.3 -0.7 -12.9 
Manitoba 91.1 39.7 2.1 -10.5 
Saskatchewan 111.9 48.8 2.1 -10.5 
Alberta 151.6 66.1 -5.7 -17.3 
British Columbia 96.0 41.8 1.4 -11.1 
 
Appendix 3 shows relative real per capita GDP (RRGDP), relative net fiscal transfers (RNFT), real per 
capita GDP (RGDP) and net fiscal transfers (NFT) – based on the 2008-2010 average; sorted on RRGDP. 
In a way, this gives a picture of how fiscal flows support the relative income of poor regions and reduce that 
of rich regions.                                      
Appendix 3.3: Below-Average Jurisdictions (Full Sample) 
Year Jurisdiction RNFT (%) 
 
Year Jurisdiction RNFT (%) 
1995 Newfoundland 20.3 
 
2007 West Virginia        2.2 
1998 Newfoundland 19.1 
 
2010 Manitoba 2.1 
1992 Newfoundland 19.1 
 
2010 Arizona              2.1 
1995 Prince Edward 16.7 
 
2010 South Carolina       2.1 
1992 Prince Edward 16.4 
 
1992 Florida              2.1 
2001 Newfoundland 15.9 
 
2001 Florida              2.1 
1998 Prince Edward 15.2 
 
2010 Saskatchewan 2.1 
2001 Prince Edward 14.7 
 
1995 Florida              2.0 
2007 Newfoundland 13.5 
 
1995 New Mexico           2.0 
2004 Newfoundland 13.0 
 
1992 Arkansas             2.0 
2007 Prince Edward 12.3 
 
2007 Iowa                 2.0 
2004 Prince Edward 11.7 
 
1995 West Virginia        2.0 
2001 New Brunswick 11.5 
 
2004 Washington           2.0 
2010 Newfoundland 11.3 
 
2007 Alabama 2.0 
1998 New Brunswick 11.2 
 
1992 Texas                2.0 
1992 New Brunswick 11.2 
 
2010 Alaska               2.0 
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2010 Prince Edward 11.2 
 
2010 Alabama 2.0 
1995 New Brunswick 10.6 
 
2004 Idaho                2.0 
2007 New Brunswick 10.2 
 
2001 Hawaii               2.0 
2004 New Brunswick 10.0 
 
2007 Quebec 1.9 
1998 Nova Scotia 9.5 
 
2001 Arizona              1.9 
1995 Nova Scotia 9.3 
 
2001 Utah                 1.9 
2010 New Brunswick 8.8 
 
1995 Arkansas             1.9 
2001 Nova Scotia 8.1 
 
2010 Louisiana            1.8 
1992 Nova Scotia 7.9 
 
2004 Alabama 1.8 
2007 Nova Scotia 7.2 
 
2010 Idaho                1.8 
2001 Saskatchewan 6.4 
 
1998 Idaho                1.8 
2004 Nova Scotia 6.3 
 
1992 Wyoming              1.8 
1995 Saskatchewan 5.7 
 
2004 West Virginia        1.8 
2010 Nova Scotia 5.6 
 
2004 Arkansas             1.8 
2004 Saskatchewan 5.6 
 
2007 Oklahoma             1.8 
2001 South Dakota         5.3 
 
1998 Iowa                 1.8 
1992 Manitoba 5.0 
 
2004 Iowa                 1.8 
2007 Saskatchewan 5.0 
 
2007 South Carolina       1.8 
2001 Mississippi          4.9 
 
2004 Florida              1.8 
1998 South Dakota         4.8 
 
2004 Wyoming              1.8 
2001 North Dakota         4.7 
 
2007 Nebraska             1.8 
2001 Tennessee            4.7 
 
2007 New Hamp        1.8 
1992 Saskatchewan 4.4 
 
2010 Nevada               1.7 
1998 Saskatchewan 4.4 
 
1998 Oklahoma             1.7 
2004 South Dakota         4.1 
 
1992 West Virginia        1.7 
2007 South Dakota         4.1 
 
1998 Nebraska             1.7 
1998 Mississippi          4.0 
 
2010 Arkansas             1.7 
2001 Manitoba 4.0 
 
1998 Florida              1.7 
1992 South Dakota         4.0 
 
2004 Nebraska             1.7 
2007 Manitoba 4.0 
 
2001 Kentucky             1.7 
1998 North Dakota         3.9 
 
2004 Oklahoma             1.7 
2004 Manitoba 3.9 
 
2001 Kansas               1.7 
2007 Mississippi          3.9 
 
2010 Oklahoma             1.7 
2001 Louisiana            3.8 
 
1995 Wyoming              1.7 
2001 Alaska               3.7 
 
1995 Washington           1.6 
2001 New Mexico           3.7 
 
2004 Montana              1.6 
1995 South Dakota         3.7 
 
2001 Vermont              1.6 
2010 Tennessee            3.7 
 
1998 Hawaii               1.6 
2001 West Virginia        3.6 
 
1998 South Carolina       1.6 
2007 Tennessee            3.6 
 
1998 Maine                1.6 
2010 South Dakota         3.6 
 
1992 New Hamp        1.6 
1992 Mississippi          3.5 
 
2010 North Dakota         1.6 
1998 Tennessee            3.4 
 
2010 New Hamp        1.6 
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2004 Tennessee            3.3 
 
2001 Indiana              1.6 
2001 Alabama 3.3 
 
1992 Alabama 1.6 
1995 Manitoba 3.3 
 
1995 Alaska               1.5 
2001 Arkansas             3.3 
 
1992 Nebraska             1.5 
2010 Mississippi          3.1 
 
2001 Maine                1.5 
1995 Mississippi          3.1 
 
2010 Quebec 1.5 
2004 North Dakota         3.1 
 
1992 Montana              1.5 
2007 North Dakota         3.1 
 
2007 Idaho                1.5 
2004 Mississippi          3.1 
 
1995 Montana              1.5 
2001 Montana              3.0 
 
1995 New Hamp        1.5 
1998 West Virginia        3.0 
 
1995 Alabama 1.5 
2007 Alaska               3.0 
 
2007 Florida              1.5 
2001 Texas                2.9 
 
2004 South Carolina       1.4 
1998 New Mexico           2.9 
 
2010 Iowa                 1.4 
1992 North Dakota         2.8 
 
2001 Missouri             1.4 
1992 Tennessee            2.8 
 
2004 British Colum 1.4 
2001 Iowa                 2.8 
 
1995 Maine                1.4 
2007 Louisiana            2.7 
 
2004 Arizona              1.4 
2001 Oklahoma             2.7 
 
2007 Montana              1.4 
1998 Louisiana            2.7 
 
2007 Arizona              1.4 
1998 Manitoba 2.7 
 
1998 Vermont              1.4 
1998 Arkansas             2.7 
 
2004 New Hamp      1.4 
2007 Texas                2.6 
 
2010 British Colum 1.4 
2004 Alaska               2.6 
 
2001 Nevada               1.3 
1995 Tennessee            2.6 
 
1995 Nebraska             1.3 
1998 Alaska               2.6 
 
1992 Washington           1.3 
1995 North Dakota         2.6 
 
2007 Missouri             1.3 
1995 Louisiana            2.6 
 
1992 Quebec 1.3 
2004 Texas                2.6 
 
1998 Washington           1.3 
2001 South Carolina       2.6 
 
2010 Nebraska             1.3 
1998 Montana              2.5 
 
2007 Maine                1.3 
2007 New Mexico           2.5 
 
1998 Arizona              1.2 
1992 Louisiana            2.5 
 
2010 Hawaii               1.2 
1998 Texas                2.4 
 
1995 Oklahoma             1.2 
2010 New Mexico           2.4 
 
2007 Kentucky             1.2 
2007 Arkansas             2.3 
 
2007 Vermont              1.2 
2001 Nebraska             2.3 
 
2010 West Virginia        1.2 
1998 Alabama 2.3 
 
2010 Vermont              1.2 
2004 Louisiana            2.3 
 
1995 South Carolina       1.2 
2007 Washington           2.3 
 
1995 Arizona              1.1 
1995 Texas                2.2 
 
1992 Arizona              1.1 
2004 New Mexico           2.2 
 
1992 South Carolina       1.1 
2010 Texas                2.2 
 
1998 Quebec 1.1 
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2010 Washington           2.2 
 
1998 New Hamp        1.1 
2001 Idaho                2.2 
 
2004 Utah                 1.1 
1992 New Mexico           2.2 
 
2010 Utah                 1.1 
2010 Florida              2.2 
     
Notes: Our full sample is divided into two, on the basis of the median value of 1.1% for the RNFT variable. 
Jurisdictions with median values above 1.1% are named below-average jurisdictions, while those below are 
tagged above-average jurisdictions.  
 
Appendix 3.4: Above-Average Jurisdictions (Full Sample) 
Year Jurisdiction RNFT (%) 
 
Year Jurisdiction RNFT (%) 
2007 Michigan             1.0 
 
1998 Virginia             -0.3 
2001 North Carolina       1.0 
 
2004 Illinois             -0.3 
2007 Kansas               1.0 
 
1992 Michigan             -0.3 
2001 Wyoming              1.0 
 
2001 Illinois             -0.3 
2010 Wyoming              1.0 
 
1992 Virginia             -0.4 
1992 Maine                1.0 
 
1992 Colorado             -0.4 
1995 Vermont              1.0 
 
1992 California           -0.4 
2010 Michigan             1.0 
 
1998 Ohio                 -0.4 
2004 Kansas               1.0 
 
1992 Ohio                 -0.4 
2004 Vermont              1.0 
 
1995 Virginia             -0.4 
2010 Maine                1.0 
 
2001 Delaware             -0.5 
2010 Montana              0.9 
 
2001 Colorado             -0.5 
2007 Nevada               0.9 
 
2010 Oregon               -0.5 
2007 Wyoming              0.9 
 
2004 Oregon               -0.5 
2010 Missouri             0.9 
 
1992 Illinois             -0.5 
2004 Nevada               0.9 
 
1998 California           -0.5 
2004 Missouri             0.9 
 
2007 Delaware             -0.6 
2001 British Columbia 0.9 
 
2004 Delaware             -0.6 
2010 Georgia              0.9 
 
2007 Oregon               -0.6 
2010 Kentucky             0.9 
 
2001 Minnesota            -0.6 
1998 Utah                 0.9 
 
1995 Ohio                 -0.6 
1992 Alaska               0.8 
 
1992 Wisconsin            -0.6 
1998 Kansas               0.8 
 
2010 Ontario -0.7 
1998 Kentucky             0.8 
 
1998 Illinois             -0.7 
1998 Missouri             0.8 
 
1995 Colorado             -0.7 
1995 Quebec 0.8 
 
1998 Michigan             -0.7 
1992 Idaho                0.8 
 
1995 Illinois             -0.7 
2007 Indiana              0.8 
 
1998 Oregon               -0.7 
2001 Washington           0.8 
 
1998 Colorado             -0.7 
2007 Utah                 0.7 
 
1998 Wisconsin            -0.8 
2010 Indiana              0.7 
 
1992 Oregon               -0.8 
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2004 Maine                0.7 
 
2004 Ohio                 -0.8 
2007 Hawaii               0.7 
 
2007 Virginia             -0.8 
1998 Wyoming              0.7 
 
2004 California           -0.8 
1995 Iowa                 0.7 
 
2007 Minnesota            -0.9 
1998 Nevada               0.7 
 
1995 Michigan             -0.9 
2010 North Carolina       0.7 
 
1995 Wisconsin            -0.9 
2004 Quebec 0.7 
 
1998 British Colum -1.0 
1995 Idaho                0.7 
 
2004 Virginia             -1.0 
1992 Oklahoma             0.7 
 
2001 Virginia             -1.0 
1992 Kansas               0.6 
 
2004 Minnesota            -1.0 
2001 Pennsylvania         0.6 
 
2010 Virginia             -1.0 
1998 Rhode Island         0.6 
 
1992 New Jersey           -1.1 
2001 New Hampshire        0.6 
 
1992 British Colum -1.1 
1995 Kansas               0.6 
 
2010 Minnesota            -1.2 
1992 Missouri             0.6 
 
1992 Hawaii               -1.2 
2010 Kansas               0.6 
 
2010 California           -1.2 
1992 Utah                 0.6 
 
2007 California           -1.3 
1992 Iowa                 0.5 
 
1992 Minnesota            -1.3 
2001 Rhode Island         0.5 
 
1998 New Jersey           -1.3 
2010 Rhode Island         0.5 
 
1995 New Jersey           -1.3 
2007 Georgia              0.5 
 
1995 Oregon               -1.3 
2004 Hawaii               0.5 
 
2001 Maryland             -1.5 
1995 Missouri             0.5 
 
2004 New Jersey           -1.5 
1998 North Carolina       0.5 
 
1992 Connecticut          -1.6 
2001 Georgia              0.5 
 
1995 Ontario -1.6 
2007 North Carolina       0.5 
 
1992 Delaware             -1.6 
1992 Vermont              0.5 
 
2010 Maryland             -1.6 
1995 Rhode Island         0.4 
 
1998 Ontario -1.6 
1992 Kentucky             0.4 
 
1995 Delaware             -1.7 
1998 Indiana              0.4 
 
2007 Ontario -1.7 
1995 Hawaii               0.4 
 
2007 Maryland             -1.7 
2007 Wisconsin            0.4 
 
1992 Alberta -1.7 
2007 British Columbia 0.4 
 
1995 Minnesota            -1.8 
2001 Ohio                 0.3 
 
1998 Delaware             -1.8 
1992 Rhode Island         0.3 
 
2007 New Jersey           -1.8 
2004 Kentucky             0.3 
 
2010 New Jersey           -1.9 
2001 Michigan             0.3 
 
2004 Ontario -1.9 
2007 Rhode Island         0.3 
 
2001 Ontario -1.9 
1995 California           0.2 
 
2004 Maryland             -1.9 
1992 North Carolina       0.2 
 
1998 Minnesota            -1.9 
1995 Nevada               0.2 
 
1995 British Colum -2.0 
1995 Kentucky             0.2 
 
1995 Maryland             -2.0 
2004 Georgia              0.2 
 
2001 New Jersey           -2.1 
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2004 North Carolina       0.2 
 
1992 Maryland             -2.1 
2001 Wisconsin            0.2 
 
1992 New York             -2.2 
2004 Indiana              0.2 
 
1992 Massachusett    -2.2 
2007 Pennsylvania         0.1 
 
1998 Maryland             -2.2 
2010 Ohio                 0.1 
 
1995 New York             -2.3 
1992 Nevada               0.1 
 
1992 Ontario -2.4 
1998 Pennsylvania         0.1 
 
2001 California           -2.5 
2004 Pennsylvania         0.1 
 
1995 Massachusett        -2.5 
1995 North Carolina       0.1 
 
1998 New York             -2.5 
1992 Georgia              0.1 
 
2001 Alberta -2.5 
2004 Michigan             0.1 
 
2004 Massachusett        -2.6 
1998 Georgia              0.1 
 
2010 Massachusett        -2.8 
1995 Utah                 0.1 
 
2007 Massachusett        -2.9 
1992 Pennsylvania         0.0 
 
1995 Connecticut          -2.9 
2010 Wisconsin            0.0 
 
1995 Alberta -2.9 
2001 Quebec 0.0 
 
2004 Alberta -3.2 
1995 Pennsylvania         0.0 
 
2004 New York             -3.3 
2004 Colorado             0.0 
 
1998 Massachusett        -3.5 
1992 Indiana              -0.1 
 
2001 New York             -3.6 
2007 Ohio                 -0.1 
 
1998 Alberta -3.7 
1995 Georgia              -0.1 
 
2004 Connecticut          -3.7 
2004 Rhode Island         -0.1 
 
2010 New York             -4.1 
2004 Wisconsin            -0.1 
 
2007 New York             -4.2 
2007 Illinois             -0.2 
 
2007 Alberta -4.4 
2010 Pennsylvania         -0.2 
 
2010 Connecticut          -4.5 
2010 Delaware             -0.2 
 
2007 Connecticut          -4.6 
2007 Colorado             -0.2 
 
1998 Connecticut          -4.6 
2001 Oregon               -0.2 
 
2001 Massachusett        -4.8 
2010 Illinois             -0.3 
 
2001 Connecticut          -5.4 
2010 Colorado             -0.3 
 
2010 Alberta -5.7 
1995 Indiana              -0.3 
     
Notes: The full sample is divided into two, on the basis of the median value of 1.1% for the RNFT variable. 
Jurisdictions with median values above 1.1% are named below-average jurisdictions, while those below are 
tagged above-average jurisdictions.  
Appendix 3.5: Net Recipients (Full Sample) 
Year Jurisdiction RNFT (%) 
 
Year Jurisdiction RNFT (%) 
1995 Newfoundland 20.3 
 
2004 Oklahoma             1.7 
1998 Newfoundland 19.1 
 
2001 Kansas               1.7 
1992 Newfoundland 19.1 
 
2010 Oklahoma             1.7 
1995 Prince Edward 16.7 
 
1995 Wyoming              1.7 
1992 Prince Edward 16.4 
 
1995 Washington           1.6 
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2001 Newfoundland 15.9 
 
2004 Montana              1.6 
1998 Prince Edward 15.2 
 
2001 Vermont              1.6 
2001 Prince Edward 14.7 
 
1998 Hawaii               1.6 
2007 Newfoundland 13.5 
 
1998 South Carolina       1.6 
2004 Newfoundland 13.0 
 
1998 Maine                1.6 
2007 Prince Edward 12.3 
 
1992 New Hampshire        1.6 
2004 Prince Edward 11.7 
 
2010 North Dakota         1.6 
2001 New Brunswick 11.5 
 
2010 New Hampshire        1.6 
2010 Newfoundland 11.3 
 
2001 Indiana              1.6 
1998 New Brunswick 11.2 
 
1992 Alabama 1.6 
1992 New Brunswick 11.2 
 
1995 Alaska               1.5 
2010 Prince Edward 11.2 
 
1992 Nebraska             1.5 
1995 New Brunswick 10.6 
 
2001 Maine                1.5 
2007 New Brunswick 10.2 
 
2010 Quebec 1.5 
2004 New Brunswick 10.0 
 
1992 Montana              1.5 
1998 Nova Scotia 9.5 
 
2007 Idaho                1.5 
1995 Nova Scotia 9.3 
 
1995 Montana              1.5 
2010 New Brunswick 8.8 
 
1995 New Hampshire        1.5 
2001 Nova Scotia 8.1 
 
1995 Alabama 1.5 
1992 Nova Scotia 7.9 
 
2007 Florida              1.5 
2007 Nova Scotia 7.2 
 
2004 South Carolina       1.4 
2001 Saskatchewan 6.4 
 
2010 Iowa                 1.4 
2004 Nova Scotia 6.3 
 
2001 Missouri             1.4 
1995 Saskatchewan 5.7 
 
2004 British Columbia 1.4 
2010 Nova Scotia 5.6 
 
1995 Maine                1.4 
2004 Saskatchewan 5.6 
 
2004 Arizona              1.4 
2001 South Dakota         5.3 
 
2007 Montana              1.4 
1992 Manitoba 5.0 
 
2007 Arizona              1.4 
2007 Saskatchewan 5.0 
 
1998 Vermont              1.4 
2001 Mississippi          4.9 
 
2004 New Hampshire        1.4 
1998 South Dakota         4.8 
 
2010 British Columbia 1.4 
2001 North Dakota         4.7 
 
2001 Nevada               1.3 
2001 Tennessee            4.7 
 
1995 Nebraska             1.3 
1992 Saskatchewan 4.4 
 
1992 Washington           1.3 
1998 Saskatchewan 4.4 
 
2007 Missouri             1.3 
2004 South Dakota         4.1 
 
1992 Quebec 1.3 
2007 South Dakota         4.1 
 
1998 Washington           1.3 
1998 Mississippi          4.0 
 
2010 Nebraska             1.3 
2001 Manitoba 4.0 
 
2007 Maine                1.3 
1992 South Dakota         4.0 
 
1998 Arizona              1.2 
2007 Manitoba 4.0 
 
2010 Hawaii               1.2 
1998 North Dakota         3.9 
 
1995 Oklahoma             1.2 
2004 Manitoba 3.9 
 
2007 Kentucky             1.2 
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2007 Mississippi          3.9 
 
2007 Vermont              1.2 
2001 Louisiana            3.8 
 
2010 West Virginia        1.2 
2001 Alaska               3.7 
 
2010 Vermont              1.2 
2001 New Mexico           3.7 
 
1995 South Carolina       1.2 
1995 South Dakota         3.7 
 
1995 Arizona              1.1 
2010 Tennessee            3.7 
 
1992 Arizona              1.1 
2001 West Virginia        3.6 
 
1992 South Carolina       1.1 
2007 Tennessee            3.6 
 
1998 Quebec 1.1 
2010 South Dakota         3.6 
 
1998 New Hampshire        1.1 
1992 Mississippi          3.5 
 
2004 Utah                 1.1 
1998 Tennessee            3.4 
 
2010 Utah                 1.1 
2004 Tennessee            3.3 
 
2007 Michigan             1.0 
2001 Alabama 3.3 
 
2001 North Carolina       1.0 
1995 Manitoba 3.3 
 
2007 Kansas               1.0 
2001 Arkansas             3.3 
 
2001 Wyoming              1.0 
2010 Mississippi          3.1 
 
2010 Wyoming              1.0 
1995 Mississippi          3.1 
 
1992 Maine                1.0 
2004 North Dakota         3.1 
 
1995 Vermont              1.0 
2007 North Dakota         3.1 
 
2010 Michigan             1.0 
2004 Mississippi          3.1 
 
2004 Kansas               1.0 
2001 Montana              3.0 
 
2004 Vermont              1.0 
1998 West Virginia        3.0 
 
2010 Maine                1.0 
2007 Alaska               3.0 
 
2010 Montana              0.9 
2001 Texas                2.9 
 
2007 Nevada               0.9 
1998 New Mexico           2.9 
 
2007 Wyoming              0.9 
1992 North Dakota         2.8 
 
2010 Missouri             0.9 
1992 Tennessee            2.8 
 
2004 Nevada               0.9 
2001 Iowa                 2.8 
 
2004 Missouri             0.9 
2007 Louisiana            2.7 
 
2001 British Columbia 0.9 
2001 Oklahoma             2.7 
 
2010 Georgia              0.9 
1998 Louisiana            2.7 
 
2010 Kentucky             0.9 
1998 Manitoba 2.7 
 
1998 Utah                 0.9 
1998 Arkansas             2.7 
 
1992 Alaska               0.8 
2007 Texas                2.6 
 
1998 Kansas               0.8 
2004 Alaska               2.6 
 
1998 Kentucky             0.8 
1995 Tennessee            2.6 
 
1998 Missouri             0.8 
1998 Alaska               2.6 
 
1995 Quebec 0.8 
1995 North Dakota         2.6 
 
1992 Idaho                0.8 
1995 Louisiana            2.6 
 
2007 Indiana              0.8 
2004 Texas                2.6 
 
2001 Washington           0.8 
2001 South Carolina       2.6 
 
2007 Utah                 0.7 
1998 Montana              2.5 
 
2010 Indiana              0.7 
2007 New Mexico           2.5 
 
2004 Maine                0.7 
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1992 Louisiana            2.5 
 
2007 Hawaii               0.7 
1998 Texas                2.4 
 
1998 Wyoming              0.7 
2010 New Mexico           2.4 
 
1995 Iowa                 0.7 
2007 Arkansas             2.3 
 
1998 Nevada               0.7 
2001 Nebraska             2.3 
 
2010 North Carolina       0.7 
1998 Alabama 2.3 
 
2004 Quebec 0.7 
2004 Louisiana            2.3 
 
1995 Idaho                0.7 
2007 Washington           2.3 
 
1992 Oklahoma             0.7 
1995 Texas                2.2 
 
1992 Kansas               0.6 
2004 New Mexico           2.2 
 
2001 Pennsylvania         0.6 
2010 Texas                2.2 
 
1998 Rhode Island         0.6 
2010 Washington           2.2 
 
2001 New Hampshire        0.6 
2001 Idaho                2.2 
 
1995 Kansas               0.6 
1992 New Mexico           2.2 
 
1992 Missouri             0.6 
2010 Florida              2.2 
 
2010 Kansas               0.6 
2007 West Virginia        2.2 
 
1992 Utah                 0.6 
2010 Manitoba 2.1 
 
1992 Iowa                 0.5 
2010 Arizona              2.1 
 
2001 Rhode Island         0.5 
2010 South Carolina       2.1 
 
2010 Rhode Island         0.5 
1992 Florida              2.1 
 
2007 Georgia              0.5 
2001 Florida              2.1 
 
2004 Hawaii               0.5 
2010 Saskatchewan 2.1 
 
1995 Missouri             0.5 
1995 Florida              2.0 
 
1998 North Carolina       0.5 
1995 New Mexico           2.0 
 
2001 Georgia              0.5 
1992 Arkansas             2.0 
 
2007 North Carolina       0.5 
2007 Iowa                 2.0 
 
1992 Vermont              0.5 
1995 West Virginia        2.0 
 
1995 Rhode Island         0.4 
2004 Washington           2.0 
 
1992 Kentucky             0.4 
2007 Alabama 2.0 
 
1998 Indiana              0.4 
1992 Texas                2.0 
 
1995 Hawaii               0.4 
2010 Alaska               2.0 
 
2007 Wisconsin            0.4 
2010 Alabama 2.0 
 
2007 British Columbia 0.4 
2004 Idaho                2.0 
 
2001 Ohio                 0.3 
2001 Hawaii               2.0 
 
1992 Rhode Island         0.3 
2007 Quebec 1.9 
 
2004 Kentucky             0.3 
2001 Arizona              1.9 
 
2001 Michigan             0.3 
2001 Utah                 1.9 
 
2007 Rhode Island         0.3 
1995 Arkansas             1.9 
 
1995 California           0.2 
2010 Louisiana            1.8 
 
1992 North Carolina       0.2 
2004 Alabama 1.8 
 
1995 Nevada               0.2 
2010 Idaho                1.8 
 
1995 Kentucky             0.2 
1998 Idaho                1.8 
 
2004 Georgia              0.2 
1992 Wyoming              1.8 
 
2004 North Carolina       0.2 
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2004 West Virginia        1.8 
 
2001 Wisconsin            0.2 
2004 Arkansas             1.8 
 
2004 Indiana              0.2 
2007 Oklahoma             1.8 
 
2007 Pennsylvania         0.1 
1998 Iowa                 1.8 
 
2010 Ohio                 0.1 
2004 Iowa                 1.8 
 
1992 Nevada               0.1 
2007 South Carolina       1.8 
 
1998 Pennsylvania         0.1 
2004 Florida              1.8 
 
2004 Pennsylvania         0.1 
2004 Wyoming              1.8 
 
1995 North Carolina       0.1 
2007 Nebraska             1.8 
 
1992 Georgia              0.1 
2007 New Hampshire        1.8 
 
2004 Michigan             0.1 
2010 Nevada               1.7 
 
1998 Georgia              0.1 
1998 Oklahoma             1.7 
 
1995 Utah                 0.1 
1992 West Virginia        1.7 
 
1992 Pennsylvania         0.0 
1998 Nebraska             1.7 
 
2010 Wisconsin            0.0 
2010 Arkansas             1.7 
 
2001 Quebec 0.0 
1998 Florida              1.7 
 
1995 Pennsylvania         0.0 
2004 Nebraska             1.7 
 
2004 Colorado             0.0 
2001 Kentucky             1.7 
     
Notes: Full sample is divided into two, on the basis of the sign of the RNFT variable. Jurisdictions with 
positive RNFTs are called net recipients while those with negative values are called net contributors. 
 
Appendix 3.6: Net Contributors (Full Sample) 
Year Jurisdiction RNFT (%) 
 
Year Jurisdiction RNFT (%) 
1992 Indiana              -0.1 
 
2010 California           -1.2 
2007 Ohio                 -0.1 
 
2007 California           -1.3 
1995 Georgia              -0.1 
 
1992 Minnesota            -1.3 
2004 Rhode Island         -0.1 
 
1998 New Jersey           -1.3 
2004 Wisconsin            -0.1 
 
1995 New Jersey           -1.3 
2007 Illinois             -0.2 
 
1995 Oregon               -1.3 
2010 Pennsylvania         -0.2 
 
2001 Maryland             -1.5 
2010 Delaware             -0.2 
 
2004 New Jersey           -1.5 
2007 Colorado             -0.2 
 
1992 Connecticut          -1.6 
2001 Oregon               -0.2 
 
1995 Ontario -1.6 
2010 Illinois             -0.3 
 
1992 Delaware             -1.6 
2010 Colorado             -0.3 
 
2010 Maryland             -1.6 
1995 Indiana              -0.3 
 
1998 Ontario -1.6 
1998 Virginia             -0.3 
 
1995 Delaware             -1.7 
2004 Illinois             -0.3 
 
2007 Ontario -1.7 
1992 Michigan             -0.3 
 
2007 Maryland             -1.7 
2001 Illinois             -0.3 
 
1992 Alberta -1.7 
1992 Virginia             -0.4 
 
1995 Minnesota            -1.8 
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1992 Colorado             -0.4 
 
1998 Delaware             -1.8 
1992 California           -0.4 
 
2007 New Jersey           -1.8 
1998 Ohio                 -0.4 
 
2010 New Jersey           -1.9 
1992 Ohio                 -0.4 
 
2004 Ontario -1.9 
1995 Virginia             -0.4 
 
2001 Ontario -1.9 
2001 Delaware             -0.5 
 
2004 Maryland             -1.9 
2001 Colorado             -0.5 
 
1998 Minnesota            -1.9 
2010 Oregon               -0.5 
 
1995 British Colum -2.0 
2004 Oregon               -0.5 
 
1995 Maryland             -2.0 
1992 Illinois             -0.5 
 
2001 New Jersey           -2.1 
1998 California           -0.5 
 
1992 Maryland             -2.1 
2007 Delaware             -0.6 
 
1992 New York             -2.2 
2004 Delaware             -0.6 
 
1992 Massachusetts        -2.2 
2007 Oregon               -0.6 
 
1998 Maryland             -2.2 
2001 Minnesota            -0.6 
 
1995 New York             -2.3 
1995 Ohio                 -0.6 
 
1992 Ontario -2.4 
1992 Wisconsin            -0.6 
 
2001 California           -2.5 
2010 Ontario -0.7 
 
1995 Massachusetts        -2.5 
1998 Illinois             -0.7 
 
1998 New York             -2.5 
1995 Colorado             -0.7 
 
2001 Alberta -2.5 
1998 Michigan             -0.7 
 
2004 Massachusetts        -2.6 
1995 Illinois             -0.7 
 
2010 Massachusetts        -2.8 
1998 Oregon               -0.7 
 
2007 Massachusetts        -2.9 
1998 Colorado             -0.7 
 
1995 Connecticut          -2.9 
1998 Wisconsin            -0.8 
 
1995 Alberta -2.9 
1992 Oregon               -0.8 
 
2004 Alberta -3.2 
2004 Ohio                 -0.8 
 
2004 New York             -3.3 
2007 Virginia             -0.8 
 
1998 Massachusetts        -3.5 
2004 California           -0.8 
 
2001 New York             -3.6 
2007 Minnesota            -0.9 
 
1998 Alberta -3.7 
1995 Michigan             -0.9 
 
2004 Connecticut          -3.7 
1995 Wisconsin            -0.9 
 
2010 New York             -4.1 
1998 British Colum -1.0 
 
2007 New York             -4.2 
2004 Virginia             -1.0 
 
2007 Alberta -4.4 
2001 Virginia             -1.0 
 
2010 Connecticut          -4.5 
2004 Minnesota            -1.0 
 
2007 Connecticut          -4.6 
2010 Virginia             -1.0 
 
1998 Connecticut          -4.6 
1992 New Jersey           -1.1 
 
2001 Massachusetts        -4.8 
1992 British Colum -1.1 
 
2001 Connecticut          -5.4 
2010 Minnesota            -1.2 
 
2010 Alberta -5.7 
1992 Hawaii               -1.2 
    Notes: In Appendix 7, our full sample is divided into two, on the basis of the sign of the RNFT variable. 




Appendix 3.7: US Federal Aid to the States 
 




Appendix 3.8: OLS Estimation Results for Chapter 3 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent Variable lnRRGDP lnRRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRRGDP lnRGDP 
Log of lagged RGDP 
  
0.835***  0.795***  
 
0.913*** 





























 Log of lagged RGDP x NFT 


















 Capital stock 0.018*** 0.017** 0.007 0.003 0.018* 0.023 
 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.017] [0.021] [0.007] [0.018] 
Educational attainment 0.078** 0.076** 0.233 0.219 0.092* 0.410*** 
 
[0.039] [0.038] [0.188] [0.189] [0.050] [0.138] 
Constant -0.036** -0.035** 1.606*** 2.028*** -0.035* 0.779 
 
[0.014] [0.014] [0.227] [0.641] [0.021] [0.831] 
Year dummies No No No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No No No 
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 
R-Squared 0.960 0.960 0.905 0.905 0.962 0.947 
Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%.  RGDP stands for relative GDP per capita; RRGDP stands for relative real GDP per capita; NFT stands for net fiscal transfers; RNFT 
stands for relative net fiscal transfers. 
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Appendices to Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1: Mining, GDP Per Capita and EFI (2008-2010) 
Jurisdiction MGDP (%) RGDP ($'000) EFI 
Wyoming              32.9 67.9 7.6 
Newfoundland 28.3 50.4 7.8 
Alaska               26.4 68.8 7.6 
Alberta 19.2 66.1 8.2 
Saskatchewan 12.7 48.8 7.9 
West Virginia        12.5 34.5 7.3 
Oklahoma             11.3 39.2 7.6 
Texas                9.3 47.7 7.7 
Louisiana            8.8 47.3 7.5 
New Mexico           7.7 39.9 7.3 
Montana              5.4 36.8 7.4 
North Dakota         5.2 48.9 7.5 
Colorado             4.2 50.8 7.6 
Nevada               4.1 45.9 7.6 
Kentucky             3.6 37.3 7.3 
British Columbia 3.0 41.8 7.7 
Utah                 2.8 42.4 7.6 
Nova Scotia 2.4 34.8 7.3 
Arkansas             2.1 35.6 7.4 
Arizona              2.0 39.6 7.4 
Alabama 1.7 36.4 7.4 
Mississippi          1.6 31.7 7.2 
Manitoba 1.6 39.7 7.5 
Idaho                1.6 35.6 7.5 
Kansas               1.4 44.2 7.5 
New Brunswick 1.3 34.9 7.4 
Pennsylvania         1.1 45.4 7.5 
California           0.9 52.8 7.5 
Vermont              0.8 41.3 7.3 
Virginia             0.7 52.1 7.5 
Ohio                 0.6 42.4 7.4 
Minnesota            0.5 50.5 7.5 
Indiana              0.5 42.6 7.5 
Tennessee            0.5 40.0 7.5 
Ontario 0.5 42.3 7.6 
Missouri             0.4 42.4 7.5 
South Dakota         0.4 45.9 7.5 
Quebec 0.4 37.1 7.4 
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Illinois             0.4 50.8 7.6 
Georgia              0.3 42.8 7.6 
Michigan             0.3 38.7 7.4 
North Carolina       0.3 44.0 7.6 
Iowa                 0.2 45.8 7.6 
Wisconsin            0.2 44.2 7.4 
Florida              0.2 39.6 7.4 
Nebraska             0.2 48.6 7.6 
Washington           0.2 53.5 7.5 
Oregon               0.2 48.5 7.6 
South Carolina       0.2 35.9 7.4 
New Hampshire        0.2 46.7 7.6 
Hawaii               0.1 49.5 7.3 
Prince Edward 0.1 31.3 7.2 
Maryland             0.1 53.4 7.5 
New York             0.1 59.5 7.5 
Rhode Island         0.1 45.9 7.3 
Connecticut          0.1 65.0 7.6 
New Jersey           0.1 56.3 7.4 
Massachusetts        0.0 59.8 7.5 
Maine                0.0 38.4 7.3 
Delaware             0.0 62.6 7.7 
 
Notes: Appendix 8 depicts the mining share of GDP (MGDP), real GDP per capita and Economic 
Freedom Index (EFI) for all 60 Canadian and US jurisdictions for the 2008-2010 period, sorted on 
MGDP. As previously discussed, Wyoming and Delaware in the US and Newfoundland and Prince 
Edward Island in Canada take the first and last positions, respectively.  The table also reveals that there 
is actually no much variation in EFI for all the regions. On average though, Canadian provinces seem to 
have a higher level of economic freedom than their US counterparts. 
 
Appendix 4.2: Employment-based Diversity Indices (2008-2010) 
Jurisdiction QGV AGV ENT HHI KRUG 
Massachusetts        2.03 0.85 1.60 0.30 0.15 
Rhode Island         1.86 0.78 1.61 0.29 0.12 
Nevada               1.85 0.85 1.64 0.28 0.19 
New York             1.84 0.89 1.62 0.28 0.13 
Maryland             1.74 0.87 1.64 0.27 0.13 
Florida              1.72 0.85 1.66 0.27 0.14 
Nova Scotia 1.68 0.85 1.70 0.26 0.13 
Hawaii               1.67 0.93 1.62 0.26 0.16 
British Columbia 1.66 0.80 1.74 0.26 0.10 
Virginia             1.61 0.87 1.67 0.26 0.12 
Pennsylvania         1.60 0.78 1.71 0.26 0.09 
New Jersey           1.56 0.81 1.70 0.26 0.10 
California           1.55 0.80 1.72 0.25 0.06 
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Michigan             1.54 0.79 1.70 0.25 0.10 
Newfoundland 1.54 0.82 1.72 0.25 0.20 
Connecticut          1.53 0.81 1.70 0.25 0.10 
Quebec 1.52 0.82 1.75 0.25 0.08 
Ontario 1.51 0.79 1.76 0.25 0.06 
Vermont              1.50 0.81 1.70 0.25 0.11 
New Brunswick 1.50 0.77 1.77 0.25 0.09 
Colorado             1.49 0.81 1.73 0.25 0.09 
Illinois             1.48 0.75 1.73 0.25 0.08 
New Mexico           1.46 0.88 1.71 0.24 0.18 
Ohio                 1.44 0.76 1.73 0.24 0.08 
Minnesota            1.44 0.75 1.72 0.24 0.06 
New Hampshire        1.43 0.78 1.73 0.24 0.11 
Arizona              1.43 0.82 1.74 0.24 0.08 
Georgia              1.36 0.76 1.76 0.23 0.05 
Manitoba 1.36 0.72 1.84 0.24 0.09 
Oregon               1.35 0.76 1.74 0.23 0.07 
Missouri             1.35 0.76 1.73 0.23 0.04 
Prince Edward 1.34 0.76 1.76 0.23 0.23 
Washington           1.33 0.78 1.75 0.23 0.08 
North Carolina       1.32 0.77 1.75 0.23 0.09 
Maine                1.29 0.68 1.70 0.24 0.09 
Tennessee            1.29 0.73 1.76 0.22 0.09 
Delaware             1.28 0.65 1.68 0.25 0.09 
Montana              1.23 0.79 1.76 0.21 0.16 
Alberta 1.23 0.68 1.89 0.22 0.20 
Louisiana            1.22 0.75 1.83 0.22 0.14 
South Carolina       1.22 0.77 1.77 0.22 0.13 
Utah                 1.21 0.76 1.79 0.22 0.09 
West Virginia        1.21 0.80 1.80 0.22 0.19 
Indiana              1.21 0.76 1.78 0.22 0.15 
Wisconsin            1.20 0.75 1.76 0.21 0.15 
Texas                1.17 0.70 1.83 0.21 0.09 
Alaska               1.17 0.82 1.84 0.22 0.35 
Alabama 1.12 0.74 1.80 0.21 0.15 
Saskatchewan 1.12 0.66 1.94 0.21 0.20 
Idaho                1.11 0.73 1.79 0.20 0.11 
Nebraska             1.09 0.71 1.79 0.20 0.10 
Kansas               1.08 0.72 1.81 0.20 0.14 
Kentucky             1.06 0.72 1.81 0.20 0.15 
Mississippi          1.05 0.75 1.81 0.20 0.21 
Oklahoma             1.04 0.73 1.82 0.20 0.18 
South Dakota         1.03 0.72 1.78 0.19 0.11 
Arkansas             1.03 0.71 1.83 0.20 0.17 
Iowa                 1.00 0.69 1.80 0.19 0.14 
North Dakota         0.98 0.74 1.81 0.19 0.19 
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Wyoming              0.80 0.66 1.90 0.17 0.35 
 
Notes: Appendix 9 shows our five diversity measures which are based on the distribution of 
employment across 10 industry sectors; sorted on QGV.  Considering that diversity measures are 
sensitive to the number of industries used, we include four and six broad categories for the goods- and 
services-producing sectors, respectively. Our employment variable is the annual employment in full-
time equivalents, a common indicator for industry structure.  
 
Appendix 4.3: GDP-based Diversity Indices (2008-2010) 
Jurisdiction QGV AGV ENT HHI KRUG 
West Virginia        3.12 1.03 2.19 0.52 0.89 
Delaware             1.47 0.93 1.68 0.25 0.39 
New York             1.36 0.93 1.71 0.24 0.27 
Massachusetts        1.32 0.88 1.72 0.23 0.21 
Rhode Island         1.13 0.86 1.78 0.21 0.19 
Maryland             1.10 0.90 1.78 0.21 0.23 
Connecticut          1.09 0.85 1.78 0.21 0.20 
Virginia             1.09 0.85 1.81 0.21 0.19 
Hawaii               1.03 0.90 1.79 0.20 0.34 
Nevada               1.03 0.75 1.88 0.20 0.25 
Florida              1.00 0.79 1.85 0.20 0.18 
Pennsylvania         1.00 0.77 1.87 0.20 0.11 
New Jersey           0.98 0.76 1.83 0.20 0.15 
Colorado             0.97 0.75 1.91 0.20 0.15 
California           0.95 0.79 1.88 0.20 0.08 
New Hampshire        0.94 0.77 1.84 0.19 0.10 
Illinois             0.87 0.74 1.89 0.19 0.10 
Ontario 0.87 0.78 1.89 0.19 0.15 
Missouri             0.86 0.73 1.91 0.19 0.08 
Washington           0.86 0.77 1.90 0.19 0.10 
Minnesota            0.84 0.73 1.92 0.18 0.09 
Vermont              0.84 0.74 1.91 0.18 0.09 
Oregon               0.84 0.80 1.89 0.18 0.30 
Indiana              0.83 0.75 1.91 0.18 0.34 
Michigan             0.83 0.76 1.89 0.18 0.12 
Maine                0.82 0.73 1.90 0.18 0.09 
British Columbia 0.80 0.69 1.97 0.18 0.14 
Ohio                 0.79 0.76 1.91 0.18 0.11 
Newfoundland 0.78 0.72 1.98 0.18 0.51 
Tennessee            0.78 0.71 1.92 0.18 0.14 
Georgia              0.78 0.70 1.92 0.18 0.07 
North Carolina       0.77 0.81 1.90 0.18 0.21 
Wyoming              0.75 0.63 1.99 0.18 0.72 
Wisconsin            0.75 0.76 1.92 0.17 0.15 
Prince Edward 0.74 0.66 1.95 0.17 0.32 
New Mexico           0.73 0.72 1.97 0.17 0.36 
Arizona              0.73 0.69 1.96 0.17 0.12 
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Quebec 0.71 0.69 1.96 0.17 0.15 
Alaska               0.70 0.72 1.96 0.17 0.74 
Nova Scotia 0.68 0.63 2.02 0.17 0.17 
South Carolina       0.66 0.72 1.94 0.17 0.20 
Utah                 0.64 0.69 1.98 0.16 0.12 
South Dakota         0.61 0.63 2.01 0.16 0.28 
Kansas               0.60 0.66 2.02 0.16 0.18 
Alabama 0.57 0.67 2.01 0.16 0.22 
New Brunswick 0.57 0.56 2.04 0.16 0.17 
Iowa                 0.56 0.67 2.01 0.16 0.24 
Arkansas             0.53 0.60 2.05 0.15 0.18 
Idaho                0.52 0.61 2.06 0.15 0.16 
Montana              0.52 0.61 2.08 0.15 0.29 
Kentucky             0.51 0.63 2.05 0.15 0.24 
Mississippi          0.51 0.63 2.05 0.15 0.28 
Alberta 0.51 0.60 2.11 0.16 0.33 
Manitoba 0.50 0.55 2.08 0.15 0.18 
Nebraska             0.49 0.57 2.05 0.15 0.21 
Texas                0.46 0.52 2.08 0.15 0.25 
Louisiana            0.45 0.56 2.08 0.15 0.35 
Oklahoma             0.45 0.55 2.08 0.14 0.30 
North Dakota         0.28 0.43 2.18 0.13 0.33 
Saskatchewan 0.28 0.44 2.23 0.14 0.39 
 
Notes: Following Appendix 9 above, some authors (e.g. Palan, 2010) suggest the use of an alternative 
variable, other than employment, in the construction of the indices. This is in order to address issues 
related to productivity biases. Appendix 10 therefore shows the same five diversity measures (still 





Appendix 4.4: OLS Estimation Results (Resource-Diversity-Growth Nexus) 
Dependent Variable lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP lnRGDP 
Diversity Index Used Herfindahl Absolute Ogive Quadratic Ogive Entropy Krugman 
Log of lagged RGDP 0.778*** 0.787*** 0.774***  0.763***   0.738***  
  [0.029] [0.023] [0.030] [0.029] [0.019] 
Diversity -0.020 -0.044 0.007 -0.105 0.009 
  [0.116] [0.250] [0.065] [0.302] [0.012] 
Natural resources -0.003 0.009 0.008** -0.007 -0.011** 
  [0.031] [0.014] [0.004] [0.030] [0.005] 
Diversity x natural resources -0.007 0.009 -0.002 0.026 -0.451*** 
  [0.019] [0.03] [0.011] [0.048] [0.133] 
Capital stock 0.044 0.048* 0.041 0.043 0.036 
  [0.028] [0.025] [0.029] [0.029 [0.022] 
Educational attainment 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.196 0.197*** 0.228*** 
  [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.032] 
Constant 2.703 2.636*** 2.787*** 2.961*** 3.110*** 
  [0.426] [0.291] [0.356] [0.381] [0.00] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No No No No 
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 
R-Squared 0.895 0.595 0.895 0.896 0.902 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; no sign means not significant at 1%, 5% and 
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